Colonel Mahaney Research Paper

In conclusion, Colonel Connor's count of Indians dead revealed 224 bodies on the battlefield and 48 more at a curve on the river for a total of 272. Some other estimates state from 368 to 400, for Connor’s soldiers, fourteen died with four officers and forty-nine men wounded, of whom one officer and eight men died later and in addition, seventy-nine were disabled by freezing. After the battle, the troops crossed to the south side of the river and made camp for the night. Later that night, Corporal Tuttle stated, “The night of January 29th, 1863 I shall never forget (how can I). There we camped on the bank of Bear River with our dead and dying, wounded and frozen, 2 feet of snow on the ground. Nothing for a fire but green willows which burn about as well as snow. Oh, the

Charming Downtown McKinney offers residents and visitors access to more than 120 wonderful shops and more than a dozen delightful restaurants, coffee shops, and pubs. Downtown McKinney is one of the area's most popular shopping destinations, and it is easy to see why. The charming shopping district is home to a number of unique specialty shops, upscale boutiques, art galleries, gift shops, and antique stores.

This paper was written by Dr. Richard L. Kugler from the National Defense University, Center of Technology and National Security. Operation Anaconda was a success, but taught many lessons for modern-era force operations and defense transformation that deserves to be remembered (Kugler, 2007). Even though the battle plan was complex and sophisticated, it was not followed by the Afghan forces, which left US ground troops to do the battle alone. US forces had to replan the battle at a moment's notice.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

General Robert E. Lee is the best general of all time. But you would expect him to be best because he was raised in a strong military family, and trained in the best military schools in America. Then fought to keep mexico out of the states. But in 1861 it was to protect his home which was his biggest duty.

From June to 2004 to present, beloved Colonel Michael Dane Steele is in command of 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Rakkasans). I have just been notified that I will take command from Colonel Steele in November 2006 which leaves just short of six months for me to plan for the change. A review of author Raffi Khatchadourian’s article, “The Kill Company,” published in The New Yorker on July 6, 2009 is necessary for background in writing this paper, however; the timeframe assumed for the purpose of writing this essay is June 2004. To this end, it must also be assumed that the author does not benefit from the knowledge gained by reading most of the information in Khatchadourian’s article. My goal is to set and maintain an effective, ethical command climate through investigation, self-education, and unit-wide professional military education.

Throughout history, the United States Government and Armed Forces have learned from devastating mistakes and decisive victories making the US Armed Forces superior to most, if not all, other militaries; however, the Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia throughout Operation Restore Hope, Operation Provide Relief, and the Joint Special Operations Task Force missed the mark on such “lessons learned”. The inadequate intelligence; the ignorance of tactics, techniques, and procedures; and absence of reinforcements cost needless loss of US troops, and crippling a sophisticated, well-equipped military at the hands of an under-equipped militia using irregular warfare tactics. Even 24 years later, the impact resonating still weighs heavily on minds of key leaders in the government along with all echelons of military commanders.

General Hugh Shelton was selected as a leader for this assignment since I served in the United States Army’s Group Support Company, 3rd Special Forces Group as he was the Commander in Chief of the United States Special Operations Command before he was nominated as the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff. General Shelton was the 14th Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of

At the start of the new millennium, China became rapidly known as the fastest growing economy sparking the greatest shift of relative power in history. Coincidence, or not, Afghanistan’s narrow border with China made it a perfect strategic target to presume military presence within the Asian region. Arguably, the invasion of Afghanistan lays largely on a tactical plan designed by the US to resist

The United States from the Cold War and into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues to face challenges in translating military might into political desires due to its obsession with raising an army, electing politicians and assembling a diplomatic corp that continue to gravitate towards State-to-State engagements that if not rectified could lead to substantial delays in fighting terrorism and non-terrorist adversaries or worse total failure of the United States Military’s ability to properly carry out it’s politicians objectives due to being blindsided.

To paraphrase the quote attributed to Trotsky, “We may not be interested in insurgency but insurgency is interested in us.” The United States faces this dilemma. The question remains how to prepare for this amidst competing interests and threats. The U.S. military should prepare for both conventional and irregular warfare, while prioritizing conventional warfare, recognizing irregular warfare as the most significant short term threat to national interests and conventional warfare the most threatening in the long term. This paper will compare and contrast the considerations for these types of warfare, explain why the U.S. should prioritize conventional operations while preparing for both, and describe the short and long term

Andrew J. Bacevich was born 1947 in Normal, Illinois. In 1969, he graduated from the U.S. Military Academy and served in the Vietnam War for a year from 1970 to 1971. He retired in the early 1990’s with the rank of Colonel after also holding posts in Germany, Persian Gulf, and the United States. He later earned his Ph.D. in American Diplomatic History from Princeton University. He is a professor at Boston University, currently teaching international relations. He is also a retired career officer of the U.S. Army and one of the former directors of Boston University’s Center for International Relations. In 2007, his son, First Lieutenant Andrew Bacevich Jr., who also served in the U.S. Army, was killed in action at the age of 27.

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

This paper will be explaining the similarities, and differences, between the Vietnam War and the War in Afghanistan. There are many topics that bring these two wars together. However, I am only going to be talking about public support, policy objectives, military strategy, weapons, fighting spirit, links to home, and death totals. These topics have a lot of information about them, but there is too much to write about every little detail, so I will cover the broad overview of them. Each paragraph will be about one of the topics. There will also be a discussion about insurgencies and counter insurgency operations. These are two big topics in Vietnam and Afghanistan since almost all of the enemy in both wars were, and are, comprised of insurgents and different types of militia groups.