Finding Justification For The Existence Of Minds

The question of the self is one that appears throughout history and has been debated in myriad ways. Many people assert their claim as the correct one, though some are content to contemplate the self for the rest of their lives rather than remain at one conclusion. Humans are their own enigma, unable to understand the complexity of themselves. It is important to have some theory of consciousness in order to understand the actions of ourselves and others, therefore it is irresponsible to consider the matter a moot point. After consideration of works describing the physical processes of the brain, it seems that there is nothing more simple or wonderful than consciousness existing within the physical brain. Moreover, the concept of self is a construct of the mind rather than something that truly exists.

For centuries philosophers have engaged themselves into conversations and arguments trying to figure out the nature of a human person; this has lead to various theories and speculation about the nature of the human mind and body. The question they are tying to answer is whether a human being is made of only the physical, body and brain, or both the physical or the mental, mind. In this paper I will focus on the mind-body Identity Theory to illustrate that it provides a suitable explanation for the mind and body interaction.

In David M. Armstrong’s “The Nature of Mind”, Armstrong praises the field of science and seeks to put the concept of mind into terms that agree with science’s definition of minds. His interest is in the physico-chemical, materialist view of man. Armstrong considers science to be the authority over other disciplines because of its reliability and result in consensus over disputed questions.

Other people do not have minds. At least, I cannot know for sure that they do, and will argue for this case in this essay. The problem of other minds (that is, can we know that other people have minds) is a problem that (like all classic philosophical problems) seemingly has no provable answer. The problem is such; I do not know for sure that other people actually have minds; I only know what my own experiences are like through direct experience (i.e. I know my experiences because I experience them), but I cannot have direct knowledge of other people’s experiences, as I cannot experience their experiences alongside them. Therefore, I only have information about people’s behaviour to go on; e.g. I cannot know that someone is happy, but I can experience them behave in such a way that would lead me to the conclusion that they’re happy, as that is how I would act if I were happy. The problem with this, however, is that behaviour is not equal to mental states, and therefore I have no knowledge of other people’s mental states, only that they seem to experience mental states based on their behaviour. Of course, I cannot know that they experience mental states for sure, as I cannot experience other’s mental states, I can only draw conclusions from their behaviour, which does not prove that they do have minds.

Thesis: The mind-body problem arises because of the lack of evidence when looking for a specific explanation of the interaction of mental and physical states, and the origin and even existence of them.

Many arguments in the philosophy of the mind have been made for and against, whether or not the mind and the brain are the same entity. The mind-brain identity theory is the view that the mind is the brain and that mental states are brain states (Mandik 77). Therefore, we can identify sensations and other mental processes with physical brain processes (Blutner 4). I argue, that the mind is not identical to the brain, and the conceivable idea of zombies, as well as the multiple realizability argument, can disprove this theory.

Individuals rely on the human experience to define not only their self-concept but their conviction. According to the theory of mind, humans can only intuit the existence of their

Prinz publication “Is the mind really modular?” demonstrates a various examples and explanations, highlighting each and everyone one of the modular systems that Fodor created. The number of descriptions created for the modules is composed by individuals who share different points of view. This doesn’t prove that the theory is wrong, it will simply state that there is no certainty of being a hundred percent sure. My position on this essay will be in contradiction to the approach that Prinz argues to disapprove the “Modularity of the mind” theory.

The mind is perhaps the most fascinating part of the human body due to its complexity and ability to rationalize. In essence, the mind-body problem studies the relation of the mind to the body, and states that each human being seems to embody two unique and somewhat contradictory natures. Each human contains both a nature of matter and physicality, just like any other object that contains atoms in the universe. However, mankind also is constituted of something beyond materialism, which includes its ability to rationalize and be self-aware. This would imply that mankind is not simply another member of the world of matter because some of its most distinctive features cannot be accounted for in this manner. There are obvious differences between physical and mental properties. Physical properties are publically accessible, and have weight, texture, and are made of matter. Mental properties are not publically accessible, and have phenomenological texture and intentionality (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). This is challenging to philosophers, because man cannot be categorized as a material or immaterial object, but rather a combination of both mind and body (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). Man embodies mind-body dualism, meaning he is a blend of both mind and matter (Stewart, Blocker, Petrick, 2013). The mind-body problem creates conflict among philosophers, especially when analyzing physicalism in its defense. This paper outlines sound

In philosopher Thomas Nagel’s “Other Minds” chapter of his book, What Does It All Mean?, the philosophical problem of considering minds belonging to others is posed. The issue mainly revolves around privileged access, which restricts someone’s knowledge of experiences and thoughts to his or her own mind. By critically observing this particular human limitation, a reflection on the standard account of knowledge, “Other Minds”, and class discussions thus far will further explore the implications and possible methods of attempting to resolve this problem in epistemology. Specifically this will address the consideration of others’ experiences, other people’s consciousness, and the seemingly unconscious.

Humans can be distinguished in many features from animals. Some might ask what are some unique characteristics that only humans have. While some people believe that the learning differentiates between humans and animals, others think that souls and spirits differentiate humans from animals. In “Strange Creatures”, Susan Blackmore talks about the idea of imitation and the way that humanity creates “memes” that are a collection of cognitive units of information. Memes control human thoughts and actions. In Zadie Smith’s essay, “Speaking in tongues”, the author supports the idea of having plural selves, multiple voices to different people, and that an authentic self does not exist. Everything that is

For in Descartes terms, it was plausible to doubt that one has a body, but impossible to doubt the existence of one’s mind; therefore “…self and mind must be identical” (Palmer 162).

Many are disconcerted by the idea that humans and Minds can be described as systems which operate based on interpretations of symbols, much like machines, computers, and robots: things that we have created yet do not think of as being “thinking,” themselves. We, as human beings, are comforted in the notion that we are born into this world with a fully capable Mind, a soul or spirit, and are, thereafter, free to choose our fate as we will. Although it seems plausible that we are born with Mind, I cannot subscribe to such a simplistic version of thinking about our true capacity for affecting outcome.

The Problem of Other Minds is said to be first introduced by John Stuart Mill in his 1979 works “An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, and of The Principal Philosophical Questions Discussed in his Writings” (Mill, 1867) in which Mill talks about his “fellow creatures” and his belief that there are other minds beside our own. The idea behind the problem of other minds is whether or not we can justify our belief that there are other minds beside our own. It is often claimed that the Problem of Other Minds was in fact first introduced by Rene Descartes, his interpretation of minds as separate entities gives rise to not only his problem of mental causation but also the Problem of Other Minds. Descartes theory that dogs cannot

The Mind-Body problem arises to Philosophy when we wonder what is the relationship between the mental states, like beliefs and thoughts, and the physical states, like water, human bodies and tables. For the purpose of this paper I will consider physical states as human bodies because we are thinking beings, while the other material things have no mental processes. The question whether mind and body are the same thing, somehow related, or two distinct things not related, has been asked throughout the history of Philosophy, so some philosophers tried to elaborate arrangements and arguments about it, in order to solve the problem and give a satisfactory answer to the question. This paper will argue that the Mind-Body Dualism, a view in