Suppose a demand curve has the form x = 100 - 10p. If the market price is $5, how would a $200 deductible impact quantity demanded? A. The consumer will behave in the same manner as he would with no insurance and consume 50 services. B.The consumer will behave in the same manner as he would with no insurance and consume 0 services. C.The consumer will behave as if the market price is $0 and consume 50 services. D.The consumer will behave as if the market price is $0 and consume 100 services.

Suppose a demand curve has the form x = 100 - 10p. If the market price is $5, how would a $200 deductible impact quantity demanded? A. The consumer will behave in the same manner as he would with no insurance and consume 50 services. B.The consumer will behave in the same manner as he would with no insurance and consume 0 services. C.The consumer will behave as if the market price is $0 and consume 50 services. D.The consumer will behave as if the market price is $0 and consume 100 services.

Microeconomics A Contemporary Intro

10th Edition

ISBN:9781285635101

Author:MCEACHERN

Publisher:MCEACHERN

Chapter14: Transaction Costs, Imperfect Information, And Behavioral Economics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 14PAE

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