The Chinese Room Argument

no, a machine could not be conscious. I propose that those who argue the yes case that a machine

The documentary Alien of the Deep Sea presented us with six different experiments aimed at studying different aspects of octopuses' intelligence. I will focus on just one of those experiments and attempt to apply Jackendoff's First Fundamental Argument which argues that a language user's mind can be viewed as an internal computational system containing unconscious set of rules.

Even with the correct programming a computer cannot freely think for itself, with its own conscious thought. John Searle is a philosopher of mind and language at UC Berkeley. Searle’s Chinese Room Argument is against the premise of Strong AI. He argues that even though a computer may have the ability to compute the use of syntax (Weak AI), a computer could not be able to understand the meaning behind the words it is communicating. Semantics convey both intentional and un-intentional content in communication. Though a computer could be programmed to recognize which words would convey the correct meaning of a symbol. This,

In particular, in 1974, Ned Block created the China Brain thought experiment to criticize functionalism and variable realizability. Supposed that the entire population of China was ordered to simulate the working of a single brain, with each person acting as a neuron. To simulate neuron firing, each individual is handed a two-way radio and unique instructions on whom to contact depending on who called him or her. All of this would then be connected to a body, which would provide the sensory input and express the behavioral output for the China “Brain”. Block argues that since this brain contains sensory input, behavioral output and internal mental states, the China brain would be consciousness since it contains all of the elements of a functionalist description of the mind. However, Block thinks that it would be absurd for the China Brain to have any sort of experiences at all. It just doesn’t seem intuitively correct for this being to have consciousness or be able to experience qualia. Thus, Block argues that functionalism and variable realizability are

John Searle 1980(in Cooney, 2000), provides a thought experiment, commonly referred to as the Chinese room argument (CRA), to show that computers, programmed to simulate human cognition, are incapable of understanding language. The CRA requires us to consider a scenario where Searle, who is illiterate in Chinese, finds himself locked in a room with a book containing Chinese characters. Additionally, he has another book which has a set of instructions written in English (which he understands), that allows him to match and manipulate the Chinese characters so that he can provide appropriate written responses (in Chinese) to incoming questions, which are also written in Chinese. Moreover, Searle has a pile of blank paper with which he uses to jot down his answers. Subsequently, Searle becomes so proficient in providing responses that the quality of his answers matches that of a native Chinese speaker. Thus, Searle in the CR functions as a computer would, where he is the system while the books are the program and the blank paper acts as storage.

Much like the course any sporting event is bounded by the rules of the game, the course of any philosophical discussion is bounded by the ideas accepted as axioms. A game of soccer in which the players were permitted to hold the ball in their hands would be radically different, even incomparable to a traditional game, even if all other factors (weather, location, player’s skill) were physically identical. In much the same way, although both begin with the same set of facts (materially closed universe, constant physical laws) Jaegwon Kim’s view on mental causation is radically different from Searle’s, because they approach the issue from different philosophical perspectives. Neither is wrong, if you reason using their principles. Neither is

The reply states a computer can only derive the semantics from syntax if given enough connections to assist with the derivation from syntax to semantics. However; since the reply is essentially an incomplete argument against Searle’s argument, it is not a very devastating criticism. If the Chinese Room was put into the robot, and I was given all of this syntactical information about the world, I still would not know what the symbols would mean despite what the robot is actually doing because I am only shuffling symbols. I am unable to gain any meaning from them. (Cole, 4.2) The actions of the robot do not prove that the computer operating it is thinking, it only means that it is still able to run through its own

The main conclusion is that a computer may be able to produce a language but is not able to comprehend the real understanding of that language. There have been many skeptics with different points of view about this theory, as well as supporting the argument. Searle states, “The point of the argument is this: if the man in the room does not understand Chinese on the basis of implementing the appropriate program for understanding Chinese then neither does any other digital computer solely on that basis because no computer, qua computer, has anything the man does not have.” (Cole,

The Strange Tales from a Chinese Studio, collected and put into text by Chinese scholar Pu Songling, is a collection of tales of mostly alchemic, supernatural, and paranormal nature. One of the common threads that runs through the collection is that of the sexual encounters and sexual relations between people, people and creatures, and people and supernatural beings. These stories deal with the subject of sexual indulgence, and clearly connote sex as a negative and dangerous aspect of human desires. Stir-Fry, the last story in Strange Tales, however, forcefully deviates from that trend of the perception of sexual desire. In Stir-Fry, Pu glides over the topic of the dildo and treats it as if it were just any normal other object that would be ridiculous to cook and serve guests at dinner. A scholar’s sexual desires are no less strange than the tales of sex in stories such as “The Fornicating Dog,” “The Painted Skin,” “Snake Island,” and especially “Lotus Fragrance.” The sexual nature of the toy Pu ignores completely, and he enforces the idea that sexual desires or encounters are not as strange or taboo as Pu himself makes them out to be in his earlier stories in the Strange Tales collection.

In an effort to prove that computers will never evolve into systems similar to human, Fish (2011) also presents an illogical argument that men will never be able to create a machine that is comparable to mankind, which is a paradox in itself as he tries to prove mankind’s superiority by assuming a limited the scope of man’s intelligence in creating complex machines with cognitive abilities.

John Searle formulated the Chinese Room Argument in the early 80’s as an attempt to prove that computers are not cognitive operating systems. In short though the immergence of artificial and computational systems has rapidly increased the infinite possibility of knowledge, Searle uses the Chinese room argument to shown that computers are not cognitively independent.

The Representational Theory of Mind proposes that we, as both physiological and mental beings, are systems which operate based on symbols and interpretations of the meanings of such symbols rather than beings which operate just on physiological processes (chemical reactions and biological processes). It offers that humans and their Minds are computing machines, mental software (the Mind) which runs on physical hardware (the body). It suggests, too, that we are computing machines functioning as something other than a computing machine, just as every other machine does.

* Developments in computer science would lead to parallels being drawn between human thought and the computational functionality of computers, opening entirely new areas of psychological thought. Allen Newell and Herbert Simon spent years developing the concept of artificial intelligence (AI) and later worked with cognitive psychologists regarding the implications of AI. The effective result was more of a framework conceptualization of mental functions with

In his paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Alan Turing sets out to answer the question of whether machines can think in the same humans can by conceptualizing the question in concrete terms. In simple terms, Turing redefines the question by posing whether a machine can replicate the cognition of a human being. Yet, some may object to the notion that Turing’s new question effectively captures the nature of machines’ capacity for thought or consciousness, such as John Searle. In his Chinese room thought experiment, Searle outlines a scenario that implies machines’ apparent replication of human cognition does not yield conscious understanding. While Searle’s Chinese thought experiment demonstrates how a Turing test is not sufficient to establish that a machine can possess consciousness or thought, this argument does not prove that machines are absolutely incapable of consciousness or thought. Rather, given the ongoing uncertainty of the debate regarding the intelligence of machines, there can be no means to confirm or disconfirm the conscious experience of machines as well as the consciousness of humans by extension of that principle.

Substantial studying has been made on the subject and Turing’s overly optimistic point of view, yet, we experience difficulty when trying to combine idea of advancement in technology and what makes us humans: the capability of thinking. Conventionally, we have firmly grasp to the idea that the act of thinking is the official stamp of authenticity which differentiate humans from the rest of beings, and so while trying to decide if a computer can think or not, we are closely scrutinizing the foundation of our nature as beings to its core. But before we dive into the subject matter of why I disagree with Turing, we must inquire about what exactly is thinking. Some have tried to define thinking as having conscious thoughts; but thinking and consciousness are not terminologies that are mutually exchangeable. While thinking is a state of consciousness, consciousness is not thinking. Even as we process information necessary for reasoning, much of our brain activity and processing takes