Any charge that is not airfare is referred to as ancillary revenue for airlines—and they are cleaning up on it to the tune of $20 billion a year. While consumers can avoid some fees, such as those for food, preferred seating, and wi-fi, the majority can’t avoid baggage fees. What type of pricing strategies are airlines using? Is it ethical for airlines to charge baggage fees?

Any charge that is not airfare is referred to as ancillary revenue for airlines—and they are cleaning up on it to the tune of $20 billion a year. While consumers can avoid some fees, such as those for food, preferred seating, and wi-fi, the majority can’t avoid baggage fees. What type of pricing strategies are airlines using? Is it ethical for airlines to charge baggage fees?

Microeconomics A Contemporary Intro

10th Edition

ISBN:9781285635101

Author:MCEACHERN

Publisher:MCEACHERN

Chapter6: Consumer Choice And Demand

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 10QFR

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What type of pricing strategies are airlines using? Is it ethical for airlines to charge baggage fees?
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JetBlue and Delta are the only two major airlines with regularly scheduled service between New York and Nantucket. There are 900 potential passengers every week, each of whom is willing to pay up to $400 for a ticket. Since the two airlines provide an essentially identical (bad) service, customers simply prefer to buy from the cheaper one. (If they charge the same price, then they will split the market equally.) Each airline can transport at most 1200 passengers each week. You can safely assume that each airline spends literal peanuts (i.e., zero) serving passengers; however, each passenger displaces air cargo that is worth $160 in profits to the carriers. Suppose that each airline takes a short-run perspective and only wants to maximize each week's profits, and that neither one would consider shutting down the route in the foreseeable future. (a) What is the appropriate economic model to study price competition in this market? (b) If you use Nash equilibrium to make a prediction, what…
JetBlue and Delta are the only two major airlines with regularly scheduled service between New York and Nantucket. There are 900 potential passengers every week, each of whom is willing to pay up to $400 for a ticket. Since the two airlines provide an essentially identical (bad) service, customers simply prefer to buy from the cheaper one. (If they charge the same price, then they will split the market equally.) Each airline can transport at most 1200 passengers each week. You can safely assume that each airline spends literal peanuts (i.e., zero) serving passengers; however, each passenger displaces air cargo that is worth $160 in profits to the carriers. Suppose that each airline takes a short-run perspective and only wants to maximize each week’s profits, and that neither one would consider shutting down the route in the foreseeable future. a) What is the appropriate economic model to study price competition in this market, and why? b) If you use Nash equilibrium to make a…