Question 4A and B are both currently single. They are deciding whether or not they should get married and among other thingsare considering the effect that marriage will have on the quantity of home commodities that they can produce.While single, A and B each face the following budget and time constraints:BC: x = whTC: 1+h = 1where h is market hours, w is the market wage and there is a time endowment of 1 unit.If A and B marry, they will face the following budget and time constraints:BCM: x = x4 + xB = waha + wghgTC: tA + hA = 1TC: ta + ha = 1t = tA+Bwhere the superscript M stands for `married".Now consider, A has a higher market wage than B does: wA = 4w'B . B specializes in home production.In the above scenario, the expression for the production function z in terms of wB and t is4w B (2 – 1)!8wB (2 – 1)1O 4wB (2 + 1)O 4wa (2 - 1)Oooo

Answered: A and B are both currently single. They…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

A decrease in the supply of in building materials (shortage) means that construction companies cannot get enough materials to complete all their projects. The owners of construction companies in Fiction Town have a choice between these two options: To lay off (temporarily fire) 10% of their least experienced workers. To reduce the hours of all employees by 5 hours a week, meaning they will be paid for 5 fewer hours of work. What happens to the average income of people who are employed as construction workers? The owners of the companies make profit from the payments made on their construction projects. What happens to the income of the owners? Assume that construction workers are counted as part of the average income in all of Fiction Town. What happens to the average income of people there? Why?
Consider this situation faced by a first-semester senior in mechanical engineering who is exhausted from extensive job interviewing and penniless from excessive partying. Mary’s impulse is to accept immediately a highly attractive job offer to work in her brother’s successful manufacturing company. She would then be able to relax for a year or two, save some money, and then return to college to complete her senior year and graduate. Mary is cautious about this impulsive desire, because it may lead to no college degree at all. Develop at least two formulations for Mary’s problem. Identify feasible solutions for each problem formulation in (a).
Karen goes to the casino with 1000$ and plays the following strategy: In her first game, she putsin 1$. If she wins, she finishes playing and takes her profit home. If she looses a game, she willplay another game and put in twice as much money as she did in the previous game. If she wins,she will finish playing and take her profits home. She will keep going with that strategy, untilshe either wins a game or runs out of money.(a) Create a table for n = 1, 2, ..., 10 which lists: (a) The amount of money she puts in in game n;(b) the sum of the amount of money she has put in in all games up to this game n; and (c)her overall profit if the game n is the first game she wins.(b) What is the likelihood of her loosing 8 games in a row?(c) How many games can she loose in a row before she cannot afford to continue with herstrategy of doubling her bet?(d) Given the low likelihood of loosing, is this a smart strategy for Karen to pursue?
Assume that a country is endowed with 8 units of oil reserve. There is no oil substitute available. How long the oil reserves will last ifa) the marginal willingness to pay for oil in each period is given by P=8-0.57q. (b) the marginal cost of extraction ofol s constant at $4 Per unit and c) discount rate is 1%?
Households live two periods and have prefernces U(c1)+βU(c2) where 0<β<1 and U is the utility function and satisfies our usual assumptions. There are N households in the economy. N1 of these have endowments y1 in the first period and no endowment in the second-these agents are called "Type 1". The remaining N2 have no endowment in the firs period and y2 in the second period- these agents are called "Type 2". Hencethe resources of the economy are N1y1 in the first period and N2y2 in the second, where N=N1+N2 Households have access to a credit market where the can borrow (s<0) or save s<0. The type 1 agent faces budget constraints y1=c11+s1 rs1=c21 where the consumption for the type i agent in period j is denoted cji. The type 2 agent faces budget constraints 0=c12+s2 y2+rs2=c22 The resource constraints are N1y1=N1c11+N2c12 N2y2=N11c21+N2c22 a) state the maximization problem solved by each type of agent and derive the fist order and second order conditions. Derive the…
A first-price auction with a reserve price is a type of auction very similarto the first-price auctions we discussed in class. The only different is that, in order for a bidder to win the object, their bid must be at least equal to the reserve price. If all bidders submit bids strictly less than the reserve price, then the auctioneer keeps the object and nobody pays anything. Suppose that Anna participates in a first-price auction with a reserve price equal to $20 and her valuation of the good is $50. Which bids are weakly dominated for Anna?
When the market mechanism is allowed to operate freely, prices will determine: a. Only the mix of output to be poduced and the resources to be used in the production process.b. Only the resources to be used in the production process and for whom the output is produced.c. The mix of output to be produced, the resources to be used in the production process, and for whom the output isproduced.d. Only for whom the output is produced and the mix of output to be produced.
Constructing an equilibrium Households live two periods and have prefernces U(c1)+βU(c2) where 0<β<1 and U is the utility function and satisfies our usual assumptions. There are N households in the economy. N1 of these have endowments y1 in the first period and no endowment in the second-these agents are called "Type 1". The remaining N2 have no endowment in the firs period and y2 in the second period- these agents are called "Type 2". Hencethe resources of the economy are N1y1 in the first period and N2y2 in the second, where N=N1+N2 Households have access to a credit market where the can borrow (s<0) or save s<0. The type 1 agent faces budget constraints y1=c11+s1 rs1=c21 where the consumption for the type i agent in period j is denoted cji. The type 2 agent faces budget constraints 0=c12+s2 y2+rs2=c22 The resource constraints are N1y1=N1c11+N2c12 N2y2=N11c21+N2c22 a) state the maximization problem solved by each type of agent and derive the fist order and second order…
Suppose that there is a nonrenewable resource that can be consumed today (period 1) or tomorrow (period 2) and that it has a fixed supply of 2 units. Assume that the inverse demand for the resource in each period is given by: P1 = 25 - 5Q1 P2 = 25 - 5Q2 Moreover, assume that the resource's marginal extraction cost (MEC) is constant in both periods at $5 and that the social discount rate is 10% (i.e., r=0.10). Assuming that the resource is efficiently allocated, what is the consumer surplus in period 1?
Ehat is the maximum amount you would pay for an asset that generates an income of P250,000 at the end of each of five years if the opportunity cost of using funds is 8%?
Jiffy-Pol Consultants is paid $1,000,000 for each percentage of the vote that Senator Sleaze receives in the upcoming election. Sleaze’s share of the vote is determined by the number of slanderous campaign ads run by Jiffy-Pol according to the function S = 100N/(N + 1), where N is the number of ads. If each ad costs $4,900 approximately how many ads should Jiffy-Pol buy in order to maximize its profits? A) 2,853. B) 1428. C)98 D) 477.
Let the following demand and supply equations be respectively:D = 5p ́ ́-4p ́ + 11S = 6p ́ ́-2p ́ + 5p-4Find p (t) with the hypothesis that the market is in equilibrium with the conditionsinitials p (0) = 4 and p ́ (0) = 7

SEE MORE QUESTIONS

Recommended textbooks for you

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Economics

ISBN:

9780190931919

Author:

NEWNAN

Publisher:

Oxford University Press

Principles of Economics (12th Edition)

Economics

ISBN:

9780134078779

Author:

Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster

Publisher:

PEARSON

Engineering Economy (17th Edition)

Economics

ISBN:

9780134870069

Author:

William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling

Publisher:

PEARSON

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Economics

ISBN:

9780190931919

Author:

NEWNAN

Publisher:

Oxford University Press

Principles of Economics (12th Edition)

Economics

ISBN:

9780134078779

Author:

Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster

Publisher:

PEARSON

Engineering Economy (17th Edition)

Economics

ISBN:

9780134870069

Author:

William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling

Publisher:

PEARSON

Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)

Economics

ISBN:

9781305585126

Author:

N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:

Cengage Learning

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

Economics

ISBN:

9781337106665

Author:

Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:

Cengage Learning

Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…

Economics

ISBN:

9781259290619

Author:

Michael Baye, Jeff Prince

Publisher:

McGraw-Hill Education

SEE MORE TEXTBOOKS