8. Consider a Stackelberg duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 − 2Q1 − 2Q2. The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by MCi = 2. Based on this information, the Stackelberg leader's reaction function is: A. QL = 24.5 − 0.5QF B. QL = 24.5 − 0.5QF C. QL = 49 − 0.5QF D. None of the preceding answers is correct

8. Consider a Stackelberg duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 − 2Q1 − 2Q2. The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by MCi = 2. Based on this information, the Stackelberg leader's reaction function is: A. QL = 24.5 − 0.5QF B. QL = 24.5 − 0.5QF C. QL = 49 − 0.5QF D. None of the preceding answers is correct

Micro Economics For Today

10th Edition

ISBN:9781337613064

Author:Tucker, Irvin B.

Publisher:Tucker, Irvin B.

Chapter10: Monopolistic Competition And Oligoply

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 12SQ: A common characteristic of oligopolies is a. interdependence in pricing decisions. b. independent...

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

A common characteristic of oligopolies is a. interdependence in pricing decisions. b. independent pricing decisions. c. low industry concentration. d. few or no plant-level economies of scale.
Consider a Stackelberg duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100-2Q₁-2Q₂. The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by MCi = 2. Based on this information, the Stackelberg leader's marginal revenue function is Multiple Choice a)MR(Q ₂) =100-2Q₂ + c1/2. b) MR(Q ₂)= 100-Q₂+ c2/2. c)MR(Q₁) = 50-2 Q₁ + c2/2. d)MR(Q₁) = 50-2Q₂ + c 1/2.
q18 Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 600 − 6Q1 − 6Q2 . The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by MCi(Qi) = 3Qi. Based on this information, firm 1 and 2's marginal revenue functions are a. MR1(Q1,Q2) = 600 − 12Q1 − 6Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 600 − 6Q1 − 12Q2. b. MR1(Q1,Q2) = 600 − 6Q1 − 12Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 600 − 12Q1 − 6Q2. c. MR1(Q1,Q2) = 600 − 12Q1 − 12Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 600 − 12Q1 − 12Q2 d. MR1(Q1,Q2) = 300 − 12Q1 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 300 − 12Q2.
Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 400 − 3Q1 − 3Q2 . The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by MCi(Qi) = 2Qi. Based on this information, firm 1 and 2's marginal revenue functions are Multiple Choice MR1(Q1,Q2) = 400 − 6Q1 − 3Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 400 − 3Q1 − 6Q2. MR1(Q1,Q2) = 200 − 6Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 200 − 3Q1. MR1(Q1,Q2) = 200 − 3Q1 − 3Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 200 − Q1 − 3Q2. MR1(Q1,Q2) = 400 − 6Q1 − 6Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 400 − 6Q1 − 6Q2.
Distinguish between the following terms Bertrand and Cournot duopoly Cournot and Stackelberg duopoly
Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q1 - 2Q2. The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by MCi(Qi) = 2Qi. Based on this information, firm 1 and 2's reaction functions are: A. r1(Q2) = 24.5 - 0.5Q1 and r2(Q1) = 24.5 - 0.5Q2. B. r1(Q2) = 24.5 - 0.5Q2 and r2(Q1) = 24.5 - 0.5Q1. C. Q1 = 49 - 0.5Q2 and Q2 = 49 - 0.5Q1. D. Q1 = 49 - 0.25Q2 and Q2 = 49 - 0.25Q1. Please provide me with detail step by step process to get to the answer. coz no matter how many times I tried. my answer doesnt match the one in answer key
Which of the following best represents the pricing behavior of firms in an oligopolistic market? A) Stay*Put Clothespins takes the market price of clothespins as given and produces the amount of clothespins where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. B) Unykdrugs, Inc. produces where its marginal revenue is equal to its marginal cost and prices on its downward-sloping demand curve such that the market for its product clears, knowing it will not face competition due to patents it holds on its products. C) Teen Angle Hardware looks for a niche to sell its hardware products to teens but finds it difficult to earn anything more than normal profit due to other hardware stores also looking for niches. D) Looking Over Your Shoulder Handbag Co. chooses the price it charges by estimating what its rivals are most likely to do and then taking their responses into consideration.
the inverse market demand in a homogeneus Cournot duopoly is P= 200 - 3(Q1 + Q2) and costs are C1(Q1) = 26Q1 and C2(Q2) = 32Q2. d. Calu\culate the profit each firm earns in equilibrium.
Suppose we have a duopoly with Firm 1 and Firm 2 and the following inverse demand function:P = 100 – 5(Q1 + Q2)Total Cost and Marginal Cost values for firms 1 and 2 are:TC1 = 20Q1TC2 = 30Q2MC1 = 20MC2 = 30Assuming a Cournot Duopoly, the following response functions are derived:Firm 1: Q1 = 8 – 0.5Q2Firm 2: Q2 = 7 – 0.5Q1Using this information, calculate the quantity produced for each firm, the price, and profits foreach firm and the market as a whole.
Answer the given question with a proper explanation and step-by-step solution. The inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly is P = 200 – 2(Q1 + Q2) and costs are C1(Q1) = 26Q1 and C2(Q2) = 32Q2. Firm 1: Q1 = ? - Q2Firm 2: Q2 = ? - Q1 b. Calculate each firm’s equilibrium output.Firm 1:Firm 2: c. Calculate the equilibrium market price.$ d. Calculate the profit each firm earns in equilibrium.Firm 1: $Firm 2: $
Consider a Stackelberg duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 400 − 2Q1 − 2Q2. The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by MCi = 4. Based on this information, the Stackelberg follower's reaction function is a. Q2 = 99 − 0.5Q1. b. Q2 = 198 − 0.5Q1. c. Q2 = 198 − 0.5Q2. d. Q2 = 99 − 0.5Q2.
In a homogeneous products duopoly, each firm has a marginal cost curve MC= 10, i= 1,2. The market inverse demand curve is P= 50−Q, where Q = Q1+Q2. a) What would be the equilibrium price in this market if firms acted as price-taking firms? b) What would be the equilibrium price in this market if the two firms acted as a profit-maximizing cartel? Obtain the Lerner index c) What would be the Cournot equilibrium quantities, price and profit in this market? Obtain the Lerner index of each firm and compare it to b)