Operation and War Sustainment

A modernized and ready, tailored land force capability to meet combatant commanders’ requirements across the range of military operations meets a number of ASPG near term objectives. The imperative addresses operational adaptability, maintains a global stabilizing presence, and regionally aligns forces.

The development of the allied military strategy in World War II (WWII) presented challenges for the U.S. and Great Britain as they worked together to defeat the Axis powers. First, this paper will review the environment at the time of WWII when Admiral Stark penned the “Plan Dog” memorandum and MAJ Wedemeyer’s War Defense Team put together the “Victory Plan”. Next, it will look at the advantages and disadvantages of coalition operations with supporting examples. Then, a review of two major meetings between U.S. and Great Britain will identify what strategic decisions were made and the effects they have on the war. Finally, this paper will explore the foundations of strategy (Clausewitz and Sun Tzu) by which the allied forces used and

The Army Reserve provides Sustainment support duties for Active Duty missions. Sustainment Warfighting tasks provide support and services. There are three main Sustainment Warfighting Functions; Conduct logistics, Provide personnel services and Provide health service support. Sustainment tasks enable the Warfighting forces to extend operations and maintain capabilities. One of the most

Originally influenced by the strategic events seen throughout the Napoleonic Wars in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the nine principles of war derived from the United States’ Army’s “Principles of War and Operations” outline a basic strategic guide on waging war. Shortly before the military adopted these guidelines, however, the United States of America saw civil unrest as the Southern states seceded to form the Confederate States of America. As the Union Army of the North battled the Confederate Army of the South, strategic principles similar to those outlined in the U.S. Army’s doctrine began to appear on the battlefield. Although the armies of the Union and the Confederacy both utilized strategic elements outlined in the United States’ Army’s “Principles of War and Operations”, the Union army’s stricter adherence to certain strategic principles resulted in their ultimate success.

Central to the success of Operation Overlord, was the successful execution of Operation Fortitude. Before understanding Operation Fortitude, one must know the points of

Following their success in North Africa, the Allied decision to invade Sicily was an appropriate next step towards defeating Axis powers. Operation HUSKY, the first phase of the Italian campaign, supported the Allied strategic goals of opening Mediterranean shipping lanes, diverting German forces off of the Eastern front and encouraging Italy to exit the Axis. HUSKY resulted in Allied Forces securing the island, despite leadership failures and the ineffective coordination of joint functions at the operational level. A two part analysis of the Allied Force operational level joint functions during Operation HUSKY follows. The first will evaluate the joint function of command and control using the three attributes of mission command from joint doctrine: commander’s intent, mutual trust, and understanding. The second will evaluate the integration of two of the remaining joint functions using the definition of integration from joint doctrine.

On the basis of United States Code, Title 10, and joint doctrine, the Marine Corps, in coordination and cooperation with the Navy, has made logistical self-sufficiency an essential element of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) expeditionary warfighting capabilities. This means that the Marine Corps’ logistics mission, at all commands and support levels, is to generate MAGTFs that are rapidly deployable, self-reliant, self-sustaining, and flexible and that can rapidly reconstitute (Logistics Operations, 1999). While the Marine Corps is unmatched in its ability to be the most rapid responding force across the globe, a deficiency exists that should be addressed. Over the past decade, there have been numerous successful innovations in ground and aviation logistics, but they have lacked in standardization or integration within the MAGTF. Emerging operating concepts such as disaggregated MAGTF operations and seabasing, along with current fiscal constraints, are driving the need to further modernize and integrate MAGTF logistics in order to optimize support to the warfighter (Borrelli & Hodge, 2013). Independently, the logistical concepts and systems that exist for the ground elements and the aviation elements are proven to be effective and efficient, however, when the aviation and ground elements work in concert the response of logistical support is hindered. This paper will offer possible solutions to close the logistics gap between the Marines Corps’ aviation and

JP 3-09 points out that a critical component of integrating joint fires into an operation is the development of a fire support plan. This plan describes the operational environment and identifies priorities and objectives regarding the use of joint fires capabilities. Specifically, air planners refuse to cooperate with ground and naval force planners to synchronize fires capabilities to achieve desired objectives. Throughout the planning and execution of HUSKY, Allied air forces independently establish priorities and objectives. Air forces planners prioritize the neutralization of Axis air forces at the expense of support functions such as the protection of naval assets or close air support of ground forces.

The plan to align brigades with each global combatant command is a great strategy. The benefits of regional aligned forces are shown in improved operations, planning, and execution of missions. It also provides a greater partnership as the result of cultural proficiency and reduced cost of security operations in foreign countries.

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

I agree that the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) needs improved to meet emerging needs of the Army. The JSPS is too rigid and requires unnecessary levels of approval resulting in delayed decisions. Geographic Combatant Commands are required to develop theater level campaign plans, and Functional Combatant Commands are required to develop global and functional campaign plans. (Sweeney, p. 8) Through the use of In-Progress Reviews (IPR), Combatant Commanders are able to discuss shortages or impacts to their plans directly with the Secretary of Defense. This provides immediate feedback and opportunity to address concerns without all the current approval processes. These IPRs also reduced the confusion created by multiple products and

The US Army’s Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0 provides a comprehensive overview of how the Army plans operations, expanding upon its doctrine publication (ADP) 5-0, The Operations Process. This and other doctrine materials are produced by the Army’s Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Most famously, then CAC Commander Lt. General David Petraeus, before his later ignominious downfall as Director of CIA, spearheaded the production in 2006 of Army Field Manual FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. Ft. Leavenworth is also home to the Army’s Command and General Staff Officer’s Course (CGSOC) (the basics of Army planning methodology), the School of Advanced Military

Stability and Support Operations (SASO) covers a wide variety of missions performed by the United States military. According to DoD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations”.1 The military has evolved from an “either-or” point-of-view, to an all inclusive method of conducting operations.2 Prior to the Vietnam War, “There was no organization in the United States government trained and equipped to perform this mission, and little incentive for existing institutions to adapt to meet the need for such an organization even if that need had been widely recognized.”3 This evolution has

This paper provides an evaluation of the command and control and integration of joint functions associated with the invasion of Sicily, known as Operation HUSKY. The Allies achieved a positive outcome despite the fact that key leaders demonstrated ineffective command and control capabilities and poor integration. The paper will first evaluate the joint function of command and control, using the three attributes of mission command from joint doctrine: commander’s intent, mutual trust, and understanding. An evaluation of the integration of intelligence and fires joint functions at the Operational level will follow.

Army sustainment is based on an integrated process (people, systems, materiel, health services, and other support) indivisibly linking sustainment to operations. The concept focuses on building a combat ready Army, delivering it to the combatant commander (CCDR) as part of the joint force, and sustaining its combat power across the depth of the operational area and with unrelenting endurance (ADRP 4-0, Chap. 1, Intro.) Sustainment maintenance is off-system component repair and/or end item repair and return to the supply system or by exception to the owning unit, performed by national level maintenance providers. National level maintenance providers include the Army