You want to divide students into pairs who will share a 2-bedroom apartment for the coming year (one-sided matching). Your interest is in "stable roommates," i.e. such that there is no blocking pair: no two students would rather room with each other than their current assigned roommates. 1. Suppose there is one 2-bedroom apartment and three students with preferences: A: CAB

You want to divide students into pairs who will share a 2-bedroom apartment for the coming year (one-sided matching). Your interest is in "stable roommates," i.e. such that there is no blocking pair: no two students would rather room with each other than their current assigned roommates. 1. Suppose there is one 2-bedroom apartment and three students with preferences: A: CAB

Principles of Microeconomics

7th Edition

ISBN:9781305156050

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8PA

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Anastasia, Emma, and Greta are deciding what to do on a weekend getaway. They each suggest a first, second, and third choice and then vote on the options. Table 18.2 shows their first, second, and third choice preferences. Explain why they will have a hard time teaching a decision. Does the group prefer mountain biking to canoeing? What about canoeing compared to the beach? What about the beach compared to the original choice of mountain biking?
1. In the Traveler’s Dilemma, each of two people chooses a number between 180and 300. Each is paid the lower of the two numbers, but the person who choosesthe higher number must pay an amount x to the person who chose the lowernumber. In one case, x = 5, while in the other case x = 180. What differencewould you expect between choices with the two values of x?a. Higher choices when x = 5.b. Higher choices when x = 180.c. Little or no difference.d. Impossible to predict.2. Consider these statements about communication in experiments.1. Chat communication is usually more effective than written simple signals (A,B, etc.).2. Friendly appeals to mutual interest and payoff dominance are effective.3. Promises often affect beliefs and actions.4. A promise is not worth the paper it is printed on.Which of these are true?a. 1 and 2b. 1 and 3c. 2 and 3d. 1, 2, and 33. A treasure is hidden under one of the four boxes below. A person gets twoguesses to find the treasure. What do you think is the most…
please only do: if you can teach explain each partc: what does it mean? can you show graphs: show WARP : If the consumer’s wealth is high enough that both bundles can buy with both prices then WARP violates If the consumer may not be spending all of her wealth, are her choices consistent withthe Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (or is it impossible to determine)?: If the consumer’s wealth is high enough that both bundles are aordable atboth prices then WARP violates. why? Therefore, it is notpossible to know
Suppose that 2 roommates, Andy and Bob, are trying to pick an apartment in Chicago. Locations can be chosen from set of alternatives A={ x: x exists [0,1]}. Andy and Bob both want to minimize their daily commute but they work at different locations: Andy at xA=0.3, while Bob at xB=0.6. Specifically, their utility functions are: ui(x)= -(x-xi)2. Question: What is the set of all Pareto Efficient outcomes in A, assuming no money can be exchanged.
1) Suppose that Abel and Eden spend their incomes on two goods, food (F) and clothing (C).Abel’s preferences are represented by the utility function U(F,C)=10FC, while Eden’spreferences are represented by the utility function U(F,C)= 0.20F2C2A) With food on the horizontal axis and clothing on the vertical axis, identify on a graph theset of points that give Abel the same level of utility as the bundle (10, 5). Do the same forEden on a separate graph.B) On the same two graphs, identify the set of bundles that give Abel and Eden the samelevel of utility as the bundle (15, 8).C) Do you think Abel and Eden have the same preferences or different preferences? Explain 2. Graphically show the effect of an increase in price of Coca Cola on the demand of PepsiCola 3. Assume a budget line is drawn for two commodities: X on the x-axis and Y on the y-axis. Ifthe income of the consumer is 120 Birr, the y-intercept is 3, and the slope of the budget lineis -0.5 then determined the price of commodity…
7.A college football coach says that given any two linemen A and B, he always prefers the one who is bigger and faster. Is this preference relation transitive? Is it complete? 8.Explain why convex preferences means that “averages are preferred to extremes. 9.If good 1 is a “neutral,” what is its marginal rate of substitution for good 2?
Q.4. Example 1.D.1: Suppose that X = {x,y,z}, B = {{x,y}, {y,z},{x,z}}, C({x,y}_ = {x}, C({y,z}) = {y} and C({x,z})={z} This choice structure satisfies the weak axiom. Nevertheless, we cannot have rationalizing preferences. How do we know if this choice structure satisfies the weak axiom? Given the C({x,y}) = x, C({y,z}), shouldn't C({x,z}) = x? if we have to always make the same choice based on WARP.
3. Rick thinks either Morty or Summer broke his TV. Morty and Summer each have to decide simultaneously whether totake the blame or blame the other person. If they both blame the same person (both blame Morty or both blameSummer), the person they blame gets a small punishment and utility of -2, while the blameless person gets a utility of 0.Otherwise (if they both blame the other or both blame themselves), they both get a more severe punishment and autility of -10.a. Draw the normal (matrix) form of this game, with Morty choosing the row and Summer choosing the column.Does either Morty or Summer have a dominant strategy? Explain your answer. Note: only Morty and Summerare players in this Game. Rick designed the game and is not a player. b. Find all Nash equilibria of this game. c. Suppose instead there are three suspects: Morty, Summer, and Jerry. Otherwise, the rules are the same asbefore. Draw the normal (matrix) form of the game. Hint: draw three matrices, with Morty choosing the…
Suppose there was a debate regarding how to spend $1 billion in newly found revenues in the budget. Suppose the most liberal Democrat suggests an increase to Food Stamp (SNAP) allotments. Suppose the most conservative Republican suggests an increase in defense spending. The Republican says that, on average, military spending does the most good, so more is better. The Democrat is arguing that the extra food purchased by the extra spending will increase well-being the most. What is going on here? A . Both are employing marginal analysis, just from different perspectives. B. Only the Democrat is using marginal analysis. C. Only the Republican is using marginal analysis. D. Neither are using marginal analysis.
(1e) Hello! I just want to ask for help whether the answers in the given pictures are correct. If it's not, please help me recheck and resolve it. Please refer to the given pictures below for the answers and questions. After verifying the given answers shown in the subsequent picture, PLEASE ANSWER LETTER — D. Bundle E has one less cheeseburger than Bundle D. What assumption(s) would still allow you to say that Bundle E is preferred to Bundle D? Briefly explain. NOTE: Type only your answers. Please do not handwritten your answers.
Consider an economy with 2 goods and 2 identical agents, each of whom has the following utility function, u (x1; x2) = ln x1 + 2 ln x2. The aggregate endowments of the 2 goods are given by (1; 2). Suppose there is a social planner who cares about agents equally.(a) Set up the plannerís problem.(b) Calculate the first-best outcome 2. Consider an economy with 2 goods and 2 identical agents, each of whom has thefollowing utility function, 11(31, 3:2) = In 3:; + 2111332. The aggregate endowments ofthe 2 goods are given by (1, 2). Suppose there is a. social planner who cares aboutagents equally. (a) Set up the planner’s problem.(b) Calculate the ﬁrst-best outcome (11.6., the social planner’s solution).