Assume a firm located in a non-urban location pays a wage of $34/hour. However, it is assumed that there is a 20% chance that workers incur "switching costs" of $14/h. a) what is the expected wage? b) If a firm in an urban cluster wants to match the expected wage (and all else is equal), what should it pay assuming that urban switching cost is only $10 and the chance that switching is necessary is only 10%.

Assume a firm located in a non-urban location pays a wage of $34/hour. However, it is assumed that there is a 20% chance that workers incur "switching costs" of $14/h. a) what is the expected wage? b) If a firm in an urban cluster wants to match the expected wage (and all else is equal), what should it pay assuming that urban switching cost is only $10 and the chance that switching is necessary is only 10%.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.8P

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