2 questions refer to the games above. (Fun fact, as an aside: the payoffs reflect the frequencies of the letter pairs formed by the names of the strategies in the English language, per 10,000 words.) iiiRow PlayerO ORow PlayerECONGON4,92106, 60G15, 280,27, 2392,4Column PlayerA24, 1816, 1Column PlayerA110,031, 3316,140, 181M47, 680,148, 297,2S9,428, 57R169, 13311, 1084, 553, 16H35, 111, 49In game ii, strategy C is dominated for Row by strategy...O E.Oo.ON.O and N, when they are mixed so that each is played with probability 1/2.In game ii, strategies G and M are dominated for Column by strategy...O A only.O R only.O S only.OR or S.S115, 741, 1728, 5733, 10

Method of iterated elimination of dominated strategy. Sometimes we can get Nash equilibrium by the…

Row Player E C O N G 15, 28 0,2 7,23 92,4 Column Player A 110,0 31, 33 16, 1 40, 181 M 47,68 0, 1 48, 29 7,2 R 169, 133 11, 10 84, 55 3, 16 S 115, 74 1, 17 28, 57 33, 10 In game ii, strategy C is dominated for Row by strategy... E. O. N. O and N, when they are mixed so that each is played with probability 1/2. In game ii, strategies G and M are dominated for Column by strategy... A only. R only. S only. R or S.

Row Player E C O N G 15, 28 0,2 7,23 92,4 Column Player A 110,0 31, 33 16, 1 40, 181 M 47,68 0, 1 48, 29 7,2 R 169, 133 11, 10 84, 55 3, 16 S 115, 74 1, 17 28, 57 33, 10 In game ii, strategy C is dominated for Row by strategy... E. O. N. O and N, when they are mixed so that each is played with probability 1/2. In game ii, strategies G and M are dominated for Column by strategy... A only. R only. S only. R or S.

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter17: Making Decisions With Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 17.5IP

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8) Three decision makers have assessed utilities for the problem whose payoff table appearsbelow.s1 s2 s3d1 500 100 -400d2 200 150 100d3 -100 200 300probability.2 .6 .2Indifference Probability for PersonPayoff A B C300 .95 .68 .45200 .94 .64 .32150 .91 .62 .28100 .89 .60 .22-100 .75 .45 .10a. Plot the utility function for each decision maker.b. Characterize each decision maker's attitude toward risk.c. Which decision will each person prefer?
1.4. Suppose you are against one of two alternatives but 90% of theelectorate disagrees with your position and favors that option. Is there avoting method that is anonymous, neutral, and monotone that preventsthat option from being selected as the winning alternative?
efer to the following table showing the probability distribution of payoffs from an activity to answer the question below: Units Payoff Probability 1 $30 10% 2 40 25% 3 60 30% 4 50 20% 5 10 15% What is the expected value?
Time remaining: 01 :51 :45 Economics A dealer decides to sell an antique automobile by means of an English auction with a reservation price of $900. There are two bidders. The dealer believes that there are only three possible values, $7,200, $3,600, and $900, that each bidder’s willingness to pay might take. Each bidder has a probability of 1/3 of having each of these willingnesses to pay, and the probabilities for each of the two bidders are independent of the other’s valuation. Assuming that the two bidders bid rationally and do not collude, the dealer’s expected revenue from selling the car is approximately Group of answer choices $3,600. $2,500. $3,900. $5,400. $7,200.
** Please be advsed that this is practice only from previous yeasr *** Answers: (a) There are no Nash equilibria.(b) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and no mixed strategy Nash equilibria.(c) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and one mixed strategy Nash equilibria with p = 1/2 and q = 1/2.(d) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and one mixed strategy Nash equilibria with p = 1/2 and q = 3/4.(e) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and one mixed strategy Nash equilibria with p = 3/4 and q = 1/2.
4.25 The Gorman Manufacturing Company must decide whether to manufacture a component part at its Milan, Michigan, plant or purchase the component part from a supplier. The resulting profit is dependent upon the demand for the product. The following payoff table shows the projected profit (in thousands of dollars): State of Nature Low Demand Medium Demand High Demand Decision Alternative s1 s2 s3 Manufacture, d1 -20 40 100 Purchase, d2 10 45 70 The state-of-nature probabilities are P(s1) = 0.35, P(s2) = 0.35, and P(s3) = 0.30. Use a decision tree to recommend a decision.Recommended decision: Use EVPI to determine whether Gorman should attempt to obtain a better estimate of demand.EVPI: $
Cameron and Luke are playing a game called ”Race to 10”. Cameron goes first, and the players take turns choosing either 1 or 2. In each turn, they add the new number to a running total. The player who brings the total to exactly 10 wins the game. a) If both Cameron and Luke play optimally, who will win the game? Does the game have a first-mover advantage or a second-mover advantage? b) Suppose the game is modified to ”Race to 11” (i.e, the player who reaches 11 first wins). Who will win the game if both players play their optimal strategies? What if the game is ”Race to 12”? Does the result change? c) Consider the general version of the game called ”Race to n,” where n is a positive integer greater than 0. What are the conditions on n such that the game has a first mover advantage? What are the conditions on n such that the game has a second mover advantage?
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You and a coworker are assigned a team project on which your likelihood or a promotion will be decidedon. It is now the night before the project is due and neither has yet to start it. You both want toreceive a promotion next year, but you both also want to go to your company’s holiday party that night.Each of you wants to maximize his or her own happiness (likelihood of a promotion and mingling withyour colleagues “on the company’s dime”). If you both work, you deliver an outstanding presentation.If you both go to the party, your presentation is mediocre. If one parties and the other works, yourpresentation is above average. Partying increases happiness by 25 units. Working on the project addszero units to happiness. Happiness is also affected by your chance of a promotion, which is depends on howgood your project is. An outstanding presentation gives 40 units of happiness to each of you; an aboveaverage presentation gives 30 units of happiness; a mediocre presentation gives 10 units…
you and a friend decide to run a three mile race. If you agree to run together, you keep up with himfor the first mile, but you overexert yourself and run the last two miles at slower paces on your own. Tomake up for lost time, your friend runs the last two miles at a faster pace. Your mile times are 6:30, 7:00,and 7:30. Your friend’s times are 6:30, 6:00, and 6:00. If you both agree to run on your own, you run aconstant pace of 7:05 while your friend runs at a constant pace of 6:05. If you want to run together butyour friend wants to run solo, he runs his constant pace of 6:05. You, on the other hand, want to showhim that you can run faster, but you end up overexerting yourself after the first mile. You run times of6:20, 7:05, and 7:30. If he wants to run together but you do not, you both run at your pace of 7:05. Thissituation can be turned into an economic game, with the payoffs the overall race times. You each wantto run the fastest time you possibly can.(a) Who are the players in…
64. (This problem assumes knowledge of the basic rulesof baseball.) George Lindsey (1959) looked at boxscores of more than 1000 baseball games and foundthe expected number of runs scored in an inning foreach on-base and out situation to be as listed in the fileP09_64.xlsx. For example, if a team has a man on firstbase with one out, it scores 0.5 run on average untilthe end of the inning. You can assume throughout thisproblem that the team batting wants to maximize theexpected number of runs scored in the inning.a. Use this data to explain why, in most cases,bunting with a man on first base and no outs isa bad decision. In what situation might buntingwith a man on first base and no outs be a gooddecision?b. Assume there is a man on first base with one out.What probability of stealing second makes an attempted steal a good idea?
There are N women that all share the same toilet every day in an office building. Each sits on the toilet to use it and must decide whether to put down toilet paper on top of the toilet or sit directly on it. The toilet is cleaned just once a day at a random time and no one knows when this is done. It takes time and effort to put down toilet paper so if she knew the toilet was clean (either because she is the first to use it after it was cleaned or if all previous users after it was last cleaned put down toilet paper) she would rather not put down toilet paper. However, if she believes the toilet is dirty she would rather put down toilet paper. a) Is this game best described as simultaneous or sequential move? b) How many equilibria are there in this game? c) Briefly provide a general description of the equilibria. Which equilibrium/equilibria provide the highest social payoff?