Exercise 3. Consider the following game in normal form. L U 4, 4 1, 6 D 6, 1-3, -3 (a) Find all the Nash equilibria of this game. (b) Show that the following probability measure is a correlated equilibrium of this game. L R U c) Show that the following probability measure a correlated equilibrium of this game. L R U0 (d) Plot the payoff profile of cach equilibrium in (a)-(c) above. Are the payoff profiles in (b) and (c) inside or outside the convex hull of NE pavoffs?

Exercise 3. Consider the following game in normal form. L U 4, 4 1, 6 D 6, 1-3, -3 (a) Find all the Nash equilibria of this game. (b) Show that the following probability measure is a correlated equilibrium of this game. L R U c) Show that the following probability measure a correlated equilibrium of this game. L R U0 (d) Plot the payoff profile of cach equilibrium in (a)-(c) above. Are the payoff profiles in (b) and (c) inside or outside the convex hull of NE pavoffs?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.7P

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Nn3 Suppose an incumbent monopoly firm currently earns a profit of $50,000 per period. A potential entrant could enter and make a profit of $15,000 per period while also lowering the incumbent’s profit to $20,000 per period. The monopoly firm could seek to engage in predatory pricing, which would lead to both firms earning a loss of $5,000 per period. (a) Is there a Nash Equilibrium in this game? If so, what is it? (b) Discuss how this game might play out in the real world?
** Please be advsed that this is practice only from previous yeasr *** Answers: (a) There are no Nash equilibria.(b) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and no mixed strategy Nash equilibria.(c) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and one mixed strategy Nash equilibria with p = 1/2 and q = 1/2.(d) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and one mixed strategy Nash equilibria with p = 1/2 and q = 3/4.(e) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and one mixed strategy Nash equilibria with p = 3/4 and q = 1/2.
. On a given evening, J. P. enjoys the consumption of cigars (c) and brandy (b) according to thefunctionU (c, b) = 20c - c2 +18b- 3b2.How many cigars and glasses of brandy does he consume during an evening? (Cost is no objectto J. P.)b. Lately, however, J. P. has been advised by his doctors that he should limit the sum of glasses ofbrandy and cigars consumed to 5. How many glasses of brandy and cigars will he consumeunder these circumstances?
2. Kier, in The scenario, wants to determine how each of the 3 companies will decide on possible new investments. He was able to determine the new investment pay off for each of the three choices as well as the probability of the two types of market. If a company will launch product 1, it will gain 50,000 if the market is successful and lose 50,000 if the market is a failure. If a company will launch product 2, it will gain 25,000 if the market is successful and lose 25,000 if the market will fail. If a company decides not to launch any of the product, it will not be affected whether the market will succeed or fail. There is a 56% probability that the market will succeed and 44% probability that the market will fail. What will be the companies decision based on EMV? What is the decision of each company based on expected utility value?
Mf. Mean variance utility defines risk using certainty equivalent wealth. The lower the certainty equivalent wealth, the lower the mean variance utility. uestion Select one: O True O False Under constant relative risk aversion, the lower the certainty equivalent wealth is than the average wealth of a lottery the riskier the lottery. Select one: O True O False Given a normally distributed risky asset and a risk free asset, a person with a lower CRRA risk aversion coefficient will put less in the risk free asset than a person with a higher CRRA risk aversion. Select one: O True O False Greater risk aversion means a plot of utility vs. wealth would look less curved. Select one: O True O False The greater the wealth, the less the utility of the next dollar of wealth. Select one: O True O False People don't like risk because it means they get poorer when they're poorer and richer when they're rich. In fact, a financial security…
f we observe a consumer choosing (x1, x2) when (y1, y2) is available one time, are we justified in concluding that (x1, x2) (y1, y2)?
(Symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium) A profile α∗ of mixed strategies in a strategic game with vNM preferences in which each player has the same set of actions is a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if it is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and α∗ i is the same for every player i. Solve this problem: At a large round table sit n ≥ 2 players, each holding 3 cards: one white, one black, and one red. Each player must secretly choose one of their cards and then, when the bell rings, simultaneously reveal it publicly with all the others. If all players choose the white card, each of them receives 6 points. If player i chooses the white card, and at least one of the other players chooses a card of a different color, player i receives 1 point. If player i chooses the black card, they receive 3 points, regardless of the decisions of the other players. If player i chooses the red card, they receive 0 points, regardless of the decisions of the other players. Find all symmetric…
1 Question 2. Suppose that there is one risk free asset with return rf and one risky asset with normally distributed returns, r ∼ N(µ, σ2). The investor has an expected utility maximizer with the CARA utility u(r) = −e −Ar. Write down the investor’s maximization problem of choosing α fraction of his wealth will be invested in the risky asset Find the optimal fraction of wealth that the investor will invest in the risky asset α∗Hint: Use the fact that if a random variable x is distributed normally with mean µx and variance σ2x , then for any constant α, What happens to the optimal fraction of wealth that the investor will invest in the risky asset as the risk aversion A increases? Explain the intuition behind your result.
Suppose that an individual is just willing to accept a gamble to win or lose $1000 if the probability ofwinning is 0.6. Suppose that the utility gained if the individual wins is 100 utils. How much utility does one lose if one loses the gamble?
Using the random variables X and Y from Table 2.2, consider two new random variables W = 4 + 8X and V = 11 - 2Y. Compute (a) E(W) and E(V); (b) J2W and J2V; and (c) JWV and corr(W, V).
Give typing answer with explanation and conclusion Suppose that the government must undertake an irreversible policy decision regarding the extent of air pollution regulation. The government is making this decision in a situation of uncertainty, however. In particular, there is some probability p that the benefits will remain the same as they are this year for all future years, but there is some probability 1 - p that benefits will be less in all future years. If we take into consideration the multiperiod aspects, should we err on the side of overregulation or underregulation, compared to what we would do in a single-period choice?
You have drawn a painting that you want to sell to an anonymous buyer, but you do not know exactly how much they are willing to pay. Based on past experiences, you estimate that the buyer will be willing to pay in monetary units where a random variable is evenly distributed continuously over the interval [200, 500]. Let's assume that your assessment regarding the random variable is correct, i.e., that it is indeed evenly distributed continuously over the interval [200, 500]. What price �p will you choose if you want to maximize your expected profit? What will be your expected profit?