Suppose that we have numerical representations (V1, ... , VI) for the preferences (≻i) of our I consumers, and we are using a weighted utilitarian social welfare functional for some given collection of weights (ai) to make social choices. Show that we can change to the (equal-weighted) utilitarian social welfare functional without changing the choices that are made by changing at the same time the numerical representations of the preferences (≻i).s

Suppose that we have numerical representations (V1, ... , VI) for the preferences (≻i) of our I consumers, and we are using a weighted utilitarian social welfare functional for some given collection of weights (ai) to make social choices. Show that we can change to the (equal-weighted) utilitarian social welfare functional without changing the choices that are made by changing at the same time the numerical representations of the preferences (≻i).s

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter4: Utility Maximization And Choice

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 4.11P

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