a) Explain the difference between strategy si strictly dominating strategy s'i and strategy s'i weakly dominating strategy s'i. b ). Consider the following game: player 2 G A. 0,5 7.3 3.8 4,3 player 1 B9.8 0,3 4. 10 9.10 0, 12 4.8 8.2 5.0 4.2 0,8 D 10, 10 3, 10 Does any player have a strictly dominant strategies? Find the strictly dominant strategies solution and the iterated elimination of strictly dom- inated strategies solution, if any. c) Consider the following game: player 2 C R T 2. 10 0,0 3,3 B 0.0 5.1 5.0 player 1 Find all the Nash equilibria (including mixed strategy ones).

a) Explain the difference between strategy si strictly dominating strategy s'i and strategy s'i weakly dominating strategy s'i. b ). Consider the following game: player 2 G A. 0,5 7.3 3.8 4,3 player 1 B9.8 0,3 4. 10 9.10 0, 12 4.8 8.2 5.0 4.2 0,8 D 10, 10 3, 10 Does any player have a strictly dominant strategies? Find the strictly dominant strategies solution and the iterated elimination of strictly dom- inated strategies solution, if any. c) Consider the following game: player 2 C R T 2. 10 0,0 3,3 B 0.0 5.1 5.0 player 1 Find all the Nash equilibria (including mixed strategy ones).

Exploring Economics

8th Edition

ISBN:9781544336329

Author:Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:Robert L. Sexton

Chapter15: Oligopoly And Strategic Behavior

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 17P

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