4) Solve the following using iterated deletion of strongly dominant strategies. Player 2 D Player 1 E 6,16 8,6 6,2 Is there an iterated deletion of strictly dominant strategy equilibrium? 16,12 6,4 0,18 4,2 A B C 4,16 2,10
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- 4. Correlated EquilibriaConstruct an example (not one from class or the reading) of a Normal form game with a correlated equilibrium that is not a Nash equilibrium.on 8.1 Consider the following game: Player 1 A C D 7,6 5,8 0,0 Player 2 E 5,8 7,6 1, 1 F 0,0 1,1 4,4 a. Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (if any). b. Find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which each player randomizes over just the first two actions. c. Compute players' expected payoffs in the equilibria found in parts (a) and (b). d. Draw the extensive form for this game.Consider the following payoff matrix that is below : A. Does Player A have a dominant startegy? Explain why or why not b. Does player B have a dominant strategy? Explain why or why not. Player B Strategy 1 2 Player A Strategy 1 $2,000 \ $1,000 -$1,000 \ -$2,000 2 -$2,000 \ -$1,000 $1,000 \ $2,000
- 5 Suppose two players play one of the two normal-form games shown in Figure 1. L U 0,-1 D 2,4 R 2,0 6,0 L U | 4,-1 D 2,-2 R 2,0Now suppose that Player 2 knows which game is being played, but Player 1 does not. Find the pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game.Explain all will rate what is always true for a pure nash equilibrium of a two-person non zero-sum game A.No player can improve his payoff with a unilateral change of strategy B. it is a Pareto maximum of the payoff matrix C. No player can worsen the payoff of his opponent with a unilateral change of strategy D. It gives worse payoffs to both players than any berge equilibriumFor the game in FIGURE 7.6, derive players’ best-reply functions, plot them as shown in Figure 7.5, and find the Nash equilibrium.
- John enjoys playing two-player zero-sum games. The matrix below shows the losses to John in a particular two-player zero-sum game. His strategies are denoted by I, II, and III, whereas the strategies for his opponent are denoted by A, B, and C. I II III A 3 2 4 B 0 1 1 C 1 3 0 (a) Explain which of John’s strategies is dominated.The opponent now has the option of a fourth strategy, D, which results in none ofJohn’s strategies being dominated.(b) Suggest possible values for the strategy D.Suppose that there are only two firms in a market in which demand is given by p = 64 - Q, where Q is the total production of the two firms. Each firm can choose either a low level of output, qL = 15, or a high level of output, qH = 20. The unit cost of production for both firms is $4. Write down the normal-form representation of the game in which the strategic variable for each firm is the quantity of output and the firms make their choices simultaneously. Find the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game (quantities produced and market price).(1) Write down each player’s best response functions and find all the Nash equilibria.(2) For each action of each player, determine whether it is strictly, weakly, or not domi-nated by any other actions. Justify your answer.(3) Find the set of rationalizable action profiles by iteratedly eliminate strictly dominatedactions. Clearly show the steps.
- Consider a two-player, sequential-move game where each player can choose to play right or left. Player 1 moves first. Player 2 observes player 1’s actual move and then decides to move right or left. If player 1 moves right, player 1 receives $0 and player 2 receives $25. If both players move left, player 1 receives –$5 and player 2 receives $10. If player 1 moves left and player 2 moves right, player 1 receives $20 and player 2 receives $20. a. Write this game in extensive form. b. Find the Nash equilibrium outcomes to this game. c. Which of the equilibrium outcomes is most reasonable? Explain.Consider the following strategic game with 2 players: P1 AND P2 E F G H A 10,30 0,50 5,5 40,20 B 40,10 10,10 8,20 30,5 C 15,5 10,30 5,20 25,20 D 20,3 20,8 6,6 20,0 (a) Specify the strategies for P1 and P2, respectively. Eliminate all strictlydominated strategies, and FIND the reduced game until you can reduce the game nofurther.(b) Find all the Nash equilibria for the reduced game, including the mixed-strategy onesTwo players bargain over $20. Player 1 first proposes a split of(n, 20 - n), where n is an integer in {0, 1, ..., 20}. Player 2 can either accept or reject this proposal. If player accepts it, player 1 obtains $n and player 2 obtains $(20 - n). If player 2 rejects it, the money is taken away from them and both players will get $0. Question: Find two subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game and state clearly each player's equilibrium strategies (recall that in a dynamic game, a player's strategy is a complete-contingent plan). Explain why the strategy profiles form a subgame perfect equilibrium.