3. Find the dominant and dominated strategies in the following games (in case players have such strategies). Is there any dominant strategy equilibrium in any of these games? (а) Player 2 L R Player 1 U5,5 | 3,6 D 6,3| 4,4 (b) Player 2 W X V Y Z A 2,5| 4,4 | 5,5 | 0,4 | 1,5 B 5,3 | 3,3 | 4,3 | 2,2 | 1,0 C | 1,1 | 0,1 6,0 | 3,0 | 1,1 D 6,2 | 3,0 | 4,2 | 3,2 | 1,2 E Player 1 C 3,2 1,2 E 1,1 | 5,1 | 4,2 | 1,0 | 0,2

3. Find the dominant and dominated strategies in the following games (in case players have such strategies). Is there any dominant strategy equilibrium in any of these games? (а) Player 2 L R Player 1 U5,5 | 3,6 D 6,3| 4,4 (b) Player 2 W X V Y Z A 2,5| 4,4 | 5,5 | 0,4 | 1,5 B 5,3 | 3,3 | 4,3 | 2,2 | 1,0 C | 1,1 | 0,1 6,0 | 3,0 | 1,1 D 6,2 | 3,0 | 4,2 | 3,2 | 1,2 E Player 1 C 3,2 1,2 E 1,1 | 5,1 | 4,2 | 1,0 | 0,2

Principles of Microeconomics

7th Edition

ISBN:9781305156050

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter17: Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 5PA

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