A seller has an indivisible asset to sell. Her reservation value for the asset is s; which she knows privately. A potential buyer thinks that the asset's value to him is b; which he privately knows. Assume that s and b are independently and uniformly drawn from [0; 1]: If the seller sells the asset to the buyer for a price of p; the seller's payoff is p-s and the buyers' payoff is b- p: 1. Suppose the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer p to the seller. What is the optimal offer if the buyers' value is b = 1/2
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A seller has an indivisible asset to sell. Her reservation value for the asset is s; which she knows privately. A potential buyer thinks that the asset's value to him is b; which he privately knows. Assume that s and b are independently and uniformly drawn from [0; 1]: If the seller
sells the asset to the buyer for a
1. Suppose the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer p to the seller. What is the optimal offer if the buyers' value is b = 1/2
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- A seller has an indivisible asset to sell. Her reservation value for the asset is s, which she knows privately. A potential buyer thinks that the assetís value to him is b, which he privately knows. Assume that s and b are independently and uniformly drawn from [0, 1]. If the seller sells the asset to the buyer for a price of p, the seller's payoff is p-s and the buyer's payoffis b-p. Suppose simultaneously the buyer makes an offer p1 and the seller makes an offer p2. A transaction occurs if p1>=p2, and the transaction price is 1/2 (p1 + p2). Is the following strategy profile a Bayesian Nash equilibrium: the buyer chooses p1 = 1/2 if b>=1/2 and he chooses p1=0 if b<1/2; the seller chooses p2=1/2 if s<1/2 and she chooses p2=1 if s>1/2. Why or why not? Can there be a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in which the transaction price is .9 whenever there is a transaction? Why or why not?A seller has an indivisible asset to sell. Her reservation value for the asset is s, which she knows privately. A potential buyer thinks that the assetís value to him is b, which he privately knows. Assume that s and b are independently and uniformly drawn from [0, 1]. If the seller sells the asset to the buyer for a price of p, the seller's payoff is p - s and the buyer's payoffis b - p. Suppose the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer p to the seller. What's the optimal offer if the buyer's value is b = 1/2?Leo owns one share of Anteras, a semiconductor chip company which may have to recall millions of chips. The stock currently trades at $100/share. Leo believes the probability that they have to recall the chips is 50%. If the chips have to be recalled, the stock price will be cut in half, but otherwise it will remain $100. The expected value of Leo's share is ______ Assume Leo has the utility function, U(X)=√X. The minimum price Leo would accept to sell his share is _______ Leo's risk premium is ________
- (a) For what values of γ is the utility function well behaved? (i.e. U′ > 0 and U′′ < 0) (b) Derive an expression for the stochastic discount factor mt+1? (c)What are the prices q0s1and q0s2 of complex securities s1 and s2 at t = 0? d) What weights create Arrow-Debreu securities? (hint: What are the weights of the complex securities that create payoffs (1, 0)′ and (0, 1)′?) (e) What are the state prices q1 and q2? (hint: State prices are a function of prices from part c) and the the inverse of the payoff matrix from part d).) (f) What is the price of a risk free bond qb? (g) What are the risk neutral probabilities π1RN and π2RN ? (h) Using the risk neutral probabilities solve for qs1and qs2 (i) Is π2RNgreater than or less than the true probability π2? Why? .If a risk‐neutral individual owns a home worth $200,000 and there is a three percent chance the home will be destroyed by fire in the next year, then we know that:a) He is willing to pay much more than $6,000 for full cover.b) He is willing to pay much less than $6,000 for full cover.c) He is willing to pay at most $6,000 for full cover.d) None of the above are correct.e) All of the above are correct.David wants to auction a painting, and there are two potential buyers. The value for eachbuyer is either 0 or 10, each value equally likely. Suppose he offers to sell the object for $6, and the two buyers simultaneously accept or reject. If exactly one buyer accepts, the object sold to that person for $6. If both accept, the object is allocated randomly to the buyers, also for $6. If neither accepts, the object is allocated randomly to the bidders for $0. (a) Identify the type space and strategy space for each buyer. (b) Show that there is an equilibrium in which buyers with value 10 always accept. (c) Show that there is an equilibrium in which buyers with value 10 always reject.
- Suppose Investor A has a power utility function with γ = 1, whilst Investor B has a power utility function with γ = 0.5 (i) Which investor is more risk-averse(assuming that w > 0)? (ii) Suppose that Investor B has an initial wealth of 100 and is offered the opportunity to buy Investment X for 100, which offers an equal chance of a payout of 110 or 92. Will she choose to buy Investment X?Two partners start a business. Each has two possible strategies, spend full time or secretly take a second job and spend only part time on the business. Any profits that the business makes will be split equally between the two partners, regardless of whether they work full time or part time for the business. If a partner takes a second job, he will earn $20,000 from this job plus his share of profits from the business. If he spends full time on the business, his only source of income is his share of profits from this business. If both partners spend full time on the business, total profits will be $200,000. If one partner spends full time on the business and the other takes a second job, the business profits will be $80,000. If both partners take second job, the total business profits are $20,000. a) This game has no pure strategy Nash equilibria, but has a mixed strategy equilibrium. b) This game has two Nash equilibria, one in which each partner has an income of $100,000 and one in…BPO Services is in the business of digitizing information from forms that are filled out by hand. In 2006, a big client gave BPO a distribution of the forms that it digitized in house last year, and BPO estimated how much it would cost to digitize each form. Form Type Mix of Forms Form Cost A 0.5 $3.00 B 0.5 $1.00 The expected cost of digitizing a form is . Suppose the client and BPO agree to a deal, whereby the client pays BPO to digitize forms. The price of each form processed is equal to the expected cost of the form that you calculated in the previous part of the problem. Suppose that after the agreement, the client sends only forms of type A. The expected digitization cost per form of the forms sent by the client is . This leads to an expected loss of per form for BPO. (Hint: Do not round your answers. Enter the loss as a positive number.)
- Angie owns an endive farm that will be worth $90,000 or $0 with equal probability. Her Bernouilli utility function is u(w) =√w, where w is her wealth level (sum of initial wealth and the worth of the endive farm). 1. Suppose her firm is the only asset she has, that is, she has no initial wealth. What is the lowest price P at which she will agree to sell her endive farm before she knows how much it will be worth? 2. Redo part (1) assuming that she has $160,000 in her bank safe. 3. Compare and discuss your results in parts (1) and (2). What relationship can you find between Angie’s initial wealth level (zero versus $160,000) and her risk aversion?Suppose that there is limited commitment in the credit market, but lenders are uncertain about the value of collateral. Each consumer has a quantity of collateral H, but from the point of view of the lender, there is a probability a that the collateral will be worth p in the future period, and probability 1 - a that the collateral will be worthless in the future period. Suppose that all consumers are identical. (a) Determine the collateral constraint for the consumer, and show the consumer’s lifetime budget constraint in a diagram. (b) How will a decrease in a affect the consumer’s consumption and savings in the current period, and consumption in the future period? Briefly explain your results. Please do fast ASAP fastConsider a two-state economy with two agents who have identical preferences given by u(x)=lnxu(x)=lnx . If their endowments are (2, 1) and (1, 2) respectively and the two states are equally likely, show that both agents are fully insured in this mutual insurance endowment economy.