Joint Light Tactical Vehicle ( Jltv )

The case study and presentation used for this Joint Operations paper was about Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD). I will describe two operational-level successes and two failures experienced during the operation. I will offer clear proposals, that if implemented could have prevented those failures.

Request the SC of USAG Benelux favorably consider and approve retention of 1EA Mercedes VITO 7 PAC Vehicle for support of the following critical missions. Mercedes Vito van, IF-AE 512 (seven passengers) is primarily used by TSC Benelux/Chievres for daily operational support in the local area and long distance missions to destinations as far away as Vilseck, GE. In addition to supporting normal Soldier training, we also provide Visual Information (VI) support missions throughout Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg. Non Tactical

Current capability set fielding along with future fielding 's including Bradley engineering change proposal (ECP), Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development (EMD), and full rate production (FRP) radio variants are the Army 's answer to brigade combat team modernization. The tactical environment is the tip of the spear, a challenging space where effectiveness, survivability, and sustainability provide the keys to success. That success is becoming increasingly reliant on data. Data drives our missions, from operations, intelligence, and fires, to other areas such as medical and logistics. Consumption of data is being fueled by the introduction of new communication systems. Warfighter information tactical (WIN-T) has begun to bring this data down to the Brigade and Battalion level with the Point of Presence (POP), and the Battalion and Company level with the Soldier Network Extension (SNE). New radio waveforms are providing conduits for data down to the tactical edge. WIN-T and Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) radios are being integrated into Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) vehicle platforms now. The Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio (MNVR) is just around the corner in FY17.

Since 1985, eleven different versions of the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) have been in service. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is being developed by the Army and the Marine Corps as a successor to the HMMWV. The Department of Defense (DoD) initiated the JLTV program to replace its aging fleet of the HMMWV. The purpose of this essay is to determine if the high cost of the JLTV should preclude it from replacing the HMMWV as outlined in the 2010 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy. Because of the cost, an inability to meet joint requirements and the presence of feasible alternatives, the Department of Defense should not continue acquisition of the JLTV.

Chief Warrant Officer Three Teddy Vanzant is an extraordinary instructor whose technical abilities and extensive combat systems experience make him uniquely suited to train United States Army, Ordnance Warrant Officers. Teddy has spent the last 13 months completely redesigning the Programs of Instruction for the M1A2SEPv2, Abrams Main Battle Tank and the M3, Bradley Fighting Vehicle. He provided sound guidance and assistance to the CASCOM, Training Development during the validation of not only these two critical combat systems, but for the M109A6, Paladin as well. Due to these qualities and his dedication to the instructional mission, I recommend CW3 Vanzant to compete for the Distinguished Instructor Award, and the Army Logistics University,

Please accept this correspondence as a Northrop Grumman Subcontracts request for M&C Saatchi to produce a Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) with capability documentation. The requirement is a propaganda tracker.

In September 2011, the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee voted to cancel the Army and Marine Corps' Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) in their version of the fiscal year 2012 defense bill (Munoz, 2011). This measure could have completely shut down efforts to replace a thirty year-old fleet of Humvees, loyal but potentially outmoded tactical wheeled vehicles. The Army's Modernized Expanded Capacity Vehicle program has been a project set to replace the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) family in the works for years. The project, however, continues to be stymied by budgetary constraints. Per-vehicle costs for the JLTV begin at $250,000 and are likely to climb, as Lockheed-Martin secured a preliminary contract for engineering, design, and development. The high cost of the JLTV does preclude it from completely replacing the HMMWV, and yet cost does not preclude the JLTV from supplementing the Army's fleet. A middle-ground solution is the best method of maximizing initial investments, while also banking on the robustness of national security.

Strategic guidance on the general attributes of JF25 is provided in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and National Military Strategy (NMS). An important attribute is the ability to rapidly project military power to deter challengers and win decisively. Rapid force projection is central

In a fiscally constrained operating environment and a reduced footprint overseas, the Department of Defense is consistently looking for ways to mitigate challenges associated with rapid global projection. By having multiple means to deliver sustainment to the warfighter, the JMMLV will prevent a single point of failure. The JMMLVs design provides an additional option along with current capabilities that exist to sustain operations and rapidly employ combat power. As Australian Maj Gen Rick Burr, Deputy Commanding General, US Army Pacific highlighted in a 2013 Defense News article concerning logistics, “The potential for anything to happen at any time is very real particularly with natural disasters…being prepared to respond to any crisis that could happen at short notice is clearly the most pressing issue at the moment.” (McLeary 2013) The United States and its ability to respond to a crisis is crucial for success and supporting global responsibilities. The use of the JMMLV offers advantages that will benefit Combatant Commands, the Services, Defense and Federal Agencies, and our coalition partners that routinely provide mutual support to one another to sustain operations.

A few decades ago, the military needed an upgrade on its cargo and troop carrying capabilities. In the 1950’s, the less modern World War II cargo aircraft were the C-190, C-47, and C-46’s. These did not meet the requirements for a continuously modernizing U.S. Military. (Simpson, M. (2011, October 19)). Therefore, in 1951, the U.S. Air Force put out a General Operating Requirement for a new airframe that will meet specifications in the category’s of how many passengers or paratroopers it will hold, as well as size

On the basis of United States Code, Title 10, and joint doctrine, the Marine Corps, in coordination and cooperation with the Navy, has made logistical self-sufficiency an essential element of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) expeditionary warfighting capabilities. This means that the Marine Corps’ logistics mission, at all commands and support levels, is to generate MAGTFs that are rapidly deployable, self-reliant, self-sustaining, and flexible and that can rapidly reconstitute (Logistics Operations, 1999). While the Marine Corps is unmatched in its ability to be the most rapid responding force across the globe, a deficiency exists that should be addressed. Over the past decade, there have been numerous successful innovations in ground and aviation logistics, but they have lacked in standardization or integration within the MAGTF. Emerging operating concepts such as disaggregated MAGTF operations and seabasing, along with current fiscal constraints, are driving the need to further modernize and integrate MAGTF logistics in order to optimize support to the warfighter (Borrelli & Hodge, 2013). Independently, the logistical concepts and systems that exist for the ground elements and the aviation elements are proven to be effective and efficient, however, when the aviation and ground elements work in concert the response of logistical support is hindered. This paper will offer possible solutions to close the logistics gap between the Marines Corps’ aviation and

AQ3 - DoDEA Facilities Financial Analyst receives the MILCON Funding Request Form, and the Funding Directive. The Facilities Financial Analyst reviews a manual excel spreadsheet for the funding

The JTF is based upon current doctrine, the scenario, and forces currently available. The command and control and organization of the JTF explains the need for service and functional components as well as the effectiveness of dual-hatting in certain situations, and where it could add additional confusion in other situations. It also explains the multinational, civil-military, SOF, command

This position paper will address if the F-35 JSF program is worth the current investment the United States has placed into it. First the pros of the program will be presented followed by the cons. Finally, the paper will discuss why the JSF program is not worth the investment.

BAL developed capabilities in the areas of space and communications, site management and the upgrade and maintenance of military aircraft and equipment. As BAL grew, it faced difficult decisions how to improve or upgrade its procurement system and process to meet its customers’ requirement, especially its major customer the Australian Defence Force (ADF).