Time remaining: 00:09:21 Economics QA and QS are the pollution levels for Arrow and Solow Industries, respectively. Profits (benefits) associated with polluting activity, πi(i = A, S) are πA=10QA−0.5QA2 and πS=20QS−QS2. The marginal benefits (profits) for each firm are MBA=10−QA and MBS=20−2QS. 2.9 Suppose Arrow is located in a remote rural area, with very low pollution levels (marginal damage = 6), while Solow is located in an urban area, with other pollution sources and many more people exposed (marginal damage = 12). What is the efficient pollution allocation in this case?

Time remaining: 00:09:21 Economics QA and QS are the pollution levels for Arrow and Solow Industries, respectively. Profits (benefits) associated with polluting activity, πi(i = A, S) are πA=10QA−0.5QA2 and πS=20QS−QS2. The marginal benefits (profits) for each firm are MBA=10−QA and MBS=20−2QS. 2.9 Suppose Arrow is located in a remote rural area, with very low pollution levels (marginal damage = 6), while Solow is located in an urban area, with other pollution sources and many more people exposed (marginal damage = 12). What is the efficient pollution allocation in this case?

Microeconomics A Contemporary Intro

10th Edition

ISBN:9781285635101

Author:MCEACHERN

Publisher:MCEACHERN

Chapter17: Externalities And The Environment

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 13PAE

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QA and QS are the pollution levels for Arrow and Solow Industries, respectively. Profits (benefits) associatedwith polluting activity, πi(i = A, S) are πA=10QA−0.5QA2 and πS=20QS−QS2. The marginal benefits (profits) for each firm are MBA=10−QA and MBS=20−2QS. 2.9 Suppose Arrow is located in a remote rural area, with very low pollution levels (marginal damage = 6), while Solow is located in an urban area, with other pollution sources and many more people exposed (marginal damage = 12). What is the efficient pollution allocation in this case? Note: question puts us back in the world of economic efficiency (i.e., where we maximize net social benefit) as opposed to the world of cost- efficiency where we minimize costs associated with reaching an environmental target. So here net benefit is equal to Benefits from pollution minus Pollution Damages. Since locations are not interdependent, you can find the pollution levels which maximize net social benefits from A’s pollution and then…
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