E1 Which graph in the figure best represents a good that is an inferior good at some income levels, and a normal good at otherincome levels?Income (A)Income(B)O A. Graph AО В. Graph BО с. Graph сO D. Graph DquantityIncomequantityIncome(C)(D)quantityquantity..... Two restuarants in Bruges, Belgium-Oud Brugge and Den Dijver-engage in price competition. Oud Brugge is located on the central town square, which is the main tourist area. Den Dijver, located on a small side street, is recognized among beer lovers asbeing one of Belgium's top beer restaurants. Two types of diners patronize these restaurants: beer lovers, who are well-informed about both restaurants, and tourists, who know about Oud Brugge and may or may not know about Den Dijver. Suppose thereare 100 beer lovers and 100 tourists. Beer lovers will not eat at Oud Brugge, and their demand function for meals at Den Dijver isQn > 100(1 - 0.02ppp)The tourists' demand function for Oud Brugge isabn > n(0.333333333 -0.04POR +0.02ppp)+ (100 - n)(1-0.02ppp).where n is the number of tourists who know about both restaurants. The tourists' demand function for Den Dijver isQbn =n(0.666666667 -0.02ppp +0.01pOR)The marginal cost of a meal at Den Dijver is 15 and the marginal cost of a meal at Oud Brugge is 20. Oud Brugge and Den Dijver simultaneously set prices.What is the Nash equilibrium in prices as a function of n?The Nash equilibrium isPDp = and pOR = (Round all numbers to exactly three decimal places.) (Properly format your expression using the tools in the palette. Hover over tools to see keyboard shortcuts. E.g., a superscript can be crealed with the " character.)If n=0, what is the Nash equilibrium in prices?The Nash equilibrium is for Den Dijver to charge S and for Oud Brugge to charge $If n = 100, what is the Nash equilibrium?The Nash equilibrium is for Den Dijver to charge S and Oud Brugge to charge S

Answered: Which graph in the figure best…

Which graph in the figure best represents a good that is an inferior good at some income levels, and a normal good at other income levels? O A. Graph A ОВ. Graph B Oc. Graph C OD. Graph D

Exploring Economics

8th Edition

ISBN:9781544336329

Author:Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:Robert L. Sexton

Chapter15: Oligopoly And Strategic Behavior

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7P

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