Suppose society consists of two individuals, A and B, who must split a fixed income of $150. Individual A's marginal utility of income is given by MUA-400-IA and individual B's marginal utility of income is given by MUB-600-61n. Suppose the social welfare function is W=UA+UB. What if the social welfare function is, instead, W=min(Ua,UB). 44. Then equity in the distribution of income would be synonymous with equality of

Suppose society consists of two individuals, A and B, who must split a fixed income of $150. Individual A's marginal utility of income is given by MUA-400-IA and individual B's marginal utility of income is given by MUB-600-61n. Suppose the social welfare function is W=UA+UB. What if the social welfare function is, instead, W=min(Ua,UB). 44. Then equity in the distribution of income would be synonymous with equality of

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter19: Externalities And Public Goods

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 19.10P

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