Consider the following Stackelberg duopoly Both firms produce differentiated goods. For form /, the dernand is q, = 10 -p+P Firm 1 chooses the price first. Firm 2 chooses the price after observing the choice of firm 1. For firm i, the total cost function is TC(g) = 29g, What is the price set by firm 1? O 59/7 O 6 O 40/3 04 ourRTIO u
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- When OPEC raised the price of oil dramatically in the mid-1970s, experts said it was unlikely that the cartel could stay together over the long term-that the incentives for individual members. to cheat would become too strong. More than fort),r years later, OPEC still exists. Why do you think OPEC has been able to beat the odds and continue to collude? Hint: You may wish to consider non-economic reasons.Consider the Cournot duopoly with linear demand function ? = 2000 − 2Q, where P is the price and Q = q1 + q2 is the total supply. Firm 1 and firm 2 has constant marginal cost of 600. Just answer the E, F and G, thank you bartleby! a. If firm compete in price, draw in detail the best response of each firm.b. Determine and explain the Bertrand equilibrium.c. What is the equilibrium quantity and how much profit for each firm?d. Explain the Bertrand Paradox in (c)!e. If firm 1 has capacity of production 450 and firm 2 has capacity of 200. Determine the Bertrand equilibrium.f. What is the equilibrium quantity, and how much profit for each firm?g. Is there any paradox in (f)?There are two firms in the market (duopoly). These two firms are competingsimultaneously. The first firm chooses its output level (x) by predicting the second firm’soutput (y). Let c denote the total cost function c(x) = x and c(y) = y. Also, let’s assumethat the inverse demand function is p(Y) = 7 - Y where Y = x + y. (1) Obtain the reactionfunction of the first firm. (2) Find the equilibrium (output and profit of each firm) whentwo firms simultaneously compete
- Consider a duopoly market with 2 firms. Aggregate demand in this market is given by Q = 500 – P, where P is the price on the market. Q is total market output, i.e., Q = QA + QB, where QA is the output by Firm A and QB is the output by Firm B. For both firms, marginal cost is given by MCi = 20, i=A,B. Assume the firms compete a la Cournot. What are the equilibrium quantities? What is the total quantity supplied on this market? What is the equilibrium price in this market?Two firms with differentiated products are competing in price. Firm A and B face thefollowing demand curves: Q_A = 70 − 2P_A + P_B and Q_B = 120 − 2P_B + P_Arespectively. Assume production is costless.a. Give equations for and graph each firm’s reaction curve.b. If both firms set their prices at the same time, what is the Nash equilibriumprice, quantity, and profit for each firm?c. Suppose A sets its price first and then B responds. What price and quantitydoes each firm set now? Is it advantageous to move first?d. Compare the profits from part b and c. Which firm benefits more from thesequential price choosing? (Please do b-d, thanks :))Suppose oil production in the Gulf of Mexico was a symmetric horizontal oligopoly in Cournot competition. Assume there are two producers, each with a constant marginal cost of production of $50 per barrel. Let the demand function for oil in the region be D(p) = 12000 – 20p, where demand is measured in barrels per day. (You will need to calculate inverse demand from demand before moving on). What would the perfectly competitive equilibrium price and quantity be? What would be the consumer surplus and producer surplus? Draw each firm’s residual inverse demand curve. Calculate the Cournot-Nash equilibrium price and quantity. What is the total consumer surplus, total producer surplus across the two firms, and deadweight loss?
- Consider a quantity-setting duopoly. The two firms are Alpha, Ltd. and Beta, Inc. The demand schedulein this market is: p Qd180 150155 175130 200Each firm has a constant marginal cost of 30 per unit. Suppose each firm can choose to produce either 75units or 100 units. Firms make their quantity choices simultaneously and the market price is whatever itneeds to be to sell the total output in the market.(a) Draw up the normal form game matrix, showing the players, strategies, and payoffs. Show your workdetermining the profits in each box in the matrix.(b) Determine the Nash equilibrium of this game.(c) Suppose the firms were able to come to an agreement to make more profit. What would this agreementbe?(d) Explain how the government might respond to such an agreement and why.Consider a quantity-setting duopoly. The two firms are Alpha, Ltd. and Beta, Inc. The demand schedulein this market is:p Qd180 150155 175130 200Each firm has a constant marginal cost of 30 per unit. Suppose each firm can choose to produce either 75units or 100 units. Firms make their quantity choices simultaneously and the market price is whatever itneeds to be to sell the total output in the market.(a) Draw up the normal form game matrix, showing the players, strategies, and payoffs. Show your workdetermining the profits in each box in the matrix.(b) Determine the Nash equilibrium of this game.(c) Suppose the firms were able to come to an agreement to make more profit. What would this agreementbe?(d) Explain how the government might respond to such an agreement and whyPart d please Suppose four Cournot competitors face an inverse market demand curve of P = 1620 – 8Q, each with identical costs Ci = 4000 + 60qi. Use the formulae given in exercise 8.15 (pgs. 214-15) for firm profits, market price, and consumer surplus at a Cournot equilibrium to answer the following questions. a. Demonstrate that a merger between F3 and F4 will not be profitable if their costs remain unchanged. (Careful: the “n” in the profit formula changes from 4 to 3.) b. Could the merger be profitable i. if fixed costs fell? If so, how much reduction is necessary? ii. If the variable costs of the merged firm fell by 75%, so that C3|4 = 8000 + 15q? (Fixed cost remains 8000 because we are assuming only variable costs fall.) c. Calculate the consumer surplus created in this market when there are four identical firms. How does it change after a merger occurs between F3 and F4 if: i. no costs savings occur ii. the merged firm reduces its fixed costs by $6000 iii. the merged firm…
- Suppose two Bertrand competitors, F1 and F2, make identical products for a market with inverse demand P = 600 – 0.5Q. Both firms have the same costs Ci = 20qi, and each firm has sufficient capacity to supply the entire market. a. What prices will the firms choose? How much might each produce and what profit would they make? Is the result a Nash equilibrium? Explain. b. Suppose F1 improves its efficiency, reducing its cost to C1 = 16q1. What will happen in this market? Explain. c. Assume now that the firms have their original identical costs, but that F1 has only 100 units of capacity and F2 has only 200 units of capacity. What prices will the firms choose now? Explain why neither firm will want to decrease its price at the equilibrium you identify. Why would neither firm want to increase its price? Prove this for F1.Part c please Suppose four Cournot competitors face an inverse market demand curve of P = 1620 – 8Q, each with identical costs Ci = 4000 + 60qi. Use the formulae given in exercise 8.15 (pgs. 214-15) for firm profits, market price, and consumer surplus at a Cournot equilibrium to answer the following questions. a. Demonstrate that a merger between F3 and F4 will not be profitable if their costs remain unchanged. (Careful: the “n” in the profit formula changes from 4 to 3.) b. Could the merger be profitable i. if fixed costs fell? If so, how much reduction is necessary? ii. If the variable costs of the merged firm fell by 75%, so that C3|4 = 8000 + 15q? (Fixed cost remains 8000 because we are assuming only variable costs fall.) c. Calculate the consumer surplus created in this market when there are four identical firms. How does it change after a merger occurs between F3 and F4 if: i. no costs savings occur ii. the merged firm reduces its fixed costs by $6000 iii. the merged firm…Assume that two companies (A and B) are duopolists who produce identical products. Demand for the products is given by the following linear demand function:P = 200 - QA - QBwhere QA and QB are the quantities sold by the respective firms and P is the sellingprice. Total cost functions for the two companies areTCA = 1500 + 55QA + Q2ATCB = 1200 + 20QB + 2Q2BAssume that the firms act independently as in the Cournot model (i.e., each firmassumes that the other firm’s output will not change).a. Determine the long-run equilibrium output and selling price for each firm.b. Determine Firm A, Firm B, and total industry profits at the equilibrium solutionfound in Part (a).