Exercise 11 D ominance and Best Responses (H) (a) Show that if an action is a best response (to some str ategy of the other players), then it is undominated. (b) Show that ever y weakly dominant strategy is pure. (c) Now, let N = {1, 2} and s¡ be a best response for player 1 to both t and t. Show that s; is also a best respon se to all mixtures t of t and t', where for any pE [0, 1], t? is defined by t = [p: t, (1 – p) : t"].
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- Given the both answer..True/False a. Consider a strategic game, in which player i has two actions, a and b. Let s−i be some strategy profile of her opponents. If a IS a best response to s−i, then b is NOT a best response to s−i. b. Consider the same game in (a). If a IS NOT a best response to s−i, then a does NOT weakly dominates b. c. Consider the same game in (a). If a mixed strategy of i that assigns probabilities 13 and 23 to a and b, respectively, IS a best response to s−i, SO IS a mixed strategy that assigns probabilities 32 and 13 to a and b, respectively. d. Consider the same game in (a). If a mixed strategy of i that assigns probabilities 13 and 23 to a and b, respectively, is NOT a best response to some strategy profile of her opponents, s−i, NEITHER is a mixed strategy that assigns probabilities 32 and 13 to a and b, respectively. e. Consider the same game in (a). If a IS a best response to s−i, SO IS any mixed strategy that assigns positive probability to a. f. Consider the same game in (a). If a…An experiment can result in any of the outcomes 1, 2, or 3.(a) If there are two different wagers, withr1(1) = 1, r1(2) = 8, r1(3) = −10r2(1) = 2, r2(2) = 12, r2(3) = −16.Is an arbitrage possible? Do not just answer a yes or no. Show your working.
- Two identically able agents are competing for a promotion. The promotion is awarded on the basis of output (whomever has the highest output, gets the promotion). Because there are only two workers competing for one prize, the losing prize=0 and the winning prize =P. The output for each agent is equal to his or her effort level times a productivity parameter (d). (i.e. Q2=dE1 , Q2=dE2). If the distribution of “relative luck” is uniform, the probability of winning the promotion for agent 1 will be a function of his effort (E1) and the effort level of Agent 2 (E2). The formula is given by...Prob(win)=0.5 + α(E1-E2), where α is a parameter that reflects uncertainty and errors in measurement. High measurement errors are associated with small values of α (think about this: if there are high measurement errors, then the level of an agent’s effort will have a smaller effect on his/her chances of winning). Using this information, please answer the following questions. Both workers have a…Choose the correct answer. A strategy AA is "dominant" for a player X if: A. Every outcome under strategy AA generates positive payoffs. B. Irrespective of any of the possible strategies chosen by the other players, strategy AA generates a higher payoff than any other strategy available to player X. C. Strategy AA is the best response to every strategy of the other player. D. Strategy AA contains among its outcomes the highest possible payoff in the game. E. Strategy AA is the best response to the best strategy of the other player.A clothing store and a jeweler are located side by side in a shopping mall. If the clothing store spend C dollars on advertising and the jeweler spends J dollars on advertising, then the profits of the clothing store will be (36 + J )C - 2C 2 and the profits of the jeweler will be (30 + C )J - 2J 2. The clothing store gets to choose its amount of advertising first, knowing that the jeweler will find out how much the clothing store advertised before deciding how much to spend. The amount spent by the clothing store will be Group of answer choices $17. $34. $51. $8.50. $25.50.
- There are N>=2 collectors who engage in the auction of an antique. The collectorshave a common valuation of the antique, denoted by v, which is known to all. Thecollectors make a simultaneous bid. Let pn denote the bid by collector n = 1,....,N. The one with the highest bid wins the antique. The winner receives payoff v-pi.The other(s) receive zero payoff. If more than one collectors make the same highestbid, then they have an equal chance of winning the item. Prove that: A) It is not a Nash Equilibrium (NE) if the highest bid is v and onlyone collector bids this price.(b) It is not a NE if the highest bid is less than v.(c) It is a NE that the highest bid is v and more than one collector bidsthis price* Please be advised this is for practice preperation only ** i just really need help on this - I dont undertsand X is an arbitrary number Suppose the stage game was played for 3 rounds. Consider the following strategy: Round 1: play C. Round 2: play C if both players played C in round 1. Otherwise, play E. Round 3: play D if both players played C in rounds 1 and 2. Otherwise, play E.Ignore discounting (that is, δ = 1). Suppose that both players pick the strategy above. What condition on x is needed to make this strategy profile a SPNE? Hint: remember to check for possible deviations separately for rounds 1 and 2.(a) 5 ≥ x(b) 7 ≥ x(c) 9 ≥ x(d) 11 ≥ x(e) 13 ≥ x1. Draw tree of the game clearly, handwritten is preferable.
- There are N women that all share the same toilet every day in an office building. Each sits on the toilet to use it and must decide whether to put down toilet paper on top of the toilet or sit directly on it. The toilet is cleaned just once a day at a random time and no one knows when this is done. It takes time and effort to put down toilet paper so if she knew the toilet was clean (either because she is the first to use it after it was cleaned or if all previous users after it was last cleaned put down toilet paper) she would rather not put down toilet paper. However, if she believes the toilet is dirty she would rather put down toilet paper. a) Is this game best described as simultaneous or sequential move? b) How many equilibria are there in this game? c) Briefly provide a general description of the equilibria. Which equilibrium/equilibria provide the highest social payoff?Cameron and Luke are playing a game called ”Race to 10”. Cameron goes first, and the players take turns choosing either 1 or 2. In each turn, they add the new number to a running total. The player who brings the total to exactly 10 wins the game. a) If both Cameron and Luke play optimally, who will win the game? Does the game have a first-mover advantage or a second-mover advantage? b) Suppose the game is modified to ”Race to 11” (i.e, the player who reaches 11 first wins). Who will win the game if both players play their optimal strategies? What if the game is ”Race to 12”? Does the result change? c) Consider the general version of the game called ”Race to n,” where n is a positive integer greater than 0. What are the conditions on n such that the game has a first mover advantage? What are the conditions on n such that the game has a second mover advantage?Two bidders compete in a second price auction (i.e., the winning bidder pays the losing bidder’s bid, and the losing bidder does not pay anything). They submit sealed bids, and the one with the highest bid wins the contract and pays the other bidder’s bid. Each bidder i’s private valuation is vi and is distributed independently and uniformly between 0 and 50. 1. For any given bidder, prove that he has a dominant strategy bid and show what it is. 2. Assuming each bidder bids his dominant strategy noted above, if a bidder with vi = 40 wins, what price does he expect to pay?