6. Suppose a government agency improves well quality from wo to wi at a cost of C, and observes an improvement in health from ho to h1, and it places a value V on this health improvement. (Don't worry about how one could come up with a valuation V, let's just assume that this value is correct.) Is it correct to think that the net benefit from this program is V - C? When might this be an overstatement of the utility gains? When might it be an understatement? When might it be approximately correct? Hint:

6. Suppose a government agency improves well quality from wo to wi at a cost of C, and observes an improvement in health from ho to h1, and it places a value V on this health improvement. (Don't worry about how one could come up with a valuation V, let's just assume that this value is correct.) Is it correct to think that the net benefit from this program is V - C? When might this be an overstatement of the utility gains? When might it be an understatement? When might it be approximately correct? Hint:

Exploring Economics

8th Edition

ISBN:9781544336329

Author:Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:Robert L. Sexton

Chapter8: Market Failure

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 10P

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b) Explain with examples why conflict can arise between the policy goals of efficiency and equity in the provision and access to health care.
Do you think Canada's universal health care program can alleviate problems caused by moral hazard and adverse selection in the private insurance markets? Why or why not? John's utility curve over total wealth is given by U(W) =VW (i.e. square root of W). Suppose that he has a 50% chance of being healthy. If he is healthy, he gets all his wealth-$10,000. If he becomes sick, he only has $3,600 remaining after medical expenditures. Calculate John's wealth and utility when he does and does not get sick, his expected utility, expected wealth, and his expected loss. Now he has the option of buying health insurance Calculate the maximum amount John would be willing to pay to fully insure against the cost of the sickness. How much is the actuarially fair and risk premium? Suppose that society consists of large, equal numbers of identical male and identical female consumers. Male consumers are similar to John; female consumers differ only in that they face a 25% probability of being sick, but…
Preventive care is not always cost-effective. Suppose that it costs $100 per person to administer a screening exam for a particular disease. Also suppose that if the screening exam finds the disease, the early detection given by the exam will avert $1,000 of costly future treatment. a. Imagine giving the screening test to 100 people. How much will it cost to give those 100 tests? Imagine a case in which 15 percent of those receiving the screening exam test positive. How much in future costly treatments will be averted? How much is saved by setting up a screening system? b. Imagine that everything is the same as in part a except that now only 5 percent of those receiving the screening exam test positive. In this case, how much in future costly treatments will be averted? How much is lost by setting up a screening system?
Suggest a relevant government policy that would yield the efficient outcome andcarefully explain the process through which the implementation of thegovernment policy will lead to the optimal outcome for better health care.
/Suppose that an individual's demand curve for doc-tor visits per year is given by the equation P = 100- 25Q, where Q is the number of doctor visits peryear and P is the price per visit. Suppose also thatthe marginal cost of each doctor visit is $50.a. How many visits per year would be efficient?What is the total cost of the efficient numberof visits?b. Suppose that the individual obtains insur-ance. There is no deductible, and the coin-surance rate is 50 percent. How many visitsto the doctor will occur now? What are theindividual's out-of-pocket costs? How muchdoes the insurance company pay for this individual's doctors' visits?c. What is the deadweight loss (if any) causedby this insurance policy?
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2. A) Discuss health insurance contract? b)What schemes are applicable for routine medical check-up and diagnostic tests?
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Why is it difficult to measure health outcomes?
What is the key difference between a fee-for-service healthcare system and a system based on health maintenance organizations?
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