Consider a two-agents, two goods economy, in which both agents, A and B, are represented by the following utility function: UA(r1, 12) = rr2 UB(y1, 42) = Y1y There are w units of each good in the economy. 1. Characterize the set of Pareto optimal allocations and represent it in the Edgeworth box. The 3 units of each goods are initially share as follows: A has w units of good 1 and zero unit of good 2; B has zero unit of good 1 and w units of good 2. 2. Determine the Walrasian equilibrium

Consider a two-agents, two goods economy, in which both agents, A and B, are represented by the following utility function: UA(r1, 12) = rr2 UB(y1, 42) = Y1y There are w units of each good in the economy. 1. Characterize the set of Pareto optimal allocations and represent it in the Edgeworth box. The 3 units of each goods are initially share as follows: A has w units of good 1 and zero unit of good 2; B has zero unit of good 1 and w units of good 2. 2. Determine the Walrasian equilibrium

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter13: General Equilibrium And Welfare

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 13.5P

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