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- Consider the following extensive form game between player 1 and player 2. T B (2, 2) L R R (3, 1) (0, 0) (5, 0) (0, 1) (a). Find the normal form representation of this game. (show the bimatrix) (b). Find all pure strategy NE. (c). Which of these equilibria are subgame perfect?A game involves two players: player A and player B. Player A has three strategies a1, a2 and a3 while player B has three strategies b1, b2 and b3. Player B b1 b2 b3 a1 -40,30 70,20 -10,120 Player A a2 40,60 80,80 60,20 a3 -30,40 -50,110 150, -70 Assuming that this is a one-time game, answer the following questions: Is there any dominant strategy for each player? What is the secure strategy of each player. What is the Nash equilibrium of the game?Paramter y = 0 If ⟨a, d⟩ is played in the first period and ⟨b, e⟩ is played in the second period, whatis the resulting (repeated game) payoff for the row player?
- Two business partners jointly own a firm and share equally the revenues. They individually and simultaneously decide how much effort to put into the firm. Let s₁ and s2 denote the effort choices of partner 1 and partner 2, respectively. Assume si € [0, 4]. The cost of effort is given by s? for i E {1, 2}. The firm's revenue is given by 4(81 +82 + bs182) where 0 ≤ b ≤ 1. (Note that the parameter 6 reflects the synergies between the effort levels. b> 0 implies that the more one partner works, the more productive the other partner is.) The payoffs for partners 1 and 2 are: u₁ (81, 82) u2 (81, 82) - = 1 [4(81 +82 +68182)] − 8² - 1 [4(81 +82 + bs182)] – $²GAME 5 Player B B1 B2 Player A A1 7,3 | 5, 10 A2 3, 8| 9, 6 In Game 5 above, O Neither player has a dominant strategy. O Player B has a dominant strategy. O Player A has a dominant strategy. O Both players have dominant strategies.Consider the following simultaneous game: Player 1 U D Player 2 L 20,-10 -10, 20 R -10, 20 20,-10 Please indicate whether each of the following statements is true or false. Player 1 has a dominant strategy. This game has a Nash equilibrium. This game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Player 1's best response is D if player 2 plays R.
- (b) ROWENA up Answer 1: up Answer 2: In this simultaneous move game, the iterated dominance equilibrium is (Rowena's . Colin's left left Answer 3: ). This game has two Nash equilibria one of which is the iterated dominance equilibrium. The other Nash equilibrium, which is not the IDE, is (Rowena's down Colin's right down Up Down Answer 4: Left right 0,0 0,0 COLIN Right 0,0 1,1Player 1 Cooperate (C) Defect (D) If the game has a dominant strategy, what is it? There is none. If the game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, what is it? There is none. Cooperate (C) 3,3 8,0 Cooperate (C) is a dominant strategy for both players. Defect (D) is a dominant strategy for both players. Cooperate (C) is a dominant strategy for 1, and Defect (D) is a dominant strategy for 2. C, C is the only Nash equilibrium. D, D is the only Nash equilibrium. C, C and D, D are both Nash equilibria. Player 2 Defect (D) 0,8 1,1Two workers are on a production line. They each have two actions: exert effort, E, or shirk, S. Effort costs a worker e > 0 and shirking costs them nothing. If two workers do action E a lot of output is produced and the workers earn £3 each. If only one worker chooses action E less output is produced and they both earn £1. The workers earn nothing if they both shirk. (i) Describe this situation as a strategic form game (assuming the workers do not observe each other's effort choice when making their own decision). (ii) For what values of e does this game have strictly dominant strategies? (iii) Describe the Nash equilibria of this game for e = 0,1, 2, 3. (iv) The workers now are re-arranged into a production line. First worker 1 moves and then worker 2 moves. Worker 2 can now see worker l's effort level before they choose their effort. Draw this extensive form game. (v) Find the subgame perfect equilibria of the production-line game for c = 1/2 and c = 3/2.
- In equilibrium, what is the probability that player 1 will use the pure strategy E in this game?(a) Consider the following bimatrix of a normal form game. Show that the set of strategies that survive elimination of weakly dominated strategies depends on the order in which the weakly dominated strategies are eliminated. Player 2 L R 1,1 0,0 M| 1,1 0,0 | 2,1 Player 1 2,1 (b) Find an example of a game where the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies would not survive the eliminination of weakly dominated strategies. (c) Find an example of a game where both players' strategies are weakly dominated in the Nash equilibrium.Subgames • • • At each node where a player makes a decision, we can think about the "subgame" starting at that node A subgame is the portion of the tree following a particular node How many subgames does our first sequential move example have? • How many subgames does our entry game have? • How many subgames does the game on the right have? • What are its Nash equilibria? Player 1 (1,4) T Player 2 U B (5,2) (3,3) р Player 1 D L 9 (2, 0) Player 2 R (6, 2)