Suppose that there is a 2.2% chance a planet will develop life, a 3.1% chance that the life will evolve into complex organisms, a 6.1% chance that complex organisms develop into advanced civilizations, and an X% chance that the advanced civilizations become intergalactic. If there are 1,351,006 planets, and we observe only 1 intergalactic civilization, what is the expected value of X? Note that X is in percentage form (e.g. 30.51 not 0.3051). You can round to two decimal places, but do not round until your final answer!

Suppose that there is a 2.2% chance a planet will develop life, a 3.1% chance that the life will evolve into complex organisms, a 6.1% chance that complex organisms develop into advanced civilizations, and an X% chance that the advanced civilizations become intergalactic. If there are 1,351,006 planets, and we observe only 1 intergalactic civilization, what is the expected value of X? Note that X is in percentage form (e.g. 30.51 not 0.3051). You can round to two decimal places, but do not round until your final answer!

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.7P

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