Consider the following game. Player S DE A 10, 10 8, 7 8, 8 Player R 8,7 9.8 9. 12 B C 9,8 7, 10 12, 7 Find the best response of step-2 Player S assuming that step-0 players (either Ror S) choose the strategy at random with equal probability. Select one O a. F O b.E O c. B O d. A O e. C O .D
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- Consider the following variation to the Rock (R), Paper (P), Scissors (S) game:• Suppose that the Player 1 (row player) has a single type, Normal.• Player 2 (column player) has two types Normal and Simple.• A player of Normal type plays this zero-sum game as we studied in class whereas a player of type Simple always play P.• Player 2 knows whether he is Normal or Simple, but player 1does not.a) Suppose player 2 is of type Normal with probability 1/3 and of type Simple with probability (2/3). Find all pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria.b) Suppose player 2 is of type Normal with probability 2/3 and of type Simple with probability (1/3). Find all pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria.You and a rival are engaged in a game in which there are three possible outcomes: you win, your rival wins (you lose), or the two of you tie. You get a payoff of 50 if you win, a payoff of 20 if you tie, and a payoff of 0 if you lose. What is your expected payoff in each of the following situations? (a) There is a 50% chance that the game ends in a tie, but only a 10% chance that you win. (There is thus a 40% chance that you lose.) (b) There is a 50–50 chance that you win or lose. There are no ties. (c) There is an 80% chance that you lose, a 10% chance that you win, and a 10% chance that you tie.There are N>=2 collectors who engage in the auction of an antique. The collectorshave a common valuation of the antique, denoted by v, which is known to all. Thecollectors make a simultaneous bid. Let pn denote the bid by collector n = 1,....,N. The one with the highest bid wins the antique. The winner receives payoff v-pi.The other(s) receive zero payoff. If more than one collectors make the same highestbid, then they have an equal chance of winning the item. Prove that: A) It is not a Nash Equilibrium (NE) if the highest bid is v and onlyone collector bids this price.(b) It is not a NE if the highest bid is less than v.(c) It is a NE that the highest bid is v and more than one collector bidsthis price
- Mohamed and Kate each pick an integer number between 1 and 3 (inclusive). They make their choices sequentially.Mohamed is the first player and Kate the second player. If they pick the same number each receives a payoff equal to the number they named. If they pick a different number, they get nothing. What is the SPE of the game? a. Mohamed chooses 3 and Kate is indifferent between 1, 2 and 3. b. Mohamed chooses 3 and Kate chooses 1 if Mohamed chooses 1, 2 if Mohamed chooses 2, and 3 if Mohamed chooses 3. c. Mohamed chooses 1 and Kate chooses 1 if Mohamed chooses 1, 2 if Mohamed chooses 2 and 3 if Mohamed chooses 3. d. Mohamed chooses 3 and Kate chooses 3.2. Kier, in The scenario, wants to determine how each of the 3 companies will decide on possible new investments. He was able to determine the new investment pay off for each of the three choices as well as the probability of the two types of market. If a company will launch product 1, it will gain 50,000 if the market is successful and lose 50,000 if the market is a failure. If a company will launch product 2, it will gain 25,000 if the market is successful and lose 25,000 if the market will fail. If a company decides not to launch any of the product, it will not be affected whether the market will succeed or fail. There is a 56% probability that the market will succeed and 44% probability that the market will fail. What will be the companies decision based on EMV? What is the decision of each company based on expected utility value?The mixed stratergy nash equalibrium consists of : the probability of firm A selecting October is 0.692 and probability of firm A selecting December is 0.309. The probability of firm B selecting October is 0.5 and probability of firm selecting December is 0.5. In the equilibrium you calculated above, what is the probability that both consoles are released in October? In December? What are the expected payoffs of firm A and of firm B in equilibrium?
- We’ll now show how a college degree can get you a better job even if itdoesn’t make you a better worker. Consider a two-player game between aprospective employee, whom we’ll refer to as the applicant, and an employer. The applicant’s type is her intellect, which may be low, moderate,or high, with probability 1/3 , 1/2 , and 1/6 , respectively. After the applicantlearns her type, she decides whether or not to go to college. The personalcost in gaining a college degree is higher when the applicant is less intelligent, because a less smart student has to work harder if she is to graduate. Assume that the cost of gaining a college degree is 2, 4, and 6 for an applicant who is of high, moderate, and low intelligence, respectively.The employer decides whether to offer the applicant a job as a manageror as a clerk. The applicant’s payoff to being hired as a manager is 15,while the payoff to being a clerk is 10. These payoffs are independent ofthe applicant’s type. The employer’s payoff from…Consider the location game we covered in Lecture 3. Now assume there arethree players (vendors). As we assumed in the lecture, consumers in each area choosethe closest vendor and if there are multiple closest vendors then these vendors receiveequal share of consumers in the area. Notice Si = {1, 2, 3, ...., 9} for i = 1, 2, 3. Here aresome examples of payoffs: u1(1, 1, 1) = 3, u1(1, 1, 9) = u2(1, 1, 9) = 2.25, u3(1, 1, 9) =4.5, u1(1, 5, 9) = u3(1, 5, 9) = 2.5 and u2(1, 5, 9) = 4. (a) Is s′1 = 1 strictly dominated by s′′1 = 2 for player 1?(b) Is s′1 = 1 weakly dominated by s′′1 = 2 for player 1?(c) Can you find a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies?Paramter y = 0 What is the highest payoff any player can receive in any subgame perfect Nashequilibrium of the repeated game?
- Find all NE of the stage game.(b) Consider a two-period game without discounting in which the stage game is played ineach period. Find all pure strategy SPNE.(c) What’s the min-max payoff of each player?(c1) Consider pure strategies only.(c2) Consider all strategies, including the mixed ones.(d) Now suppose the stage game is repeated infinitely many times. Use the Fudenberg-Maskin Folk theorem to find all possible values of payoff that can be supported as aSPNE.True/False a. Consider a strategic game, in which player i has two actions, a and b. Let s−i be some strategy profile of her opponents. If a IS a best response to s−i, then b is NOT a best response to s−i. b. Consider the same game in (a). If a IS NOT a best response to s−i, then a does NOT weakly dominates b. c. Consider the same game in (a). If a mixed strategy of i that assigns probabilities 13 and 23 to a and b, respectively, IS a best response to s−i, SO IS a mixed strategy that assigns probabilities 32 and 13 to a and b, respectively. d. Consider the same game in (a). If a mixed strategy of i that assigns probabilities 13 and 23 to a and b, respectively, is NOT a best response to some strategy profile of her opponents, s−i, NEITHER is a mixed strategy that assigns probabilities 32 and 13 to a and b, respectively. e. Consider the same game in (a). If a IS a best response to s−i, SO IS any mixed strategy that assigns positive probability to a. f. Consider the same game in (a). If a…What is the payoff for both players in the SPNE of this game?-(2,5)-(3,4)- (2,2)- (5,1)- (1,7)