a) If Firm 1 chooses q₁ = 12. what quantity will Firm 2 choose? b) If Firm 1 chooses q₁ = 100, what quantity will Firm 2 choose?

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
14th Edition
ISBN:9781305506381
Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Chapter12: Price And Output Determination: Oligopoly
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 2E
icon
Related questions
Question

HANDWRITTEN ONLY... do it as quick as possible needed urgently...

Consider the following oligopolistic market. In the first stage, Firm 1 chooses quantity q₁. Firms 2 and 3 observe Firm 1's choice, and then proceed to simultaneously choose 92 and 93, respectively.
Market demand is given by p(Q) = 100 - Q, and Q = 9₁ +92 +93. Firm 1's costs are c₁ (91) = 6q₁, firm 2's costs are c₂ (92) = 592 and firm 3's costs are c3(93) = 593.
Starting from the end of the game, you can express Firm 2's best response function in terms of 9₁ and 93, and you can similarly express Firm 3's best response function in terms of q₁ and 92. Using these, answer the
following questions.
If rounding is needed, write your answers to 3 decimal places.
a) If Firm 1 chooses q₁ = 12, what quantity will Firm 2 choose?
b) If Firm 1 chooses q₁ = 100, what quantity will Firm 2 choose?
c) In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, firm 1 produces what quantity?
d) In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, firm 2 and firm 3 each produce what quantity?
Transcribed Image Text:Consider the following oligopolistic market. In the first stage, Firm 1 chooses quantity q₁. Firms 2 and 3 observe Firm 1's choice, and then proceed to simultaneously choose 92 and 93, respectively. Market demand is given by p(Q) = 100 - Q, and Q = 9₁ +92 +93. Firm 1's costs are c₁ (91) = 6q₁, firm 2's costs are c₂ (92) = 592 and firm 3's costs are c3(93) = 593. Starting from the end of the game, you can express Firm 2's best response function in terms of 9₁ and 93, and you can similarly express Firm 3's best response function in terms of q₁ and 92. Using these, answer the following questions. If rounding is needed, write your answers to 3 decimal places. a) If Firm 1 chooses q₁ = 12, what quantity will Firm 2 choose? b) If Firm 1 chooses q₁ = 100, what quantity will Firm 2 choose? c) In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, firm 1 produces what quantity? d) In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, firm 2 and firm 3 each produce what quantity?
Expert Solution
trending now

Trending now

This is a popular solution!

steps

Step by step

Solved in 5 steps

Blurred answer
Knowledge Booster
Profit Function
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.
Similar questions
Recommended textbooks for you
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an…
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an…
Economics
ISBN:
9781305506381
Author:
James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Microeconomic Theory
Microeconomic Theory
Economics
ISBN:
9781337517942
Author:
NICHOLSON
Publisher:
Cengage
Micro Economics For Today
Micro Economics For Today
Economics
ISBN:
9781337613064
Author:
Tucker, Irvin B.
Publisher:
Cengage,
Economics For Today
Economics For Today
Economics
ISBN:
9781337613040
Author:
Tucker
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Survey Of Economics
Survey Of Economics
Economics
ISBN:
9781337111522
Author:
Tucker, Irvin B.
Publisher:
Cengage,
Exploring Economics
Exploring Economics
Economics
ISBN:
9781544336329
Author:
Robert L. Sexton
Publisher:
SAGE Publications, Inc