Recall the Myerson's model (the model of weak institutions) discussed in Section 6. We did not discuss so much the effect of the leader's exogenous payoff R for surviving the second period. Assume pr 4c - 2r. Complete the following sentence by choosing the appropriate words in (i) and (ii). "If R increases, the leader is (i) more/less likely to survive without

Recall the Myerson's model (the model of weak institutions) discussed in Section 6. We did not discuss so much the effect of the leader's exogenous payoff R for surviving the second period. Assume pr 4c - 2r. Complete the following sentence by choosing the appropriate words in (i) and (ii). "If R increases, the leader is (i) more/less likely to survive without

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.6P

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