e defined as in the lecture notes. a) Calculate the opportunity cost of skill acquisition as a function of the probability of finding a job in the skilled sector. b) bBriefly describe the nature of the trade-off faced by an unskilled worker. c) paid just enough to forego skill acquisition. Show ALL steps. "Calculate the number of employed workers in the skilled sector if unskilled workers are d) of finding a job in the skilled sector is 80 %. 'riefly explain why neither of the two labour markets is in equilibrium if the probability

e defined as in the lecture notes. a) Calculate the opportunity cost of skill acquisition as a function of the probability of finding a job in the skilled sector. b) bBriefly describe the nature of the trade-off faced by an unskilled worker. c) paid just enough to forego skill acquisition. Show ALL steps. "Calculate the number of employed workers in the skilled sector if unskilled workers are d) of finding a job in the skilled sector is 80 %. 'riefly explain why neither of the two labour markets is in equilibrium if the probability

Exploring Economics

8th Edition

ISBN:9781544336329

Author:Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:Robert L. Sexton

Chapter8: Market Failure

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 9P

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

D. If TB > TA then Type B will get more education, otherwise Type A will definitely getmore education. Discuss.E. Assume that the mean wage in Industry 1 is greater than the mean wage in Industry 2,but the variance of wages in Industry 1 is much larger than that in Industry 2. Assumealso that if you get an education you must work in Industry 1(i.e., the human capitalaccumulated is industry specific). What effect(s) might that have on the choices ofType A and Type B individuals regarding their education.F. If αA is much larger than αB, then there is nothing the government can do to induceType B individuals to go to school beyond high school.G. Discuss briefly how your answer to E change if the human capital was not entirelyindustry specific.
You have the following equation relating job risk R to wages W: W = .01*R + XB, where XB indicates control for the following confounders: education, job experience, and income. Assume W= annual wages=50,000 A. If the change in R = a 1 in 10,000 higher chance of death in a year, how much more would an individual need to be paid to be willing to assume this risk? B. What is the implied statistical value of a year of life based on this model? C. What do you think would happen to the estimated relationship between R and W if none of the three confounders were included in this model? Explain.
A firm's board of directors wants to maximize its profits. If the firm's manager puts in a high effort, the firm gets a high profit of 9 with probability 80%, but if the manager puts in a low effort, the firm gets a low profit of 4 with probability 80%. The utility functions of both the board of directors and the manager are identical and are simply u(b)-b. High effort for the manager costs 2. The manaаger has an outside wage of 1. Calculate the optimal wage schedule under high and low realized profits.
A risk-neutral manager is attempting to hire a worker. All workers in the market are of identical quality but differ with respect to the wage at which they are willing to work. Suppose half of the workers in the labor market are willing to work for a salary of $40,000 and half will accept a salary of $38,000. The manager spends three hours interviewing a given worker and values this time at $300. The first worker the manager interviews says he will work only if paid $40,000. Should the firm manager make him an offer or interview another worker?
Give typing answer with explanation and conclusion 1. If wH=100 and wL=36 and U(w)=w^1/2. Further, let the reservation utility be 7. (a) What is the minimum probability for which the wage earner accepts the contract? (b)Let p=3/4. What is the maximum cost of effort for which the tenant accepts the contract?
If your worker works hard there is a 3/5 possibility that revenues will be $150 and a 2/5 probability that revenues will be $50. If she works at a lower level of effort, there is a 50% chance of each revenue outcome. Working hard costs her $6. Working moderately costs $3. Her outside utility is zero. She is risk-neutral, with utility equal to W - C , where W is the wage and C is the Cost of Effort (3 or 6 depending on whether she works with low or high effort, resp.) If you could contract for effort, would it be profitable to induce high effort? Explain why. What would your profits be? If you cannot contract for effort, find an incentive-compatible pay scheme that will induce high effort. Set up the incentive and participation constraints and find the z (payment when revenue is 150) and y (payment when revenue is 50) where both are exactly satisfied. Would it be profitable to use this scheme? Why? Now suppose that y can never be negative. What incentive compatible scheme will give…
Over time, the gap between the wages of workers with a college degree and the wages of workers without a college degree has been increasing. Shouldn't this gap have increased the incentive for workers to earn a college degree, thereby increasing the supply of college-educated workers and reducing the size of the gap? This wage gap may have not been reduced because A. the demand for college-educated workers has increased more slowly than the supply of college-educated workers. B. a college education is only a signal of desirable worker characteristics and does not change wages. C. the demand for workers without a college degree has been increasing due to globalization. D. the supply for workers without a college degree has been decreasing due to immigration. E. both a and b. Note:- Do not provide handwritten solution. Maintain accuracy and quality in your answer. Take care of plagiarism. Answer completely. You will get up vote for sure.
A water company owns water pipes that burst often due to poor maintenance. The company can invest GHS m in the maintenance of the pipes. More maintenance means less water loss through bursts and fewer compensation payments to residents due to flooding of their properties. Assume that the value of lost water is 1/m so that more maintenance reduces the amount of loss. Assume that the value of damage to properties where the pipes are routed is 3/m , so that more maintenance decreases the amount of damage to properties. (i.) What is the socially optimal level of maintenance, m? What is the associated value of lost water and property damage? (Note: Minimize the total cost function) ( ii). What level of m is chosen when pipes that burst run through land owned by the government (the company pays nothing for damages even though there is still some damage associated with pipe bursts)? What is the new value for property damage? What is the deadweight loss?
Some economists maintain that the returns to additional years of education is actually quite small but that there is a substantial “sheepskin” effect whereby one receives a higher salary with the successful completion of degrees or the earning of diplomas (i.e., sheepskins).Explain how the sheepskin effect is analogous to a signaling model.
There are 50 workers in the economy in which all workers must choose to work a safe or a risky job. When it comes to accepting a risky job, Worker 1’s reservation price is $5; worker 2’s reservation price is $6, worker 3's reservation wage is $7, and so on. Assume there are exactly 12 risky jobs. (a) What is the equilibrium wage differential between safe and risky jobs? Which workers will be employed at the risky firm? (b) Suppose now that an advertising campaign, paid for by the employers who offer risky jobs, stresses the excitement associated with “the thrill of injury,” and this campaign changes the attitudes of the work force toward being employed in a risky job. Worker 1 now has a reservation price of $1, worker 2’s reservation price is $2, and so on. There are still only 12 risky jobs. What is the new equilibrium wage differential? c) What is the maximum the firm should be willing to pay for its ad campaign?
The top 1 percent of American households hold nearly 40percent of the total wealth. T or F?
Suppose Bethilda earned $30,000 at her last job where she faced a 3% chance of dying on the job. Now Bathilda earns $27,000 at a new job where she faces a 2% chance of dying on the job. What is Bethilda’s implied Value of a Statistical Life? What are the uses of this measure?