Consider a population of 500 families. 300 have private insurance, 100 have Medicaid, and 100 are uninsured. Suppose that Medicaid expands eligibility, and now the 100 uninsured families are now all eligible for Medicaid coverage. After one year, we see that 275 families have private insurance, 175 have Medicaid, and 50 are uninsured. In this case, the private insurance crowd-out rate associated with Medicaid expansion is what percent?

Consider a population of 500 families. 300 have private insurance, 100 have Medicaid, and 100 are uninsured. Suppose that Medicaid expands eligibility, and now the 100 uninsured families are now all eligible for Medicaid coverage. After one year, we see that 275 families have private insurance, 175 have Medicaid, and 50 are uninsured. In this case, the private insurance crowd-out rate associated with Medicaid expansion is what percent?

Exploring Economics

8th Edition

ISBN:9781544336329

Author:Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:Robert L. Sexton

Chapter17: Income, Poverty, And Health Care

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 18P

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