a given market the demand for a homogenous product is given by p(q) = 120 – 5Q. The market as two firms, firm 1 has a marginal cost c1 5 and firm 2 has a marginal cost c2 = 10. ) Assume that the firms compete in a Cournot game. Compute the price in equilibrium, quantity roduced by each firm and deadweight loss generated in this market.
Q: I am confused with my answers. Please help me recheck
A: The predominant methodology of a player is the system which yields him the higher adjustments over…
Q: Consider a Bertrand oligopoly consisting of four firms that produce an identical product at a…
A:
Q: Assuming two players in the market, with the assumption that each control half of the market…
A: The following problem has been solved as follows:
Q: Consider the following entry game: Here, firm B is an existing firm in the market, and firm A is a…
A: In-game theory, the term "Nash equilibrium" refers to a situation in which the best outcome is…
Q: In a repeated game of Bertrand competition, suppose two firms are playing the grim trigger strategy.…
A: Grim Trigger Strategy us defined as a strategy which is used on repeated prisoners dilemma where a…
Q: Two firms compete in a market to sell a standardized product and the inverse demand in the market is…
A: Given: P = 400 – Q where Q = Q1 + Q2.
Q: A homogenous product is produced by two rival firms. The firms have the same costs. The demand faced…
A: Given information Demand functionQ1 =40-P1+0.5P2 Q2=40-P2+0.5P1 TC1=50Q1 TC2=50Q2
Q: Suppose that the market demand for a certain product is given by P=340−2QP=340−2Q, where QQ is total…
A: Introduction Here are three firms in the market. Demand curve is P = 340 - 2Q Here are three firms…
Q: Three electricity generating firms are competing in the market with the inverse demand given by P(Q)…
A:
Q: Consider a market with two identical firms, Firm A and Firm B. The market demand is: P = 100 –Q…
A: In the oligopoly market structure, the decision of one firm is dependent on the decision of another…
Q: i) Consider two firms competing on output choice in an oligopoly market and selling homogeneous…
A: In stackleberg quantity competition, leader firm uses the best response function of the follower to…
Q: Consider the following Cournot duopoly. Both firms produce a homogenous good. The demand function is…
A: A duopoly is a form of market where there are two sellers and many buyers. The price in this market…
Q: There are two different market under the Galata Bridge. One of them is fried fish sandwich and the…
A: Given, PF = 100-qF+ -0.5qp => qF = 100-PF+ 0.5
Q: Consider a Cournot duopoly with the inverse demand P = 200−2Q. Firm 1 and 2 compete by…
A: The demand function : P = 200 - 2Q Marginal COst MC = 20
Q: Consider the following statements about the Stackelberg game from the slides, assuming both firms…
A: Cournot Model Outcomes - Output of each firm = qc Strategy (s1 , s2 ) => If , q1 = qc , then…
Q: Consider the following statements about the Stackelberg game from the slides, assuming both firms…
A: Answer-
Q: Consider a Stackelberg duopoly with the demand function p=10-Q where Q=q +q,. Firms 1 and 2 have…
A:
Q: Now suppose United Air Lines enters the Atlanta market. Consider this to be an oligopoly market…
A: P = 400 - 5Q MR = 400 - 10Q MC = 100
Q: Suppose that two firms produce mountain spring water and the market demand for mountain spring water…
A: Here in this situation, two firms produce mountain spring water and the market demand for mountain…
Q: Suppose the airline industry consists of only two airlines, Jumbo jet and Kenya airways. Let the two…
A: Cournot is a duopoly model.
Q: Consider the following Cournot duopoly. Both firms produce a homogenous good. The demand function is…
A: A duopoly model with asymmetric knowledge on the marginal cost of company 2 is shown here.
Q: Consider a Stackelberg duopoly with the demand function p= 10-Q where Q =q +q;. Firms 1 and 2 have…
A: Firm 1:- we have P=10-Q or P=10-q1 -q2 and MC1 =c1 TR1 = 10q1 - q12 - q2q1 MR1=10-2q1 -q2 In profit…
Q: A community's demand for monthly subscription to a streaming music service is shown by the following…
A: The total revenue earned by a firm in the market is the total payments received from the sale of…
Q: Suppose there are two duopolists that have fixed costs of $ 60, variable costs of $ 10, and have the…
A: For answer (A), We have Total cost (TC) = 60 + 10Q for both the firms. Profit for firm 1 is given…
Q: There are two firms A and B. Firms compete in a Cournot Duopoly in Karhide. They set quantities qA…
A:
Q: Three electricity generating firms are competing in the market with the inverse demand given by P(Q)…
A:
Q: Consider two firms with differentiated products, whose demand functions are given by 41 = 2 – 2pı +…
A: Given information Demand function for firm 1 q1=2-2p1+p2 Demand function for Firm 2 q2=2-2p2+p1…
Q: Suppose there are two Cournot competitors in a market where inverse demand function is given by P =…
A: We are going to solve for Tit for tat strategy to answer this question.
Q: The firms in a duopoly produce differentiated products. The inverse demand for Firm 1 is P1 = 52 -91…
A: To find the Cournot Nash equilibrium, we need to find the quantities at which each firm is…
Q: Suppose that there are two firms producing a homogenous product and competing in Cournot fashion and…
A: In Cournot duopoly two firms compete in terms of quantity and charge a common price. Each firm…
Q: 1 Consider a duopoly with firm 1 and firm 2. Their cost functions are 2q₁ and cq2, respectively,…
A: In Bertrand Duopoly model , both firms compete in prices as they go on undercutting the prices to…
Q: What is the homogeneous-good duopoly Cournot equilibrium if the market demand function is…
A: Since in Cournot model Q= q1 + q2 Q = 4000-1000p VC q1 = .22 q1 VC q2 = .22q2 MC q1 = .22…
Q: Consider the following Cournot duopoly. Both firms produce a homogenous good. The demand function is…
A: Cournot duopoly is a simultaneous game in which both the firm choose the level of production…
Q: Consider a Cournot duopoly with the inverse demand P = 200 − 2Q. Firm 1 and 2 compete by…
A: We have, Demand function: P = 200-2Q Here Q = Q1 +Q2, Q1 = quantity of firm 1 and Q2 =quantity of…
Q: An oligopoly firm faces a kinked demand curve with the two segments given by: P = 230 – 0.5Q and P =…
A: Given, P = 230 – 0.5Q P = 280 – 1.5Q MC= $150
Q: 1) Consider the following two finite versions of the Cournot duopoly model where inverse demand is…
A: Cournot contest is a financial model where contending firms pick an amount to deliver autonomously…
Q: Consider a Cournot oligopoly with two firms, where the demand curves are given by P = 100-Q,-2Q2 P2=…
A: Answer I attached below
Q: Consider two firms choosing quantities sequentially in a duopoly setting (i.e. the Stackelberg…
A: An oligopoly market is characterized by a small number of firms dominating the market. A duopoly is…
Q: Now suppose United Air Lines enters the Atlanta market. Consider this to be an oligopoly market with…
A: A firm maximizes its profit by producing at the output level where MC=MR
Q: Consider a Cournot competition game. The market demand function is: p= 4 – q1 – q2, - - where p is…
A: Given Market demand function: p=4-q1-q2 ... (1) Marginal cost =0 for both firm We have…
Q: Consider duopoly model with firm 1 and firm 2. Firms have constant marginal costs, c_1 = c_2 = 10.…
A:
Q: Suppose the airline industry consisted of only two firms: American and Texas Air Corp. Let the two…
A: The Marginal cost is the adjustment of the complete expense that emerges when the amount created is…
Q: Consider a Cournot oligopoly with three firms i = 1, 2, 3. All firms have the same constant marginal…
A: Note:- Since you have posted a question with multiple sub parts we will solve only first part here,…
Q: Suppose that there are two firms producing a homogenous product and competing in Cournot fashion and…
A: Each firm in Cournot oligopoly maximizes profit by producing at a point where their respective…
Q: Consider a Bertrand oligopoly with two firms (Firm 1 and Firm 2) both selling goods that are…
A: Best response function is determined where MR = MC
Q: 2. Two firms competing on output choice in an oligopolistic market face the following inverse market…
A: An oligopoly is a form of market that consists of a few firms and a large number of buyers. The…
Q: Consider the following oligopolistic market. In the first stage, Firm 1 chooses quantity q1. Firms 2…
A: Hello. Since you have posted multiple parts of the question and not specified which part of the…
Q: Two firms compete in a market to sell a standardized product and the inverse demand in the market is…
A: In case of Stackleberg model the leader first chooses the quantity given the quantity of firm 2.…
Q: An oligopoly firm faces a kinked demand curve with the two segments given by: P = 230 – 0.5Q and P =…
A:
Step by step
Solved in 3 steps with 2 images
- (Cournot competition with different marginal costs) Our best estimate for total marketdemand in a given market is P 1000-2Q. Two firms (1 and 2) are competing in this market in quantities, choosing Q1 and Q2 simultaneously. Firm 1 has marginalcost equal to c1 = 100 and Firm 2 produces at marginal cost c2 = 200. (a) Write down the profits of both firms and and their best response functions. (b) Find the Cournot - Nash equilibrium in quantities, and calculate equilibrium profits for both firms. (c) Suppose that each firm has the option, at a previous stage, to invest in an R&D project that will reduce its marginal cost of production by 50% if successful. What is the value of this innovation to each firm? Given that R&D costs and successprobabilities are equal, which one has greater incentives to invest in R&D ? You can think in terms of per - period profits to set aside timing issues.Consider a Cournot Oligopoly. One firm has costs C1(Q1) = 12Q1 while the other firm’s cost function is C2(Q2) = 10Q2. The demand for both firms’ products Q=Q1 +Q2 isQD(P)=200−2P. (a) Determine the equilibrium price P, the market shares s1, s2, and the quantities Q1, Q2 produced by both firms. (b) Suppose more firms with the lower cost technology, i.e., with cost function Ci(Qi) = 10Qi enter the market. How many firms with this technology must be in the market such that firm 1’s profit becomes negative. In other words, suppose there is one firm with the high costs, and n firms with the low costs. At what level n will profits of the high-cost firm be negative?Three electricity generating firms are competing in the market with the inverse demand given by P(Q) = 20 – Q. All firms have constant marginal costs. Firm 1’s marginal cost is MC = 5; it has a capacity constraint of K1 = 5 units. Firm 2’s marginal cost is MC = 8; it has a capacity constraint of K2 = 2.5 units. Firm 3’s marginal cost is MC = 10; it has a capacity constraint of K3 = 2.5 units. A. The three firms compete in the style of Cournot. Please compute the Nash equilibrium quantities. Also compute the price in the Nash equilibrium. B. Which of these firms would have produced a larger quantity if it had a larger capacity?
- Two firms produce the samecommodity, both with zero cost. The demand for this commodity is D(P) = 100−P.The two firms can each produce at most 50 units. They compete on price andrationing is efficient: if pi < pj then the demand that j faces is Dj(p) = D(pj) − qi,where qi is the quantity supplied by firm i. That is, the lower price firm gets to sellfirst. Is the price list p = (p1, p2) = (0, 0) a Nash equilibrium? Prove your assertion.Consider the following statements about the Stackelberg game from the slides, assuming both firms are identical: (I) Denote by qC the Cournot equilibrium quantity produced by each firm, and by qPC the competitive quantity defined by P(qPC) = c (price equals marginal cost). Let s2 denote a strategy where firm 2 plays q2 = qC if it observes q 1 = qC, and plays q2 = qPC otherwise. Let s 1 denote a strategy where firm 1 plays q1 = qC. Then, (s1,s2) is a Nash equilibrium of the Stackelberg game, but it’s not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. (II) The first firm is allowed to change its quantity after observing firm 2’s quantity chosen at the second stage. (III) Consumers are worse off in the Stackelberg game compared with the Cournot outcome given the same parameters. Group of answer choices: a. Only II is correct b. Only I is correct. c. All options are incorrect. d. Only III is correct e. More than one option is correct.Consider a market for crude oil production. There are two firms in the market. The marginal cost of firm 1 is 20, while that of firm 2 is 20. The marginal cost is assumed to be constant. The inverse demand for crude oil is P(Q)=200-Q, where Q is the total production in the market. These two firms are engaging in Cournot competition. Find the production quantity of firm 1 in Nash equilibrium. If necessary, round off two decimal places and answer up to one decimal place.
- Consider two firms that compete according to the Cournot model. Inverse demand is P (Q) = 16 − Q. Their cost functions are C (q1) = 2q1 and C (q2) = 6q2 (a) Solve for Nash equilibrium quantities of each firm (b) Suppose firm 2 becomes more inefficient and its cost function changes to C (q2) = xq2 where x > 6. How large must x be to cause firm 2 to not want to produce anything in equilibrium?Two firms produce a homogeneous good and compete in price. Prices can only take integer values. The demand curve is Q = 6 p, where p denotes the lower of the two prices. The lower - priced firm meets all the market demand. If the two firms post the same price p, each one gets half the market demand at that price, i. e., each gets (6p)/2. Production cost is zero.a) Show that the best response to your rival posting a price of 6 is to post the monopoly price of 3. What is the best response against a rival's price of 4? of 5?consider a market with inverse demand P(Q) = 10 − Q and two firms with cost curves C1(q1) = 2q1 and C2(q2) = 2q2 (that is, they have the same marginal costs and no fixed costs). They compete by choosing quantities. Now consider a modified game, which goes as follows: First, Firm 1 decides whether to enter the market or not. As in the previous question, there is no fixed cost, even if the firm decides to enter. Next, Firm 2 observes Firm 1’s entry choice and decides whether to enter or not.Firm 2 has no fixed cost as well. If no firm enters, the game ends. If only one firm enters, that firm chooses quantity, operating as a monopolist. If both firms enter, then Firm 1 chooses quantity q1. Then, Firm 2 observes Firm 1’s choice of q1 and then chooses q2 (like in the previous question). If a firm does not enter, it gets a payoff of zero. Which of the following statements is consistent with the SPNE of this game? Hint: you don’t need complicated math to solve this problem.(a) Neither firm…
- Consider the payoff matrix below representing two firms engaged in Bertrand Competition. Firm A is player 1 and Firm B is player 2. High price Low price High price 10, 12 -1, 13 Low price 12, 2 0, 3 What is Firm A's dominant strategy? Question 14Answer a. High price b. Low price c. Firm A does not have a dominant strategyFirms A and B operate in a market with inverse demand given by p = 160 - (q_{A} + q_{B}) Their total cost functions are C_{A}(q_{A}) = q_{A} ^ 2 / 2 and C_{B}(q_{B}) = q_{B} ^ 2 / 2 , respectively. The firms compete in quantities (Cournot competition). Denote by q_{A} ^ C and q_{B} ^ C the Nash equilibrium quantities in this game. What are q_{A} ^ C and q_{B} ^ C Hint: Again, note that I gave you the total cost function for each firm, not the marginal costs. (a) q_{A} ^ C = 24 q_{B} ^ C = 24 (b) q_{A} ^ C = 60 q_{B} ^ C = 30 (c) q_{A} ^ C = 40 q_{B} ^ C = 40 (d) q_{A} ^ C = 20 q_{B} ^ C = 20 (e) q_{A} ^ C = 30 q_{B} ^ C = 30Two firms are competing in a Bertrand setting. The demand and costs equations are: Q1 = 88–4P1+2P2, Q2 = 88–4P2+2P1; MC1 = 9; and MC2 = 10. Instructions: Use no decimals. Do not round values if used for other calculations. d. Profits Firm 1 = $ and profits Firm 2 = $ e. If Firm 1 instead produces P1 = 16, the optimal P2 = . f. When one of the firms set a P < P-Duopoly, the best strategy for the other firm is to set: A. a P-BRF, and continue with this strategy afterward with the risk of economic profits = 0. B. a P-BRF, and after this one time, then continue with P-Duopoly. C. a P > P-Duopoly from now on, until the market reaches P-Monopoly. D. also P < P-Duopoly one time, then set P-Monopoly.