In 1626, the Swedish gunship, Vasa, was constructed for war against Poland. King Gustav II of Sweden spared no expense and demanded the ship be the grandest, most prestigious watercraft ever created. His demand was fulfilled, however due to continuous design changes, inadequate communication, and a stringent timeline, the ship was poorly constructed. As a result, Vasa sunk after sailing only 1,000 yards, perishing 50 men and all of the war supplies.
1. Who is responsible for this catastrophe?
In this case, it is difficult to blame one individual for the Vasa catastrophe because several decision-makers were involved. Still, King Gustav’s numerous design alterations complicated construction and pressured decision-makers into accommodating his irrational demands. Additionally, King Gustav did not communicate well with the shipbuilders, admiral, and seamen, and instead solely concentrated on outshining other ships. Therefore, his lacking leadership and communication created confusion and stress, which trickled down and ultimately led to the failure.
2. Were there any inappropriate risks that should not have been taken? How can these be identified and mitigated on future shipbuilding initiatives?
During construction, there were several inappropriate risks taken. For example, time was not invested into accurately drawing engineering plans that accommodated the King’s requests to increase the size of the keel and number of guns. Additionally, when the principal
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Ingalls Shipbuilding understands the objectives and functional requirements. However, the action items, time, and cost to execute become a new challenge. The below action items are recommended to implement the strategy and minimize risk.
During this part of the report, I will be discussing what problems could occur during each phase (pre-construction, construction, post construction) and how you can go about preventing this from
The "Virginia 's" grandness did not keep going long. She was a frigate that was surrendered by the Union naval force, and adjusted with steel by the Confederates naval force. She was a moderate boat controlled by two old motors. It took thirty minutes just to turn her around. Three months earlier from the assault at Hampton Roads harbor the Union naval force was building an iron clad boat they could call their own, the "Screen". Composed by John Ericsson, this boat was assembled without any preparation in just three months. This boat included a spinning turret, had two eleven inch weapons and was controlled by an assistant steam motor. She was twice as quick as the "Virginia" and a great deal more flexibility.
But in 1912 the Titanic sunk and it was a disaster at that time a lot of people died and the cause was preventable. So the failure was because of a fracture in the Hull steel and the wrought iron rivets. The fracture happened because of the amount of sulphur of the steel and the high speed of the ship as it travel over below freezing water. All these could have been prevented if the captain of the ship listened to the warring about the ice. They could have used a better quality of the riveting and the steel plates.
It is important to us because the Titanic would still be here today if He looked for the iceberg. Many people are dead today because of His actions. The saying “the titanic is unsinkable” was false. Fred Fleet is responsible the sinking the titanic because he didn’t say anything to anyone, he didn’t do his job, he ignored the captain which is illustrated in how many people survived and how many people who could of survived but didn’t.
Since a disaster is defined as “a calamitous event, especially one occurring suddenly and causing great loss of life, damage, or hardship, as a flood, airplane crash, or business failure (Dictionary.com), I would say the sinking of the Vasa was a anthropogenic disaster. The failure of the Vasa can be contributed to more than just its sinking, if we take a look at its inception the Vasa was predestined to fail. The lessons learned from this event can provide insight into the loss of the Vasa and projects of today.
*This was a build/design project. The idea of making design decisions after construction was underway is an recipe for catastrophe in a project of this magnitude. The city's insistence that this be held to a tight schedule yet allowing multiple design changes was unfortunate. There were too many players, lots of pressure, and the whole project was run by committee with differing agendas. The project administrators had to balance administrative, political, and social imperatives.
According to Luth (2000) there were many opportunities throughout the construction and design phase for the design flaw to be recognized by the engineers and there should have been a better review system in place as the changes that were made were not properly reviewed by a structural engineer. This disaster could have been avoided if someone would have taken the time to make sure all the designs were safe and would work
Europe 's most ambitious warship to date was this 220-foot, triple-deck, 64-gun leviathan (Laursen 2012). It took two years for the boat builders to design and create this ship. This ship was elaborately adorned and had been rush-ordered for King Gustav Adolf 's war against Poland. The customer was the King and
Monitor. Risk management is an ongoing process. Risks must be constantly monitored to ensure that mitigation strategies are working and emerging risks identified and communicated throughout to MBE Mission structure. What features of Lee’s program did this?
Although the project team made an attempt to manage risk by performing risk analysis from early out, there was no attempt of managing the risk from a strategic perspective. For example, normally towers are built up to 6 or 7 times the width of the base, but this tower was designed to be 10 times taller. This created a major technical challenge.
It is critically important that all of us are in agreement why we are meeting and the expected outcomes. Finally, as part of the agenda review, we will review a proposed list of attendees. These personnel may include representation from the director of field operations, land based facility safety, off shore facility safety, finance, public relations, marketing, legal operations, audit department, human resources and finally key members of the project team. The workshop will be two days in duration at an offsite conference center so the group can focus on the development of the risks that are relevant to this project and its deliverables.