Three firms compete in the style of Cournot. The market demand is given by Q(P) = 9 - P. There are no fixed cost and each firm s marginal cost is co
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- Firms A and B operate in a market with inverse demand given by p = 160 - (q_{A} + q_{B}) Their total cost functions are C_{A}(q_{A}) = q_{A} ^ 2 / 2 and C_{B}(q_{B}) = q_{B} ^ 2 / 2 , respectively. The firms compete in quantities (Cournot competition). Denote by q_{A} ^ C and q_{B} ^ C the Nash equilibrium quantities in this game. What are q_{A} ^ C and q_{B} ^ C Hint: Again, note that I gave you the total cost function for each firm, not the marginal costs. (a) q_{A} ^ C = 24 q_{B} ^ C = 24 (b) q_{A} ^ C = 60 q_{B} ^ C = 30 (c) q_{A} ^ C = 40 q_{B} ^ C = 40 (d) q_{A} ^ C = 20 q_{B} ^ C = 20 (e) q_{A} ^ C = 30 q_{B} ^ C = 30Joe and Rebecca are small-town ready-mix concrete duopolists. The market demand function is Qd = 10,000 – 100P, where P is the price of a cubic yard of concrete and Qd is the number of cubic yards demanded per year. Marginal cost is $25 per cubic yard. Suppose that Joe and Rebecca compete in quantities and competition in this market is described by Cournot model. What are Joe and Rebecca’s Nash equilibrium outputs? What is the resulting price? What do they each earn as profit? How does the price compare to the marginal cost? Joe and Rebecca are small-town ready-mix concrete duopolists. The market demand function is Qd = 10,000 – 100P, where P is the price of a cubic yard of concrete and Qd is the number of cubic yards demanded per year. Marginal cost is $25 per cubic yard. Suppose that Joe and Rebecca compete in quantities and competition in this market is described by Cournot model. What are Joe and Rebecca’s Nash equilibrium outputs? What is the resulting price? What do they each…Three firms produce identical products and compete in a market where the inverse demand function is P(q1, q2, q3) = 78 − q1− q2− q3. Each has a per-unit cost of 14 and zero fixed cost. They simultaneously choose quantities. In scenario (a), find the Nash equilibrium of this game and let A = firm 2's profit in the Nash equilibrium. In scenario (b), assume that the firms form a cartel, i.e., they act as a monopoly and split the profit evenly. If the total quantity produced by the cartel is Q, then the inverse demand is P(Q) = 78 - Q. Let B = firm 2's profit in the cartel. Calculate the value of A - B and enter your answer in the box below. Please round your answer to 3 decimal places (e.g., write 4/3 as 1.333).
- Three oligopolistic firms ("1", "2" and "3") conduct quantity competition in a certain market. The interactions between them take place as follows: firm 1 defines its production quantity, which is immediately observed by firms 2 and 3; then, firm 2 makes its decision on how much it will produce, and only after observing the decisions of firms 1 and 2 does firm 3 finally make its respective choice. Furthermore, the total costs of firms 1, 2 and 3 correspond respectively to c₁(q₁) = 10q₁, c₂(q₂) = 8q₂ and c₃(q₃) = 2q₃, and the firms face a (inverse) demand given by p(Q) = 110 - Q (where Q = q₁ + q₂ + q₃). Based on this information, determine what will be the total amount produced by the firms in the (single) ENPS for that game. (Note: the correct answer is an integer.)Consider a Cournot duopoly with the inverse demand P = 200 − 2Q. Firm 1 and 2 compete by simultaneously choosing their quantities. Both firms have constant marginal and average cost MC = AC = 20. A) Find each firm’s best response function. Plot the best response functions (label the x-axes as ?1 and y-axes as ?2 ). B) Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities, profits and market price. Illustrate the equilibrium point on your graph in part (A). C) Suppose instead that firm 1 had MC = AC = 20, but firm 2’s MC = 8. What is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs and profits now? How would this affect your answers to part (B)? ExplainHow would the Cournot equilibrium change in the airline example if American's marginal cost were $90 and United's were $180? The demand the duopoly quantity-setting firms face is Q=339−p with an inverse demand function of p=339−1qA −1qU where qA is the quantity produced by American and qU is the quantity produced by United. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where qA equals ? enter your response here and qU equals? enter your response here. (enter numeric responses using integers) Furthermore, the equilibrium occurs at a price of ? (round your answer to the nearest penny)
- Consider a Cournot Oligopoly. One firm has costs C1(Q1) = 12Q1 while the other firm’s cost function is C2(Q2) = 10Q2. The demand for both firms’ products Q=Q1 +Q2 isQD(P)=200−2P. (a) Determine the equilibrium price P, the market shares s1, s2, and the quantities Q1, Q2 produced by both firms. (b) Suppose more firms with the lower cost technology, i.e., with cost function Ci(Qi) = 10Qi enter the market. How many firms with this technology must be in the market such that firm 1’s profit becomes negative. In other words, suppose there is one firm with the high costs, and n firms with the low costs. At what level n will profits of the high-cost firm be negative?Consider an oligopolistic industry with N competing firms. Suppose that these firms have no fixed costs and that they all have the same marginal costs. Each firm must choose what quantity to produce independently of each other, and all firms must choose at the same time. If we increase the number of firms in this industry (to for example N+1), the market price a.increases b.decreases c.remains unchanged d.becomes nil e.none of the aboveThree firms compete in the style of Cournot. All firms have a constant returns to scale technology: There are no fixed cost and each firm's marginal cost is constant. The market demand is given by Q(P) = 9 - P. Firm 1's marginal cost is MC1 = 1, firm 2's marginal cost is MC2 = 2. Let MC3 be the marginal cost of Firm 3. Which of the below is a necessary condition so that q > 0 for all three firms in a Nash equilibrium? a. MC3 < 1 b. MC3 < 4 c. MC3 < 3 d. MC3 > 1 e. MC3 < 2
- Suppose that two firms produce mountain spring water and the market demand for mountain spring water is given as follows: P= 254 - 91 - 92 Firm 1 and Firm 2 have a MC = 50 a) Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium price and quantity of each firm. b) Assume now that firm 1 becomes the Stackelberg leader. What will be the market price, output by each firm? Compared to part a, who gains? c) If Firm 1 chooses a quantity, then Firm 2 chooses a quantity (having observed Firm 1's quantity), then Firm 1 has an opportunity to revise its quantity (having observed Firm 2's quantity), then payoffs are determined, does either firm stand to gain relative to the case of simultaneous quantity choice? Why or why not? (hint: there is no need to do any calculation here).Consider a duopolistic market in which the two identical firms compete by selecting their quantities. The inverse market demand is P(Q) = 210−Q and each firm has a marginal cost of $15 per unit. Assume that fixed costs are negligible for both firms. Cournot Model Determine the Nash-Cournot equilibrium for this market.(Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places.) Firm 1's quantity: q1= ? units. Firm 2's quantity: q2 = ? units. Market price: P= ? Stackelberg Model Determine the Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium for this market, assuming that Firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader. (Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places.) Firm 1's quantity: q1 = ? units Firm 2s quantity: q2 = ? units. Market price: P = ?Consider a Cournot Duopoly model. The inverse demand for their products is given byP = 200 − 6Q, where Q is the total quantity supplied in the market (that is, Q = Q1 + Q2). Each firm has an identical cost function, given byT Ci = 2Qi, for i = 1, 2.(a) In the Cournot model, what does each firm choose?(b) What is the timing of each firm’s decision?(c) Find the Nash equilibrium quantities (Q∗1, Q∗2)?(d) What is the equilibrium price? Just help with c and d here please