True or false? In a 2-person economy, if the endowment is on the contract curve, there exists no exchange (exchange = some strictly positive quantity of at least one good changes hand) that could lead to both consumers reaching higher utility (strictly higher for at least one of them). True. O False.

True or false? In a 2-person economy, if the endowment is on the contract curve, there exists no exchange (exchange = some strictly positive quantity of at least one good changes hand) that could lead to both consumers reaching higher utility (strictly higher for at least one of them). True. O False.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter3: Preferences And Utility

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3.9P

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