Suppose that a union and a firm operate in an efficient bargaining framework, with equal bargaining powers (so the term for bargaining power in the Nash product equals one). The union is assumed to have a utility function, specified net of its threat point, of the form U = (w − )L. The firm gains satisfaction from profits according to the utility function U(π) = π with the threat point, , equal to zero. (a) Derive the equation for the contract curve. (b) Show that the level of employment is determined independently of the equilibrium value of wages. (c) Show that changes in the degree of bargaining power affect wages but not employment.

Suppose that a union and a firm operate in an efficient bargaining framework, with equal bargaining powers (so the term for bargaining power in the Nash product equals one). The union is assumed to have a utility function, specified net of its threat point, of the form U = (w − )L. The firm gains satisfaction from profits according to the utility function U(π) = π with the threat point, , equal to zero. (a) Derive the equation for the contract curve. (b) Show that the level of employment is determined independently of the equilibrium value of wages. (c) Show that changes in the degree of bargaining power affect wages but not employment.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter16: Labor Markets

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 16.8P

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