Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance ( Isr )

Paper 1: What are the capabilities and limitations of intelligence in supporting homeland security efforts?

How can lawmakers maintain a balanced approach while collecting intelligence on United States persons in order to prevent a national security crime and provide full consideration to the rights of said persons? Does the current legislation permit U.S. Army Counterintelligence Special Agents to conduct investigations to the fullest extent or does it hamper their ability to properly investigate? Lawmakers have asked these questions since the inception of government executed counterintelligence operations in order to support our country’s leaders trying to strike the perfect balance of investigative freedom and citizen’s rights. When the Counterintelligence Corps was formed in 1961 there were few laws that governed intelligence collection.

Responsible for the program of instruction and daily flight operations for the Army's UH60 Blackhawk Flight School XXI, management of the Aircrew Training Program and the professional development and general health and welfare of 151 assigned personnel and 252 student pilots. Responsible for the risk management, mission approval process, standardization and training of a company which daily launches 98 helicopters in day, night, IMC, and night vision goggle modes of flight. As an instructor pilot, responsible for maintaining the highest level of proficiency in the UH-60 A/L and Mike model in all modes of flight, training student pilots, conducting flight evaluations, and enforcing aviation standardization and overall unit safety procedure.

The mission command system is expressed as the placement of individuals within a unit conducting operations with a specific set of procedures and principles in place to optimize the use of its equipment. What does it mean to recognize or comprehend the art of Command and the science of Control? There are six key principles of mission command in developing a cohesive team that support all aspects of a mission. The following essay will discuss these principles and examine examples of how the famous Operation Anaconda both endured victories and inadequacies.

Michael Durant is a notable former 160th Black Hawk pilot. He is most recognized for his role in Operation Gothic Serpent, in Mogadishu, Somalia. During this operation his helicopter was one of two that were shot down with RPG’s, and he was the only survivor, who, consequently was taken captive by the Somali warlord. Mr. Durant’s career has spanned decades with the Regiment, even after retirement as the owner of a consultant firm specializing in special operations aviation. Steven Hartov is both an American and Israeli Army veteran, who has co-authored two books on the 160th with Mr. Durant. Mr. Hartov was the former editor in chief of “Special Operations Report,” and his writings are on the recommended reading list of the Army War College.

10th Mountain Division’s Commander, General Hagenbeck became the Combined Joint Task Force Commander. CJTF Mountain would be operating out of Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. Colonel Mulholland was the Special Forces Commander also located in Afghanistan. They both agreed that a cordon was needed around the valley and slowly tighten in on the Taliban forces. The mission was appropriately named Operation Anaconda.9

SOF were organized into five individual task forces with specific roles and responsibilities: Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (JSOTF-N), know as Task Force Dagger; Joint Special Operations Task Force-South (JSOTF-S), known as Task Force K-Bar; Task Force Sword; The Joint Inter Agency Task Force – Counter Terrorism (JIATF-CT), known as Task Force Bowie; and

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

Domestic terrorism is like cancer that eats away at the very values and beliefs of the American people. Instead of combining efforts to peacefully and legally enact change, domestic terrorists take the law and actions into their own hands. Groups such as eco-terrorists use firebombing to make their point that the Earth will be protected at all costs. That cost even meant human lives. Militia groups feel the same way. Their goal is not about saving the Earth but rather to change the government. They see it as too weak to handle the needs of the America people. These individuals use modified firearms, explosives, and survival tactics. Law abiding citizens are not defenseless, the FBI and NCIRC work together to help keep America safe.

General Hugh Shelton was selected as a leader for this assignment since I served in the United States Army’s Group Support Company, 3rd Special Forces Group as he was the Commander in Chief of the United States Special Operations Command before he was nominated as the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff. General Shelton was the 14th Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of

In July of 2003, 1st Battalion, 62nd Air Defense Artillery was notified to prepare for a twelve month rotation to Afghanistan (Armstrong et al., 2003). The intent was to send two brigade combat teams to rotate after six months in Afghanistan. In typical “Need to Know” fashion, 1-62 ADA was notified that they will be sent to Iraq early August (Armstrong et al., 2003). This is the first time the entire division deployed since the Vietnam War. Battalion staff began planning for several operational deployments for two different theaters. 1-62 ADA Soldiers were engaged in the Global War on Terror, combating Taliban rebel fighters in Afghanistan, and battling insurgents in Iraq (Armstrong et al.,

The command structure of Operation Anaconda was multi-headed and lacked unity due to the U.S. military presence not being fully established prior to, or during, execution which adversely effected the operation. According to College of Aerospace Doctrine, combat operations were directed by CENTCOM under General Franks, based at MacDill AFB FL, with 2 subordinate commands, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). CFACC was led by U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen Michael Moseley & CFLCC was led by Army LTG Paul Mikolashek. CFLCC & CFACC were both based in the Persian Gulf where they directed Afghanistan force operations. MG Franklin Hagenbeck, commanded the 10th Mountain Division, Task Force Mountain, the forward headquarters for CENTCOM in Afghanistan. MG Hagenbeck answered to LTG Mikolashek directly, whom headed up all land forces in the theatre of operations. Combined Air Operations Center dire was headed by LTG Michael Moseley, based at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. Special Operations Forces (SOF) Task Force (TF) Dagger headed by Col. John Mulholland, commanded Special Forces operations in Afghanistan. TF Rakkasan, 3rd Brigade of the 101st Air Assault Division was commanded by COL Frank Wiercinski based in Kandahar. Afghan forces supporting the operation were led by Zia Loden, a local warlord. TF-K Bar Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) South Kandahar, Afghanistan was headed by CPT Robert H

The 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB), 82nd Airborne Division Fort Bragg, North Carolina (NC), received orders in early 2010 to deploy to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 11-12. Our brigade commander was a very maintenance-oriented, analytical forward thinking leader. He decided to implement task force organization for the brigade very early. He based the decision on troops and companies within the brigade fully integrating different aircraft, pilots, maintainers, and support personnel into new organizations. Aviation, in general, remains filled with many different low-density Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs). Certain MOSs work on different aircraft and others work on one type of aircraft specifically. Soldiers, Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), and Officers would need to fully integrate and understand the unit’s mission and various functions. A Troop, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment (1-17), with myself as the First Sergeant (1SG), moved hangars and integrated with 1st Battalion, 82nd Attack Helicopter Battalion (AHB), and then again into Task Force (TF) Wolfpack. There were several reasons why A Troop, TF Wolfpack1-82, and 82nd CAB were one of the most successful Brigades during all OEF

The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain (10th Mountain Division), was assigned command and control (C2) of Operation Anaconda. In early 2002, CJTF Mountain initiated the joint

Counterintelligence (CI) involves actions aimed at protecting the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage from penetration and disruption by hostile nations or their intelligence services (Lowenthal, 2014). Three main components of Counterintelligence include collection, defensive and offensive. Collection is ability to gather intelligence information about rivalry capabilities against own nation; defensive part of CI involve measures to prevent and thwarting other nations attempts to penetration into own nations intelligence system; while offensive deal with running double agents to penetrate, manipulate, exploit, and control targeted adversaries. CI is said to be the most essential aspect of the intelligence disciplines, in the sense that collecting vast quantities of secret information and produce excellent analysis of the intelligence, but ineffective counterintelligence measures may diminish confidence the final results (Van Cleave, 2013). According to Federal Bureau of Investigation (2011) “Significant advances have been made in clarifying and rectifying intelligence gaps and requirements through the formation of liaison and working relationships with other U.S. intelligence community agencies, foreign partners, the private sector, and academia”. For instance, since 2001, FBI CI program has resulted to total arrests of 249, of which 46 of them were linked to espionage. Counterintelligence (CI)