Use the following payoff matrix for a simultaneous-move one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions. Player 1 Strategy A B с 23, 5 27, 5 a. What is player 1's optimal strategy? D 10, 16 Strategy B O Player 1 does not have an optimal strategy. Player 2 E 7, 14 14, 17 F 18, 18 21, 19

Use the following payoff matrix for a simultaneous-move one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions. Player 1 Strategy A B с 23, 5 27, 5 a. What is player 1's optimal strategy? D 10, 16 Strategy B O Player 1 does not have an optimal strategy. Player 2 E 7, 14 14, 17 F 18, 18 21, 19

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter13: best-practice Tactics: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 2E

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Consider the following two-player game.First, player 1 selects a number x≥0. Player 2 observes x. Then, simultaneously andindependently, player 1 selects a number y1 and player 2 selects a number y2, at which pointthe game ends.Player 1’s payoff is: u1(x; y1) = −3y21 + 6y1y2 −13x2 + 8xPlayer 2’s payoff is: u2(y2) = 6y1y2 −6y22 + 12xy2Draw the game tree of this game and identify its Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
Consider the payoff matrix for a game depicted below. Player 1 selects the row and Player 2 selects the column. Up Down Left 1, -1 -1, 1 Right -1, 1 1, -1 What is (are) the Nash equilibrium (equilibria)? Question 18Answer a. Player 1 plays right; Player 2 plays down b. Player 1 plays left; Player 2 plays down c. Player 1 plays down; Player 2 plays left d. Player 1 plays right; Player 2 plays up e. Player 1 plays up; Player 2 plays left f. There is no Nash equilibrium g. Player 1 plays down; Player 2 plays right h. Player 1 plays up; Player 2 plays right i. Player 1 plays left; Player 2 plays up
Consider a two-player, sequential-move game where each player can choose to play right or left. Player 1 moves first. Player 2 observes player 1’s actual move and then decides to move right or left. If player 1 moves right, player 1 receives $0 and player 2 receives $25. If both players move left, player 1 receives –$5 and player 2 receives $10. If player 1 moves left and player 2 moves right, player 1 receives $20 and player 2 receives $20. a. Write this game in extensive form. b. Find the Nash equilibrium outcomes to this game. c. Which of the equilibrium outcomes is most reasonable? Explain.
Consider the following game. There are two payers, Player 1 and Player 2. Player 1 chooses a row (10, 20, or 30), and Player 2 chooses a column (10/20/30). Payoffs are in the cells of the table, with those on the left going to Player 1 and those on the right going to player 2. Suppose that Player 1 chooses his strategy (10, 20 or 30), first, and subsequently, and after observing Player 1’s choice, Player 2 chooses his own strategy (of 10, 20 or 30). Which of the following statements is true regarding this modified game? I. It is a simultaneous move game, because the timing of moves is irrelevant in classifying games.II. It is a sequential move game, because Player 2 observes Player 1’s choice before he chooses his own strategy.III. This modification gives Player 1 a ‘first mover advantage’. A) I and IIB) II and IIIC) I and IIID) I onlyE) II only
E3 Bayesian Game]. Consider a Bayesian game described by a following payoff matrix. Please solve (show your solution). 1. Enumerate all pure strategies for each player. 2. Suppose that player 1 observes his type ?1 = 3. How does player 1 think of the probability of ?2? 3. Find a (pure strategy) Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Please find herewith a payoff matrix. In each cell you find the payoffs of the players associated with a particular strategy combination: The first entry is the payoff of player 1, the second entry is the payoff of player2. Player 2 t1 t2 t3 Player 1 S1 3, 4 1, 0 5, 3 S2 0, 12 8, 12 4, 20 S3 2, 0 2, 11 1, 0 Suppose both players select their strategies (S1, S2 or S3 for player 1 and t1, t2 or t3 for player 2) simultaneously and that the game is played once. In your explanation to the questions below, please do refer to the figures in the matrix. Suppose player 2 could move before player 1 (i.e. has a first mover advantage). In your explanation to the questions below, please do refer to the figures in the matrix. What strategy would (s)he select? Is it really an ‘advantage’ for player 2 to move first? Or does player 2 benefit from being the second mover (and hence player 1 moving first)? I.e. for this question, do not make a comparison to the outcome of the…
Suppose two players play a two-period repeated game, where the stage game is the normal-form game shown below. Is there a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which the players select (A, X) in the first period? If so, fully describe such equilibrium. If not, explain why not. Player 1 has choice A, B; Player 2 has choice X, Y, Z. Payoff: (A,X)-(5,7), (A,Y)-(2,4), (A,Z)-(3,8), (B,X)-(1,4), (B,Y)-(3,5), (B,Z)-(1,4)
. Find the Nash equilibrium of the following modified Rock-Paper-Scissors game: • When rock (R) beats scissors (S), the winner’s payoff is 10 and the loser’s payoff is −10. • When paper (P) beats rock, the winner’s payoff is 5 and the loser’s payoff is −5. • When scissors beats paper, the winner’s payoff is 2 and the loser’s payoff is −2. • In case of ties, both players receive 0 payoff. You are suposed to create a system of equations and then solve for them and find 3 probabilities- please show how to do that
on 8.1 Consider the following game: Player 1 A C D 7,6 5,8 0,0 Player 2 E 5,8 7,6 1, 1 F 0,0 1,1 4,4 a. Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (if any). b. Find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which each player randomizes over just the first two actions. c. Compute players' expected payoffs in the equilibria found in parts (a) and (b). d. Draw the extensive form for this game.
if Y = 4 (a) If ⟨a,d⟩ is played in the first period and ⟨b,e⟩ is played in the second period, what is the resulting (repeated game) payoff for the row player? (b) What is the highest payoff any player can receive in any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated game?
Suppose that Teresa and Caroline are both in the public eye. They get offers to sell secrets of the other to tabloids. If both keep the secrets, they are both better off than if they get exposed. If only one is exposed, the other person is better off than if no one was exposed. Their payoffs from each option are given in the payoff matrix. Suppose that Caroline and Teresa play the game over four television seasons, where each season is a new game. Consider the scenarios. Remember, a tit‑for‑tat strategy is one where the person starts by cooperating and then plays whatever strategy the other firm played last. Over four seasons, how much will Caroline make if she and Teresa both play tit‑for‑tat? $_______ Over four seasons, how much does Caroline make if she always exposes and Teresa plays tit‑for‑tat? $________
Suppose that Teresa and Caroline are both in the public eye. They get offers to sell secrets of the other to tabloids. If both keep the secrets, they are both better off than if they get exposed. If only one is exposed, the other person is better off than if no one was exposed. Their payoffs from each option are given in the payoff matrix. Suppose that Caroline and Teresa play the game over four television seasons, where each season is a new game. Consider the scenarios. Remember, a tit‑for‑tat strategy is one where the person starts by cooperating and then plays whatever strategy the other firm played last. Over four seasons, how much will Caroline make if she plays a tit‑for‑tat strategy and Teresa always exposes? $_______ Over four seasons, how much will Caroline make if she and Teresa both always expose? $_________ Does Caroline have a dominant strategy when she and Teresa play for four seasons? No, there is no dominant strategy…