General Odierno's 2014 AUSA Winter Symposium Speech

You will address Total Army Analysis, the process that takes us from the Army of today to the Army of the future.

Concepts lead change for the Army and drive the development and integration of future capabilities. More specifically, they provide a framework for analysis, readiness assessments, prioritization, and feedback. In addition, concepts serve as a foundation to help the Army maximize effectiveness and minimize risk through both materiel and nonmaterial capabilities. The role of concepts is to describe how future forces will operate. Concepts assists in the identification of prioritized capability gaps and integrated Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P).

The organizing function of management is impacted in the globalization efforts of the Army. The process of transformation of local or regional phenomena into global ones takes the utmost managerial ability from all ranks and corporations sustaining the Army. For instance, institutional organizations provide the infrastructure necessary to raise, train, equip, deploy, and ensure the readiness of all Army forces in strategic global locations. Organizing and strategic planning functions help the training base provide military skills and professional education to every soldier -as well as members of sister services and allied forces. It also allows the Army to expand rapidly in time of war.

When the demands for a large military decrease there are several ways to reduce the strength. The bonuses decrease, or go away entirely depending on how aggressive the reduction is. The new recruitment standards get tightened back to pre-buildup times. The retention boards crank back up. There are always members of the military that are not meeting the common standards, such as height and weight or the APFT. Members failing to meet the standards are the first to get sent home during board cycles.

The quick evolving military environment, needs the US Army redouble its efforts to reduce the uncertainty associated with the downsizing. There are some predominant principles that can guide the Army’s efforts in minimizing the impact of uncertainty during the force reduction. Even with major political and legislative challenges, keeping balance among the different proportions of readiness is a goal of US defense policy. During the budgetary preparation, downsizing of the armed forces often becomes one of the first victims of fiscal reduction. This was true of the years between World War I and World War II, when the Great Depression made military preparedness a very low national priority. The Army’s downsizing effect put its readiness

Consequently, the Obama Administration has silenced defense leader for a long time, so he could keep his Budget Control Act or (BCA). For example “8 years under the Obama Administration, top defense officials were largely silenced and prevented from articulating their concerns about budget cuts and decreased readiness”(Cooper pg1). The Obama Administration neglected top defense officials, which has resulted in “Army has lost more than 205,000 soldiers, or 30 percent of its staff”(Spencer). Nevertheless, this has also resulted in “3 of 58 Army brigade combat teams are considered ready for combat”(Cooper). Conversely, Obama cut down the military so far that America has 150,000-225,000 troops ready in the Army when all of our combat teams should be ready for combat, so that the armed forces can protect America’s interests at home and abroad. Moreover, the Army is not the only who has experienced decreased readiness, for example, there have been budget cuts across the board which have resulted in “The Air Force is the smallest and oldest it has ever been”(Cooper). “80 percent of the United States Marine Corps or (USMC) do not have the minimum number of aircraft they need for training and basic operations”(Cooper). “The Navy’s fleet is the smallest it has been in nearly 100 years”(Cooper). “Maintenance period will increase costs 2.6 times”(Pickup). Accordingly, all parts of the Armed forces have experienced budget cuts

The most critical issue that we face when it comes to downsizing the army is the readiness and security of our nation. Politicians say that downsizing the military brings back the nation’s financial stability. Army leaders do not see it that way, but weakens our nation 's defense capability and our commitment to the rest of the world. General Odierno, the Army Chief of Staff (2013), states that “In his professional military judgment, that the projected end strength and force structure levels would not enable the Army to fully execute 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance requirements to defeat an adversary in one major combat operation while simultaneously denying the objectives of an adversary in a second theater. Additionally, it is unlikely that the Army would be able to defeat an adversary quickly and decisively should they be called upon to engage in a single, sustained major combat operation” (Chief, Congress and DoD hammer out Army 's future manning levels, par.18). The military is not just weakened by the numbers, but by experience and

The situation in today 's Army is clearly much different from what existed years ago. Many changes have occurred, moving the Army 's EO program from a strictly educational and training initiative to a multifaceted management program with clear goals and objectives. These goals and objectives are also an integral part of human relations and are nurtured and developed through a professional military education system.

Given constrained funding and the requirements of short-term national military objectives and longer term operations, the Army should balance the Total Force as follows: first, decrease the Active Component deployments and increase the Reserve Component, specifically the National Guard. Second, assign National Guard units to specific regions and/or missions so that their training can be focused on these conflicts. And third, increase the use of National Guard units to reduce active component use particularly for low-intensity conflict and short term missions.

The Army will begin their transition in reducing total personnel and force structure beginning in FY13. Our manning flexibility will be reduced causing affecting our ability to over man formations. Currently we can fill every position we are authorized with a Soldier, however that Soldier may not be of correct grade or MOS for that position. Prioritizing, the Army is going to focus on fully manning deploying units for prioritized operations, synchronizing the personnel assignments process with the ARFORGEN cycle and with Army priorities and invest in top quality officer and non-commissioned officers (NCO) in the institutional

remember back in May of 2013 when we were all told that the “BIG ARMY” doesn’t know what to do with us, because we were one of two Air Sault Artillery units in the whole military. So like in this article soldiers found themselves again up in the air waiting for further orders to come down the chain. I wound up going to 308th BSB (Brigade Support Battalion) unit the following January. Now I was with them from January through of March 2015. While I was with them it didn’t take long before they too started to shrink. My company shank from a three-platoon size down to a two platoon. Then it shrank even more. This time they halved the remainder of the company and created a special platoon that was attached to brigade as their support. Everyone started to come down on orders to either inner-post transfer, PCS or ETS out. While this happening “BIG ARMY” sent out a letter stating that all fourth brigades nationwide will be disbanded as part of the reduction of force. Meaning that all these units now will have to find a new “home” or disappear. So, with all of this said between this article and my first-hand experiences, my question is whether the incoming president elect will take charge and find way to rectify this or not on an economic stand point.

Force management, or what is really otherwise known as planned comprehensive change, is in reality a complex and interwoven process. Though it was designed within the confines of a systemic approach referred to as the DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel and Facilities), in reality it is meant to enable both dutiful and well-thought out change as well as faster, more urgent adjustments in accordance with the evolving nature of war and information gathering tactics. The Army, as one branch involved in this initiative, focuses most of its attention in this regard on the organizational sector because of the way it facilitates an adequate and democratic step-by-step system of review (Student Reader, F102:2). But the fact is that even this initiative remains multi-faceted and appears to be rather bureaucratic in nature (it has five phases, which seems antithetical to an urgent change process), which might not be surprising since implementing the type of changes that are demanded can have major implications of all sorts. Still, it does appear that this concentration is being well received and that it will eventually serve its goal even if it does not appear that way when detailed on a point by point basis.

As stewards of our profession, commanders ensure that military expertise continues to develop and be passed on to aspiring professionals through operational development. It is during this developmental phase that Professional Soldiers put their knowledge and skills to the test. Operational Army units certify and recertify their Professional Soldiers through repetitive and realistic training events including the Combat Life Saver Course, platoon live fires, and exercises at the National Training Center. In the course of these challenging and realistic experiences, the Army’s operational units develop Soldiers and leaders prepared to maintain high standards, discipline, and operational readiness. Operational development and adaptability will continue to drive changes in Army doctrine, organization, leadership, and education as we enter the post-war era. Without this kind of development, the Army could not maintain a well-disciplined professional fighting force.

The Army National Guard (ARNG) will inactivate one Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) and one Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) and will convert one ABCT to a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). As a part of the Brigade restructure, all ABCTs will be reduced by two mechanized infantry companies as a part of the "Triangle Design". Every ABCT will consist of three Combined Arms Battalions (CAB). Two will be tank heavy, consisting of two armor companies and one mechanized infantry company. The third CAB will consist of two mechanized infantry companies and one tank company. The Armored Cavalry Squadron will consist of three cavalry troops and one tank company.”1

The framework will wipe out limits between, synchronize change between the institutional and operational armed force and will offer them some assistance with identifying chances to boost the armed force at the undertaking level.