1. Which theoretical account best explains the role of the European Court of Justice? The European Court of Justice (ECJ), first created by the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 is situated in Luxembourg. The court’s main objectives were the interpretation and the consistent and uniform application of the treaty across all Member States. With the exception of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) the ECJ has gained influence through the different treaties over time. The ECJ unlike any other international justice system is able to cooperate directly with its citizens who are able to directly invoke a European provision before a European Court through ‘direct effect’. Further EU law has supremacy over the national laws in individual Member …show more content…
The argument of “legal autonomy” suggests that because of the Member State’s lack of attention paid to the ECJ during the 1960s and 1970s led to the ECJ having power beyond its duties. The neo-functionalist perspective also considers the notion of ‘spillover’, which implies that the decision made by Member States to put certain policy areas into the control of different supranational institutions led to pressure being placed on the extension of such power on other sectors. The approach suggests that integration is unintended and yet inevitable. According to Burley and Mattli (1993), neo functionalism explains “how and why nation states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbors so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflicts between themselves”. Neo functionalism holds the idea that political actors “transfer” their “domestic alliances” in national to supranational settings as they become more successful in achieving political goals. Anne Marie Burley and Walter Mattli also argue that the legal integration process has two principal dimensions. The first is the development from treaty law to secondary Community law and hold supremacy over the domestic laws of Member States. The second dimension is the process whereby legal regulation grows from being limited to one specific domain to expanding to different areas including
This article also examines the meaning and implementation of universal jurisdiction. For no sanction mechanisms have been created to induce them, without their consent, to abide by their obligations, until now only the goodwill of states could be relied on to guarantee their implementation in good faith. Before ending with some possible remedies to minimize potential
The CJEU case-law on horizontal direct effect of directives arguably lacks consistency in regards to the application of the general principle. The principle of direct effect was established in Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen. Although there is no set definition of direct effect, a broader definition was provided in Van Gend en Loos that it “can be expressed as the capacity of a provision of EU law to be invoked before a national court.” However, Van Dyun v. Home Office established that directives are capable of direct effect. Furthermore, Marshall v. Southampton established that there could only be vertical direct effect of directives. This stringent principle has arguable ignited the highly contested debate of whether or not horizontal direct effect is applicable to directives or if directives could only have vertical direct effect. However, this essay shall explore the lack of consistency in case-law regarding horizontal direct effect of directives. Firstly, this paper will delve into the case-law of the topic of horizontal direct effect of directives in efforts to try to highlight its consistency in its approach. Secondly, the paper will use case law and the opinion of academics (enter the name of the academics later) to highlight its inconsistencies using the legal mechanisms that have been introduced by the Courts to try to compensate for the lack of horizontal direct effect of directives. Namely, indirect effect, incidental horizontal
Tucked into the stiff, stale-smelling waiting-room seat, patiently waiting on Clemmons to call her in, Veronica admired her own timing; she’d managed to finagle an excused gym absence and everything.
Enforcing the European Union legal system is diverse and done on multiple platforms; through not only actions taken against member states for breach of their obligations, but also, for example, through the use of direct effect1. Article 267 TFEU; an organism devised to practice private enforcement of EU law before national courts, has been critical to ensure uniform interpretation and application of EU law in member states. References for preliminary rulings occur when the national courts are presented with a question of EU law due to uncertainty of the provision. The national court will therefore ‘make a reference to the Court of Justice (COJ) to obtain a preliminary ruling on any point of EU law relevant to the proceedings’2. In
Despite some traces of unanimity, the Treaty implies strong supranational victories in the development of the AFSJ. This development can be explained as a natural evolution: strengthening the integration in one sector pushes for integration in another, and this has become more obvious as the EU is growing with more members. In order to make a free mobility possible, it is useful to have cooperation within the fields of AFSJ.
The principle of supremacy of European Union (EU) law has been established over the course of more than five decades. It is a principle that was established by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 1964, and it has continued to have a rich history in the jurisprudence of the ECJ and national constitutional courts. As the ECJ and national courts attempt to define their respective realms of influence, a bright debate has sparked regarding constitutional pluralism. Moreover, the recent codification of primacy in the Constitutional Treaty has led to a new debate on the scope of the supremacy of EU law.
Neoliberalism insisted that economics should break free from national models and instead impose transnational rules of business conduct. But, at the same time, it assumed that governments would stick to national bound- aries and the old way of doing things. Since September 11th, governments have rediscovered the possibilities and power of international cooperation – for example, in maintaining internal security. Suddenly, the necessity of statehood, the counter-principle of neoliberalism, is omnipresent. A European arrest warrant that supersedes national sovereignty in judicial and legal enforcement – unthinkable until recently – has suddenly become a possibility. We may soon see a similar convergence towards shared rules and frameworks in
This essay will examine and evaluate the principle of supremacy of European Union (‘EU’) law since its ‘inception in the two fundamental authorities’ of Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie and Costa v ENEL analyzing how these cases established ‘an autonomous legal order which limits national sovereignty’ . Using Professor Weiler’s prism of ‘bi-dimensionalism’ this essay will examine supremacy through two viewpoints, how the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) has looked at the supremacy of EU law and how the national courts have viewed the supremacy. Whilst the EU may have one view, the second part of bi-dimensionalism is how the Member States have reviewed and interpreted the EU decisions reconciling them with
The ECJ has had a major influence on making the constitution of the EU more supranational by setting rules such as the principle of direct effect, which implies obligation for every EU citizen without having to call in national states, and the primacy of EU law over national law. The ECJ has also had significant influence on other areas of EU policy, such as establishing the principle of mutual recognition of standards in all member states. In other words, the national courts have been incorporated into the administration of EU justice, making the ECJ the most influential judicial body in Europe.
The doctrines of direct effect and supremacy are extremely important because they require national courts to apply European Union law over any conflicting provision of national law. This essay will first consider the doctrine of direct effect, its advantages and disadvantages and it will go on examining the doctrine of supremacy, how it can be assessed and its relation with the doctrine of direct effect. Finally, some conclusion will be drawn as to how the direct effect and supremacy of Union law provisions are related to each other and how can be really helpful for individuals and member states when looking at the big picture, even if in some situations they might be seen as inappropriate.
There are two types of direct effect: Horizontal, between private individuals and Vertical, between individuals and the state. This is fact that direct effect is not clearly stated in any of the EU Treaties. The Treaty articles has direct effect, such as, Van Gend En Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen principle of direct effect set out in this case and gave full authority to the EEC Treaty. This case provided a flurry of activity in the Court of Justice, which created many of judgements and brining about further integration, such as the primacy of EU law as stated in Costa v ENEL 1964 . This case is further endorsement that under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), a court is responsible to refer cases that have reached the highest point of appeal in their own country, if there is a question of the application of EU Law. Costa had reached its highest point of
As one of the founding member of the European Council, formed in 1953, United Kingdom was entitled to incorporate the European Conventions on Human Rights into the state’s domestic law. Undoubtedly, the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter ECHR) is one of the foremost achievements in European legal history and the topmost achievement of the Council of Europe. The emergence of the authority of the European Court of Human Rights has been defined as one of the most notable occurrences in the history of international law. Its predominance in the area of human rights standards is also
The legitimacy of the ECJ to uphold EU legislation is a necessary component of effective human rights policy. The history of its increase in power is worth noting. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the ECJ’s location in Luxembourg, far from the political fray in Brussels and Strasburg, prevented it from becoming a strong body of the EU. Yet, throughout that time the court methodically built case-law that would lead to its surge in influence in the 1980s. The two most significant developments of the court during this time period were direct effect and supremacy. These twin pillars clarified the relationship between the national and EU legal orders.
The Importance of the Concept of Citizenship in the Development of EC Law After Maastricht
The marginally intergovernmental aspect of the ECJ is undermined by it’s overwhelmingly supranational functions, which have all been part of an effort to further integrate Europe. The court has changed how individuals and corporations pursue their interests legally, how the judiciary resolves conflict, and how policies are made and enforced both at