(a) Does an externality exist? If so, classify the externality as positive/negative (or both). (b) Use Coase's framework to identify the cause of the externality. (c) If an externality exists, determine whether the Coase theorem applies (i.e. is it possible/reasonably feasible to assign property rights and solve the problem?). Provide a reasoning for your assessment. (d) If an externality exists and the Coase theorem does not apply, discuss a government or institutional solution that can mitigate the problem of externality. Provide a reasoning for vour assessment

(a) Does an externality exist? If so, classify the externality as positive/negative (or both). (b) Use Coase's framework to identify the cause of the externality. (c) If an externality exists, determine whether the Coase theorem applies (i.e. is it possible/reasonably feasible to assign property rights and solve the problem?). Provide a reasoning for your assessment. (d) If an externality exists and the Coase theorem does not apply, discuss a government or institutional solution that can mitigate the problem of externality. Provide a reasoning for vour assessment

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

The marginal benefit of being able to emit a ton of sulfur dioxide emissions for two firms are given by:MBX = 1000 – ( Ex / 2 )MBY = 600 – ( Ey / 3 ) Note that these marginal benefit figures can be interpreted as marginal cost of abating emission down to levels Ex and Ey.Government regulators want to reduce total sulfur dioxide emissions to a total of 1800 tons.a) If the government imposes the same standard of 900 tons maximum emissions on both firms what would be the total cost of abatement (calculated as the aggregated marginal benefits forgone)? b) If the government distributed 900 tradable pollution permits (one ton each) to each firm what would be the final allocation of these permits after the firms trade them?c) What would be the total cost of abatement in this latter case?
Please tell follwoing sentence is True or False? Explain in 5-6 sentence only Chay and Greenstone (2003a) use cross-county differences in changes in pollution induced by the 1981-82 recession to estimate the effect of air pollution on infant mortality. If counties with big pollution declines also experience dramatic drops in population (because households move to counties with better economic opportunities), relative to counties without pollution declines, this could generate bias in their estimates.
Suppose there are only five people in a society and each favors one of the five highway construction options in Table 16.2 (include no highway construction as one of the options). Explain which of these highway options will be selected using a majority paired-choice vote. Will this option be the optimal size of the project from an economic perspective?
Suppose the local authorities wanted to achieve a more drastic reduction in total pollution of 75 tons in the scenario described above. They want to do so via the introduction of a tradable pollution permits system whereby, each permit would allow a power plant to emit one ton of SO2 annually at no cost, but a power plant’s emissions may not exceed it’s permits. The authorities must will distribute 75 permits (to achieve the 150 - 75 = 75 ton reduction). Recall that prior to the policy, each plant is emitting 75 tons. (a) If the regulator issues 35 permits to firm 1 and 40 permits to firm 2, without trading, how much would each firm have to spend to comply with the regulation? Recall that each firm must abate the pollution for which they do not hold permits. i.e. q1 = 75 − p 1 where p 1 is the number of permits firm 1 has. (b) At this initial allocation, what is the marginal willingness to pay a permit for firm 1? What is the marginal willingness to accept to sell a permit for firm 2?…
3 How does a chronic health condition diabetes, raise premiums? If you don't control your chronic condition, what are the costs to you? What are the costs to others? Does your behavior, ie, not controlling your chronic condition, mean you are imposing an externality on other people? Why or why not? Your responses should be original in nature and not copied from an online source. If you gather information through research, you must appropriately cite the source in APA format.
1) True-False-Uncertain. Respond to following statements as True, False, Uncertain and justify your claim. Answers that do not provide justification will receive zero points. According to the Coase Theorem, government intervention is needed to solve externalities. It always makes sense when a public good is financed by the government. If A is Pareto efficient and B is Pareto inefficient, A must be a Pareto improvement over B. According to Arrow’s impossibility theorem, a democratic society will always make consistent decisions.
Consider a binary choice to allow or not the emission of pollutants. The cost to consumers of allowing the pollution is C = 2,000, but this cost is only observable to the consumers. The benefit for the polluter of allowing the externality is B = 2,300, and only the polluter knows this benefit. Clearly, optimality requires this externality is allowed, since B > C. However, the final decision must be based on what each party chooses to reveal. a. Construct a tax-subsidy revelation scheme such that it is a dominant strategy for each party to report truthfully their private information. b. Show that this revelation scheme induces the optimal production of the externality. c. Show that this revelation scheme is unbalanced in the sense that the given equilibrium reports the tax to be paid by the polluter is less than the subsidy paid to the pollutee.
C2) Company A is the only supplier of glass in Big Apple City used for tall buildings’ exteriors. Its marginal cost of production is cA=1, and it has no other production costs. The demand for such glass in Big Apple city is QD=2-P. Company B in Jersey City produces the same glass and is considering whether to expand to Big Apple city. If it enters, it needs to get a permit to allow it to be a supplier in the Big-Apple city at a cost of L=0.5, which does not vary with quantity of output, and its marginal cost of production is cB=0.5. If it expands to the Big-Apple city, companies A and B both supply to the market, and the market price P satisfies QA+QB=2-P, where QA is company A’s production level and QB is company B’s. a) If company B expands to the Big-Apple city, what is the resulting price in a Nash equilibrium? b) Company B hires a consulting company to advise whether it should expand to the Big-Apple city. If you’re running the consulting company, what is your advice? Explain…
C2) Company A is the only supplier of glass in Big Apple City used for tall buildings’ exteriors. Its marginal cost of production is cA=1, and it has no other production costs. The demand for such glass in Big Apple city is QD=2-P. Company B in Jersey City produces the same glass and is considering whether to expand to Big Apple city. If it enters, it needs to get a permit to allow it to be a supplier in the Big-Apple city at a cost of L=0.5, which does not vary with quantity of output, and its marginal cost of production is cB=0.5. If it expands to the Big-Apple city, companies A and B both supply to the market, and the market price P satisfies QA+QB=2-P, where QA is company A’s production level and QB is company B’s. a) If company B expands to the Big-Apple city, what is the resulting price in a Nash equilibrium? b) Company B hires a consulting company to advise whether it should expand to the Big-Apple city. If you’re running the consulting company, what is your advice? Explain…
Question Management of AG Travel and Tour has identified two groups of individuals thatwould be interested in the vacation package consisting of room and board and/orentertainment. The maximum amount that group 1 is willing to pay for room andboard is GHC 2500 and for entertainment is GHC 500. For group 2, the maximumamount they are willing to pay for room and board is GHC 1800 and forentertainment is GHC 750. Although AG Travel and Tour is not able to identifymembers of either group, it does know that each group values the components ofthe package differently. Assuming there are an equal number of members in eachgroup and that the total membership in each group is a single individual. If themarginal cost of providing the service (room and board and/or entertainment) toeach group is GHC 1000. i. How much will the hotel charge members of each group for the vacationpackage if it could identify the members in each group?ii. How much will the profit for AG Travel and Tour be? iii. Since AG…
Three neighboring towns – Marshland, Dampland, and Wetland – all border the same lake. The lake frequently floods causing damage to property in all three towns. Each town would benefit from flood mitigation, but the level of benefits differs. With Z representing the level of mitigation: for Marshland, MB = 3 – Z for Dampland, MB = 4 – 2Z for Wetland, MB = 11- Z The marginal cost of flood mitigation is MC = 2 + 12Z Questions: ***Please Note*** Previous Expert Calculated: Z = 16/3 as the Solution to (a) Math Solver Calculates: Z = 1 ***Please Resolve*** (a) What is the socially optimal level of Z? (b) What would each individual town be willing to pay for this level of flood mitigation? (c) The representative from Wetland proposes that each town pay an equal share for the optimal level of flood mitigation. Would…
Suppose that Penn Products and Teller Industries are both emitting 30 metric tons of perfluorocarbons (PFCs) into the atmosphere. Regulators wish to reduce emissions to 40 metric tons overall, and plan to achieve this with a system of tradable permits. Penn’s marginal abatement costs are given by MACP = 5eP, where eP is the number of metric tons of emissions that Penn is cutting. Thus, the cost of cleaning up the first metric ton is $5, the second ton costs $10 to clean up, and so on. Teller’s marginal abatement costs are given by MACT = 7.5eT, where eT is the number of metric tons of emissions that Teller cuts. a. The lowest-cost way to reduce emissions is found when both firms’ marginal abatement costs are equalized. Equate Penn’s and Teller’s marginal abatement costs, and solve for eP in terms of eT. For each metric ton that Teller cuts, how many tons should Penn cut? b. Because 20 metric tons are to be cut, we know that eP + eT = 20. Use your…