Colonel Mahaney Research Paper

Diplomacy is the art of dealing with foreign countries and their people in a sensitive and effective way. The ability to influence people and situations contributes to effective American diplomacy. In The Ugly American William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick comment on the nature of American diplomacy in 1950s Southeast Asia. They identify the characteristics and effects of both inept and skilled diplomacy. The book highlights knowledge of language, history, and culture as critical components to the ability to influence indigenous populations. In many ways the situations and characters described in the book mirror situations and challenges faced by Special Operations Forces (SOF) today. Special Operations Imperatives are a planning tool that SOF use to influence people and situations they encounter. In order to understand the influence and effects of proper application of the Special Operations Imperatives the stories of Homer Atkins, Colonel Hillandale and Solomon Asch provide a setting to compare and contrast with my own experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq and Jordan.

At the start of the new millennium, China became rapidly known as the fastest growing economy sparking the greatest shift of relative power in history. Coincidence, or not, Afghanistan’s narrow border with China made it a perfect strategic target to presume military presence within the Asian region. Arguably, the invasion of Afghanistan lays largely on a tactical plan designed by the US to resist

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A

In conclusion, Colonel Connor's count of Indians dead revealed 224 bodies on the battlefield and 48 more at a curve on the river for a total of 272. Some other estimates state from 368 to 400, for Connor’s soldiers, fourteen died with four officers and forty-nine men wounded, of

The United States from the Cold War and into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues to face challenges in translating military might into political desires due to its obsession with raising an army, electing politicians and assembling a diplomatic corp that continue to gravitate towards State-to-State engagements that if not rectified could lead to substantial delays in fighting terrorism and non-terrorist adversaries or worse total failure of the United States Military’s ability to properly carry out it’s politicians objectives due to being blindsided.

About McKinney http://www.mckinneytexas.org McKinney is one of the most popular residential communities located in the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex. The community boasts a number of enticing features that lure residents to the suburbs tree-lined streets and quiet neighborhoods. The city's historic downtown, positive business environment, and family friendly amenities make McKinney one of

Executive Summary This paper was written by Dr. Richard L. Kugler from the National Defense University, Center of Technology and National Security. Operation Anaconda was a success, but taught many lessons for modern-era force operations and defense transformation that deserves to be remembered (Kugler, 2007). Even though the battle plan

From June to 2004 to present, beloved Colonel Michael Dane Steele is in command of 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Rakkasans). I have just been notified that I will take command from Colonel Steele in November 2006 which leaves just short of six months for me to plan for the change. A review of author Raffi Khatchadourian’s article, “The Kill Company,” published in The New Yorker on July 6, 2009 is necessary for background in writing this paper, however; the timeframe assumed for the purpose of writing this essay is June 2004. To this end, it must also be assumed that the author does not benefit from the knowledge gained by reading most of the information in Khatchadourian’s article. My goal is to set and maintain an effective, ethical command climate through investigation, self-education, and unit-wide professional military education.

Andrew J. Bacevich was born 1947 in Normal, Illinois. In 1969, he graduated from the U.S. Military Academy and served in the Vietnam War for a year from 1970 to 1971. He retired in the early 1990’s with the rank of Colonel after also holding posts in Germany, Persian Gulf, and the United States. He later earned his Ph.D. in American Diplomatic History from Princeton University. He is a professor at Boston University, currently teaching international relations. He is also a retired career officer of the U.S. Army and one of the former directors of Boston University’s Center for International Relations. In 2007, his son, First Lieutenant Andrew Bacevich Jr., who also served in the U.S. Army, was killed in action at the age of 27.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

The theme of my essay is war and conflict. As it connects to economics, my research topic concerns the military industrial-complex, and my research question explores the influence of the military industrial complex on the perpetuance and expansion of war. It is through a brief introductory conversation on topic of

However, this external trust has been fraying from the edges for many years – clear and realistic political strategy has been lacking from civilian leaders, a well-meaning yet disengaged public, and an insular military class that fails to organically adapt to emerging technologies. A clear and realistic political strategy determined by civilian leaders addresses the first leg of the strategic triad – government. It is said success begins at the top, with a cohesive vision and unified guidance. One doesn’t have to look further than the 2003 invasion of Iraq - then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claimed it would require no more than 150,000 troops to secure Iraq, despite the insistence of then Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki that it would take 300,000 troops, a number derived from his experience in Bosnia. (Mills, 2013) However, this detail overshadows the deeper implication – that civilian leaders were not planning for stability operations, or had a plan in place after the conventional phase of the war. The lack of guidance and vision from the nation’s strategic leaders make it extremely difficult, if not impossible for the military to effectively prosecute

General Hugh Shelton was selected as a leader for this assignment since I served in the United States Army’s Group Support Company, 3rd Special Forces Group as he was the Commander in Chief of the United States Special Operations Command before he was nominated as the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff. General Shelton was the 14th Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of

As a young officer bitter over the Vietnam War, Powell pondered “the what went wrong syndrome … which created a lively ferment.”2 He disagreed with how the war was run and often struggled with “looking to the other for answers that never came conundrums.”3 As a rising strategic leader, Powell was beginning to understand the “implications of the advice given … and the propensity for operating comfortably at the joint, interagency, intergovernment, and multinational levels.”4 He was also starting to grasp from “personal experience; cultural awareness”5,6 the importance of understanding what military objectives are, who sets them and why.

Abstract This paper will be explaining the similarities, and differences, between the Vietnam War and the War in Afghanistan. There are many topics that bring these two wars together. However, I am only going to be talking about public support, policy objectives, military strategy, weapons, fighting spirit, links to home, and death totals. These topics have a lot of information about them, but there is too much to write about every little detail, so I will cover the broad overview of them. Each paragraph will be about one of the topics. There will also be a discussion about insurgencies and counter insurgency operations. These are two big topics in Vietnam and Afghanistan since almost all of the enemy in both wars were, and are, comprised of insurgents and different types of militia groups.