The inverse demand for milk is, PD = 79 -2.70. Now suppose that the market in the previous question was run by a cartel. The cartel restricts quantity in order to maximize industry profits. In other words, it acts like a monopolist. The marginal cost of milk is, MC(Q) = 12 + 1.20. What is maximum producers surplus? Answer:

The inverse demand for milk is, PD = 79 -2.70. Now suppose that the market in the previous question was run by a cartel. The cartel restricts quantity in order to maximize industry profits. In other words, it acts like a monopolist. The marginal cost of milk is, MC(Q) = 12 + 1.20. What is maximum producers surplus? Answer:

Micro Economics For Today

10th Edition

ISBN:9781337613064

Author:Tucker, Irvin B.

Publisher:Tucker, Irvin B.

Chapter9: Monopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 20SQ

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As a manager of a chain of movie theaters that are monopolies in their respective markets, you have noticed much higher demand on weekends than during the week. You therefore conducted a study that has revealed two different demand curves at your movie theaters. On weekends, the inverse demand function is P = 20 – 0.001Q; on weekdays, it is P = 15 – 0.002Q. You acquire legal rights from movie producers to show their films at a cost of $25,000 per movie, plus a $2.50 “royalty” for each moviegoer entering your theaters (the average moviegoer in your market watches a movie only once).
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Consider a homogeneous good industry (such as an agricultural product) with just two firms and a total market demand Q = 400−P, so the inverse demand is P = 400 − Q. Suppose both firms have a constant marginal cost equal to $100 per unit of output and a fixed cost equal to $10,000. One simple way to depict rivalry in a duopoly (2 firms) is the Cournot model. This model is reasonable in agricultural markets where firms choose production (plantings) in advance and the market price is determined later after the crop is harvested. In the Cournot model we imagine that the two firms simultaneously choose their production or quantity, and that demand (market clearing) determines the price given each firms’ quantity. (a) Suppose (hypothetically) that the second firm produces 0 units, and the first firm anticipates this, so the first firm is the only seller. How much will the first firm produce (in this case the first firm acts like a monopolist and sets output where MR = MC)? Hint: The first…
Consider a homogeneous good industry (such as an agricultural product) with just two firms and a total market demand Q = 400−P, so the inverse demand is P = 400 − Q. Suppose both firms have a constant marginal cost equal to $100 per unit of output and a fixed cost equal to $10,000. One simple way to depict rivalry in a duopoly (2 firms) is the Cournot model. This model is reasonable in agricultural markets where firms choose production (plantings) in advance and the market price is determined later after the crop is harvested. In the Cournot model, we imagine that the two firms simultaneously choose their production or quantity and that demand (market clearing) determines the price given each firms’ quantity. (a) Suppose (hypothetically) that the second firm produces 0 units, and the first firm anticipates this, so the first firm is the only seller. How much will the first firm produce (in this case the first firm acts as a monopolist and sets output where MR = MC)? Hint: The first…