Suppose there are two consumers, Az B. The utility functions of each consumer are given by kem xong U₂XX-X²² Therefore For consumer A: MU-2XY; MU, -X² For consumer B: MU-Y²: MU, -2XY The initial endowments are A:X-60: Y-150 B.X-45; Y-75 Suppose the price of Y, Py-1. Calculate the price of X, P, that will lead to a competitive equilibrium How much of each good does each consumer demand in equilibrium? Consumer A's demand for X: Consumer A's demand for Y Consumer 8's demand for X Consumer B's demand for Y ts) What is the marginal rate of substitution for consumer A at the competitive equilibrium

Suppose there are two consumers, Az B. The utility functions of each consumer are given by kem xong U₂XX-X²² Therefore For consumer A: MU-2XY; MU, -X² For consumer B: MU-Y²: MU, -2XY The initial endowments are A:X-60: Y-150 B.X-45; Y-75 Suppose the price of Y, Py-1. Calculate the price of X, P, that will lead to a competitive equilibrium How much of each good does each consumer demand in equilibrium? Consumer A's demand for X: Consumer A's demand for Y Consumer 8's demand for X Consumer B's demand for Y ts) What is the marginal rate of substitution for consumer A at the competitive equilibrium

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter13: General Equilibrium And Welfare

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 13.5P

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Consider an economy with 2 goods and 2 identical agents, each of whom has the following utility function, u (x1; x2) = ln x1 + 2 ln x2. The aggregate endowments of the 2 goods are given by (1; 2). Suppose there is a social planner who cares about agents equally.(a) Set up the plannerís problem.(b) Calculate the first-best outcome 2. Consider an economy with 2 goods and 2 identical agents, each of whom has thefollowing utility function, 11(31, 3:2) = In 3:; + 2111332. The aggregate endowments ofthe 2 goods are given by (1, 2). Suppose there is a. social planner who cares aboutagents equally. (a) Set up the planner’s problem.(b) Calculate the ﬁrst-best outcome (11.6., the social planner’s solution).
James's preferences over cake, c, and money, m, can be represented by the utility functionu (c, m) = c + m + µ (c − rc) + µ (m − rm)where rc is his cake reference point, rm is his money reference point, and the function µ (·) isdefined as µ (z) = z , z ≥ 0 and λz, z < 0 where λ > 0. 1. If his reference point is the status quo (that is, his initial endowment), what is themaximum price Sam would be willing to pay to buy a cake?2. If his reference point is the status quo, what is the minimum price Sam would be willingto accept to sell a cake he already owned?
Student question Time Left :00:09:43Suppose there are two consumers, A and B. The utility functions of each consumer are given by: UA(X,Y) = 2X + Y UB(X,Y) = Min(X,Y) The initial endowments are: A: X = 5; Y = 3 B: X = 2; Y = 2 a. Illustrate the initial endowments in an Edgeworth Box. Be sure to label the Edgeworth Box carefully and accurately, and make sure the dimensions of the box are correct. Also, draw each consumer’s indifference curve that runs through the initial endowments. Is this initial endowment Pareto Efficient? b. Now suppose Consumer A gets all of both goods. Is this allocation Pareto Efficient? (You do not need to draw a new graph or illustrate this on the existing graph. Simply answer “yes” or “no.”) c. Now suppose Consumer B gets all of both goods. Is this allocation Pareto Efficient? (You do not need to draw a new graph or illustrate this on the existing graph. Simply answer “yes” or “no.”)
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A possible explanation for the indecency might be the fact that the consumers are not all alive at the same time and therefore some mutually advantageous trades cannot occur. Consider an economy where consumer t receives an endowment of 1 unit of the single consumption good at time t and obtains utility only from consumption at times t and t + 1. All consumers meet at time 0 to trade. What is the equilibrium? Is exigency restored?
Heterogeneity in an endowment economy Suppose we have two typesof households: A and B. The utility maximization problem for a consumerof type i is max InCi,t+β ln Ci,t+1 Ct,Ct+1subject to Ci,t +Ci,t+1/ 1 + rt = Yi,t + Yi,t+1 / 1 + rt Note that the A and B households have the same discount rate and the same utility function. The only thing that is possibly different is their endowments. 1, Write down the Euler equation for households A and B.
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1.) In an endowment economy with market exchange, let two consumers have preferences given by the utility function U^{h}=(x_{1}^{h})^{a}*(x_{2}^{h})^{1-a}for consumer h (1,2) with endowments given by\omega _{1}^{1}=6, \omega _{2}^{1}=4, \omega_{1}^{2}=4, and \omega_{2}^{2}=6. a.) Calculate the consumers' demand functions. b. Selecting good 2 as the measure of value (i.e. p2=1) and with alpha=1/4, find the equilibrium price of good 1 which implies equilibrium levels of consumption of both goods for both consumers. c. Demonstrate whether both consumers' indifference curves are tangential at the equilibrium. Demonstrate whether both consumers' indifference curves are tangential at the initial endowment.
Can you help me with this question. Im finding it quite difficult. In a two-good economy there are two equal-sized groups of people: type a have preferences given by 2 log(xa1) + log(xa2) and type b have preferenceslog(xb1)+2log(xb2) where xhi means consumption by a type h person of good i. The division of property is as follows: each a-person has an endowment of (30, k) units of the two goods; each b-person has an endowment of (60, 210−k) units, where k is some given number between 0 and 210. Assume that there is no production and that people can freely exchange goods to maximise their utility. If there is a competitive equilibrium, what are the individuals’ incomes (ya, yb) in equilibrium as a function of k?
Which of the follwoing theoretical results is concerned with the relationship of factor endowments and the distribution of payoffs in an economy? Rybczynski Theorem Ricardian Equivalence Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem Stolper-Samuelson Theorem