Regionally Aligned Forces Analysis

In this lesson you will continue to review the key agencies and major force management processes used in developing warfighting capability provided to combatant comman

Our nation’s military continuously evolves to ensure success in future operations. This change is only be possible if our top leaders work in concert towards a common goal. The purpose of this document is to highlight how General Stanley McChrystal changed the manner in which the U.S. Military operates and communicates in an ever-changing environment.

The Armed Forces of the United States stand at an inflection point. Fourteen years of sustained combat forged a seasoned force capable of success across the range of military operations from military engagement to joint and multinational major combat operations. Today, this seasoned force is tasked to reset from a decade plus of counterinsurgency operations and evolve capability and capacity to defend the Nation from an increasingly complex security environment. Furthermore, this transformation must be completed in the face of a stark fiscal federal budget.

Despite the complexity of this environment and fiscal austerity, the JF25 must “protect our Nation and win our wars.” It must deter and defeat state adversaries, disrupt and defeat terrorist organizations, and strengthen the global network of allies and partners.” The prioritized capabilities required for Joint Force 2025 are linked to the imperatives of securing the homeland and maintaining strategic agility. This essay discusses general attributes of the JF, specific capability requirements by service, and the risk associated with focusing the rebalance on these two imperatives.

Operationally, Regionally Aligned Forces means that nonmilitary and military powers will be endowed with the ability to grasp the human dimension of the operational environment as well as win the battle decisively. Regionally Aligned Forces expands collaborative endeavors within the Army and interagency partners, specifically the Department of State and Country Teams. It permits improved synthesis, interdependence, and interoperability between traditional Army forces and special operations. This agreement will allow responses to affect human behavior toward achieving the desired consequence.

Force management, or what is really otherwise known as planned comprehensive change, is in reality a complex and interwoven process. Though it was designed within the confines of a systemic approach referred to as the DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel and Facilities), in reality it is meant to enable both dutiful and well-thought out change as well as faster, more urgent adjustments in accordance with the evolving nature of war and information gathering tactics. The Army, as one branch involved in this initiative, focuses most of its attention in this regard on the organizational sector because of the way it facilitates an adequate and democratic step-by-step system of review (Student Reader, F102:2). But the fact is that even this initiative remains multi-faceted and appears to be rather bureaucratic in nature (it has five phases, which seems antithetical to an urgent change process), which might not be surprising since implementing the type of changes that are demanded can have major implications of all sorts. Still, it does appear that this concentration is being well received and that it will eventually serve its goal even if it does not appear that way when detailed on a point by point basis.

While the United States Army is dedicated to promoting peace, stability and security throughout the world, there are challenges that are necessary to address. Russia, North Korea, China, Iran, the rising of non state actors in the Middle East, and future strategic campaigns all present issues that face the Army. Coupled with budget sequestration, these challenges are amplified.

The Department of the Army XXXXXXX, in coordination with XXXXXX and XXXXXX, ordered the restructure of the XXXX Aviation Brigade and augmentation of aviation capabilities with the first Rotational Aviation Forces (RAF) concept in the US Army. The mission of the RAF is to support the XXXXXXX alliance in XXXXX and XXXXX.

The plan to align brigades with each global combatant command is a great strategy. The benefits of regional aligned forces are shown in improved operations, planning, and execution of missions. It also provides a greater partnership as the result of cultural proficiency and reduced cost of security operations in foreign countries.

The Army is in a period of transitioning to a new construct on how it trains and employs Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). This new idea is called Regionally Aligned Forces (RAFs). The basic concept for RAFs is to align BCTs to a Combatant Commander (COCOM) for use as needed by that COCOM. By being aligned to a COCOM, the BCT and its respective Soldiers will receive specific region cultural and language training and also be provided specific training focus as determined by that COCOM. On a rotational basis units within those regionally aligned BCTs will deploy to their designated region to support the COCOM and in return the unit and Soldiers receive invaluable experiences and realistic training. This essay is to discuss how the Army’s move to RAFs is a great strategic move for the Army on many fronts. Listed are a few of the fronts that the transition to regionally aligned forces addresses. As the Army draws down its forces in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) it has to find ways to remain relevant and useful in a time of budget reductions, smaller conflicts and greater uncertainty across the Department of Defense (DoD). With the reduction in size of the Army and the contraction of forces stationed abroad, there needs to be a plan to address this cultural exposure our forces are losing. In addition, the Army needs to preserve the lessons learned over a decade at war and not fall back into a garrison mindset where realistic training becomes unrealistic and worthless.

The past 14 years of sustained combat operations in two major conflicts paired with increased demand for U.S. Army forces globally have degraded the Army’s ability to conduct missions across the full spectrum of conflict . Proficiency in both of the Army’s core competencies, combined arms maneuver (CAM) and wide area security (WAS) faded, creating unacceptable readiness shortfalls in large portions of brigade combat teams (BCTs). Consider that in 2015, only 12 of the Army’s 32 BCTs were reported as combat ready, or about one-third. Of those 12, nine were deployed in support of combatant commander requirements worldwide, leaving only three BCTs as ready for any unforeseen

Close Air Support (CAS) is a complex mission due to the interaction of ground forces and airpower in short distance from the enemy. Historical examples evidenced that cultural differences and service rivalry affected the efficiency of CAS after World War II; while on the other hand, having a joint force with proper training improved its performance. The US Air Force and US Army argued about the property of the assets as the main factor limiting efficiency, conversely the Marine Corps exploited the strength of having CAS as the rationale for their air assets to optimize its procedures. However, beyond the issue of who owns the planes, the real difference is the use of proper training to integrate air and ground forces, assimilate doctrines, and exploit the new technologies. This paper presents a review of historical examples of CAS training, the problems of current training and future challenges to enable joint training under current restrictions of budgets and availability of forces.

In order to ascertain how air power can be most effectively employed, it is first necessary to analyse its evolution in the strategic context. This section aims to identify why the strategic uses of air power are still in their infancy, and therefore what type of strategic effects must be considered in response to future regional military modernisation. This will enable future strategic directions to be forecast, and subsequently matched against effective response options.

Based on the make-up of the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), a resident program located at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama, it will represent the AF PME School during this analysis. ACSC is an intermediate level PME School for U.S. and international military personnel. Air National Guard (ANG) personnel attend ACSC, with very few, if any, Army NG personnel. Therefore, this study will only focus on the use of ANG personnel. After completing ACSC, U.S. military forces possess the skills and knowledge to fill squadron commander positions and operational staff-level jobs supporting Combatant Commanders, Joint Staff, Air Staff, and senior level interagency officials. According to Brigadier General Jimmie Jackson, Jr., then ACSC Commandant, he testified to Congress on June 25, 2009 that since 1946 approximately 2,500 IO’s from 92 nations graduated from the college and later became Chiefs of Staff, Heads of State, Ministers, Ambassadors, or members of Parliament”. Because many of these IO’s become prominent figures in their government, it’s possible that information shared and relationships cultivated while attending ACSC could help influence their views about the U.S.

In 2012, General Ray Odierno stated “We will have units that will train to certain combined arms levels; then as they get requirements from combatant commanders, they will train and be capable of conducting operations in those areas for that combatant commander.” When discussing the benefits and shortcomings of regionally aligned forces in the United States Army we have to understand our future is complicated, dynamic, and the enemy is ever changing. Therefore, the United States Army must be prepared for all circumstances when moving into the future. This paper will discuss regionally aligned forces (RAF) and how they provide three important capabilities to geographic combatant commanders. These important capabilities include building strong