The Foreign Policy Strengths For The Privatized Combat Role

In a 2015 article, “Is U.S. military becoming outdated?” written by Stuart Bradin, Keenan Yoho, and Meaghan Keeler-Pettigrew, the authors argued that despite the U.S. military maintaining a position of global dominance “without peer” during conventional operations, it is not the ideal force against current and future threats. The authors claim that there are several negative factors arising due to the past sixteen years of war against several state and non-state elements, inferior cultural differences of government bureaucracy compared to commercial firms, and a misallocation of defense spending that leaves the US military waging war inefficiently while simultaneously losing technological dominance against current and future threats.

Despite the complexity of this environment and fiscal austerity, the JF25 must “protect our Nation and win our wars.” It must deter and defeat state adversaries, disrupt and defeat terrorist organizations, and strengthen the global network of allies and partners.” The prioritized capabilities required for Joint Force 2025 are linked to the imperatives of securing the homeland and maintaining strategic agility. This essay discusses general attributes of the JF, specific capability requirements by service, and the risk associated with focusing the rebalance on these two imperatives.

Tactically, Regionally Aligned Forces will afford a greater degree of mission predictability and stability. U.S. forces must improve their comprehension of the operational environment. With Regionally Aligned Forces, cultural, language awareness, and regional expertise

The Army completed two vitally important publications in 2014. The first was the much-anticipated U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World 2020-2040. This work, with a foreword from the Chief of Staff of the Army, “provides the intellectual foundation and framework for learning and for applying what we learn to future force development under Force 2025 and Beyond.” The TRADOC Commanding General’s foreword emphasizes that the Army Operating Concept’s “vision of the future must drive change to ensure that Army forces and prepared to prevent conflict, shape the security environment, and win wars.” The Army Operating Concept includes an acknowledgment of the “continuities in the nature of war as well as an appreciation for changes in the character of armed conflict” and references Thucydides and Clausewitz. A number of themes emerge from the Army Operating Concept’s vision of the future. These include complexity, ambiguity, multiplicity, adaptation,

In a speech at George Washington University in November of 2015, the United States Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter also addressed challenges facing the United States, stating that the security of the US depends on a force better than it is today. This force not only includes the military services, but also extends to the civilian workforce of the combat support agencies, upon which this paper focuses. The vision of the future force is one that can quickly adapt and achieve success in a sophisticated, highly-technical and rapidly changing environment; maximize the benefits of commercial technology development; and address global military competition to defend the nation and make the world a better place.

The days of unilateral and conventional battles are history. The Army of yesterday is no longer adequate to deter and defeat our nation’s enemies. Rather, the Army needs to adapt to meet the global challenges of today, and the complexity of hybrid threats. Former Army Chief of Staff, General Ray Odierno stated, “The Army is probably the most flexible, adaptable organization across all the services”. In conjunction with that claim, the Army is implementing the regionally aligned forces (RAF) concept. Through the implementation of the regionally aligned forces concept, our nation’s Army will become a versatile, adaptable and globally ready force. Although the RAF concept is thoroughly sound, it is doomed to fail during its implementation.

The United States has to maintain the ability to conduct globally irregular and conventional warfare to preserve its status as a superpower and credibility as a reliable partner. Nevertheless, America faced severe constraints for U.S. military forces due to its over $17 trillion national debt and the enacted sequestration. Therefore, a balance and prioritization is necessary to accomplish national strategic objectives, retain military and economic reliability, and solve financial limitations.

A strong military is an important factor of being a global power, other than for national security and deterrence, it also holds considerable coercive diplomatic power, typically through the threat of force (Wagner, 2014). In 2010, US military spending was larger than the next 17 highest budgets combined (The Economist, 2011). However with drastically increased military spending by China and Russia, and further cuts on US defence spending, US advantage in spending is predicted to be reduced to less than twice the Chinese and Russian budgets combined in 2020, down from three and-a-half times in 2011 (Nurkin, 2014). Such trends might be an indication of a reluctance to maintain military hegemony in the face of rising powers. However US Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel defends the cuts, noting that the changes seek to address the domestic debt problem with the improbability of conventional wars of attrition in the current global landscape (Connor and Miklaszewski, 2014). The cuts include retiring older platforms, slowing the growth of newer ones, and a general reduction of forces. Importantly, even after the reduction, US forces would still be capable of the traditional wartime scenario of “fighting on two fronts”. Furthermore, the US still enjoys firm superiority in other areas such as technology and training, challenges both China and Russia seek to address (Nurkin,

Developing and sustaining a powerful military force takes the place as the first of my visions for America. On the day, September 29, 1789, our country’s first official military force came about. That day meant that, from this time forward we will do our absolute best to defend our country. So far we have kept our word; aside from only a few losses. After reading that, we can’t lose hope; we can’t let down now, we must push forward in this goal! In the beginning process of our military addition we had the early equipment and thinking. Now, our military has developed and produced more sufficient equipment and more thoughtful and strategic thinking. According to world

The United States spends roughly $600 billion a year on defense, more than the rest of the other great powers combined. More impressive is that this massive expenditure is still essentially being done on the relative cheap. Defense spending today is at a rate of approximately 4% of GDP annually, a percentage that, while higher than those of other great powers, is lower than the rate of 10% of GDP spent in the mid-1950s and the 7% spent in the late 1980s . This is a fact that is overlooked by proponents of retrenchment. For example, Eugene Gholz, Daryl Press and Harvey Sapolsky’s “Come Home, America,” an article advancing retrenchment was published in 1997, a point where U.S. defense spending was near a fifty-year low at 3% of GDP . Military spending, however, is not the best device through which to frame capacity as it is ultimately a voluntary action on the part of the state, and as such is inherently variable. But, taken over time, it reveals something integral: long-term investment in the capacity to generate military power. Indeed, the United States over the span of decades has accumulated military capabilities nearly impossible for any state to match. This is especially the case in the modern world given the increased complexity of weapons systems and their long-term development process. If anything, simply using defense spending numbers underestimates the global military gap . By using Barry Posen’s “command of the commons” as a framework for an analysis of comparative power potential, it becomes clear that the capacity of the United States military remains unmatched. For Posen, command of the global commons-the sea, space, and air- is “the key military enabler of the US global power position” allowing the United States to project its power far from its border. In his analysis of each “common” Posen uses multiple indicators, such as number aircraft carriers and

Chapter 3, “The Army and the Joint Force,” describes the Army’s role among the other services, interdependence on their capabilities, Army contributions to sister services, and eleven mission types. It covers the Army’s core competencies which include: combined arms maneuver capability, and providing wide area security. The enabling competencies which support the core competencies include: supporting security cooperation, tailoring forces to the combatant commander, conducting entry operations, providing flexible mission command, supporting joint and army forces, supporting domestic civil authorities, mobilizing and integrating the reserve components. The final section of this chapter addresses that from WWII to present day conflicts the Army has grown in joint

As we have discussed in previous chapters; the role of the "industrial machine" and political partisanhip makes a significant impact upon the mission, support and future of US Military Policy. When looking at the role of the DOD and its ongoing actions in regard to: 1.) the continued War in Afghanistan 2.) the recent War against ISIS in Iraq and Syria 3.) on and off actions of Kim Jong-un of North Korea and recent threats against Guam and the US West Coast 4.) nuclear development concerns with Iran- what can you see about the broad role that the DOD has upon foreign affairs in general? Do you see the possible rise of another massive, global war? Do you see a specific constraint impacting the DOD in any of these conflicts specifially or the

he future of private military companies (PMCs) is depended on several factors, direction of war, and regulation. There are certain factors that will help determine the long term impact with entrusting PMCs and PSCs with critical military and government functions for a long period of time. Those factors are cost efficiency, control, flexibility, control and transparency. These are some elements that will help determine the impact of the PMC and PSC impact with the government functions and also what direction the war is heading. First of all it will cost the government potentially a lot of money to keep having PMC conducting security forces functions. PSCs may be more expensive than military forces-particularly under circumstances when the US wants to provide the same level and quality of service as the military does or when there are high levels of danger. PMCs would be cost effective for the government for a short period, but for a long period of time it will be best to invest in the armed forces. Similarly, for those who believe that a long-term commitment is crucial to successful nation building in Iraq and worried that the US cannot sustain such a long term commitment, the use of PSCs may be a tool to substitute for troops and encourage staying power. Thus there are some significant benefits to be had from involving the private sector in security.

Achieving national goals and maintaining balance in military, political/diplomatic, and economic objectives can be challenging. John Stillion’s proposal to engage in fighter pilot combat skills training during peacetime deployments presents an opportunity for advanced readiness in the case of potential future conflicts, yet I have some concerns with his rationale.

Resources, accurate innovation, political support, and privatized development are four crucial factors for enhancing military capability during peacetime innovation. Nonetheless, countries that effectively manage internal resources, and are funded through political support will often be at the forefront of military development. Moreover, accurate innovation is essential to ensure that the technology developed aligns with the required capabilities to defend the nation. Therefore, countries with political support in achieving their military vision through accurate peacetime innovation, often have the upper hand in future military strength.