RobbinGood sells financial trades to retail traders (r) and institutional traders (i) whose demand curves forfinancial trades are given by the following equationsDemand (r): Q, = 1000 – 70P,thousand tradesDemand (i): Qi = (1000/6) – (70/6)P; thousand tradesand the marginal cost is a constant $1 per trade for either kind of trader.64. Suppose RobbinGood decides to set a single price for both groups, and maximize profits accordingly.Then, RobbinGood will sell [ Answer64 ] thousand trades.

Given: The demand curve for retail traders is: Qr = 1000 - 70Pr The demand curve for institutional…

RobbinGood sells financial trades to retail traders (r) and institutional traders (i) whose demand curves for financial trades are given by the following equations Demand (r): Q, = 1000 – 70P, Demand (i): Qi = (1000/6) – (70/6)P; thousand trades thousand trades and the marginal cost is a constant $1 per trade for either kind of trader. 64. Suppose RobbinGood decides to set a single price for both groups, and maximize profits accordingly. Then, RobbinGood will sell [ Answerf64 ] thousand trades.

RobbinGood sells financial trades to retail traders (r) and institutional traders (i) whose demand curves for financial trades are given by the following equations Demand (r): Q, = 1000 – 70P, Demand (i): Qi = (1000/6) – (70/6)P; thousand trades thousand trades and the marginal cost is a constant $1 per trade for either kind of trader. 64. Suppose RobbinGood decides to set a single price for both groups, and maximize profits accordingly. Then, RobbinGood will sell [ Answerf64 ] thousand trades.

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter18: Auctions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 6MC

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