Each of two players draw a lottery ticket with a random prize written on it. You can assume that prizes a uniformly drawn from an interval between 0 and 100 (can you solve it without uniform assumption?). Both player simultaneously decide whether to keep the prize or exchange the ticket with another player. If both decide to exchange, then the tickets are swapped and each player collects a prize from the newly acquired ticket. Find the BNE of the game. Hint: consider cut-off strategies, i.e. that prizes above some z are kept, and below z are offered for exchange.
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- Why is information asymmetry not a problem if both parties to an agreementwant the same thing?Say there are two individuals; Hala and Anna who are deciding on either to buy health insurance on a pooling arrangement basis or otherwise. Both face a 30% probability of losing RM40 on medical services and 70% of losing nothing. With these information discuss whether Hala and Anna should join this arrangement or pay the medical services costs out of their own pocket money.You and your friend will divide $4. You have agreed to use the following procedure.Each of you will name a number of dollars, either $0, $1, $2, $3, or $4. You will chooseyour numbers simultaneously. If the sum of the amounts is less than or equal to $4, theneach of you receives the amount you named and the rest of the money is thrown away.If the sum of the amounts is greater than $4 and the amounts named are different, thenthe person who named the smaller amount receives that amount and the other personreceives the remaining money. If the sum of the amounts is greater than $4 and theamounts named are the same, then each receives $2. (a)Draw the payoff matrix of this game. Let “you” be the row player and “yourfriend” be the column player.(b) Derive the best reply functions of all players.(c) Find the Nash equilibrium (or all of the equilibria) of this game using thebest reply functions you found in part (a).
- Consider the following two-player game.First, player 1 selects a number x≥0. Player 2 observes x. Then, simultaneously andindependently, player 1 selects a number y1 and player 2 selects a number y2, at which pointthe game ends.Player 1’s payoff is: u1(x; y1) = −3y21 + 6y1y2 −13x2 + 8xPlayer 2’s payoff is: u2(y2) = 6y1y2 −6y22 + 12xy2Draw the game tree of this game and identify its Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.5) Three legislators are set to vote on a bill to raise the salary of legislators. The majority wins, so all three will receive the raise if at least two of them vote in favor of the bill. The raise is valued at R by each legislator. Voting in favor of the bill comes with political backlash from constituents, though, even if the bill fails. Let C be the cost of backlash for anyone voting in favor of the bill. Finally, suppose that 0 < C < R. There are four possible payoffs for each legislator: 0: if they vote against the bill and at least one other legislator votes against it (so the bill fails) R: if they vote against the bill and the others vote for the bill (so the bill passes) -C: if they vote for the bill and no one else votes for the bill (so the bill fails) R-C: if they vote for the bill and at least one other legislator votes for it (so the bill passes). The three legislators are named X, Y, and Z, and voting happens sequentially and orally. So X announces their vote (to…Consider the following compound lottery, described in words: "The probability that the price of copper increases tomorrow is objectively determined to be 0.5. If it increases, then tomorrow I will flip a coin to determine a monetary payout that you will receive: if the flip is Heads, you win $100, while if it is Tails, you win $50. If it does not increase, then I will roll a 10-sided die (assume each side is equally likely to be rolled). If the die roll is a 4 or lower, you will win $100. If it is a 5, then you will win $200, and if it is a 6 or greater, you will win $50." Fill in the blanks below for the reduced lottery that corresponds to this compound lottery (write in decimals). R= ( , $50; , $100; , $200)
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- 64. (This problem assumes knowledge of the basic rulesof baseball.) George Lindsey (1959) looked at boxscores of more than 1000 baseball games and foundthe expected number of runs scored in an inning foreach on-base and out situation to be as listed in the fileP09_64.xlsx. For example, if a team has a man on firstbase with one out, it scores 0.5 run on average untilthe end of the inning. You can assume throughout thisproblem that the team batting wants to maximize theexpected number of runs scored in the inning.a. Use this data to explain why, in most cases,bunting with a man on first base and no outs isa bad decision. In what situation might buntingwith a man on first base and no outs be a gooddecision?b. Assume there is a man on first base with one out.What probability of stealing second makes an attempted steal a good idea?A strategy for player 1 is a value for x1 from the set X. Similarly, a strategyfor player 2 is a value for x2 from the set X. Player 1’s payoff is V1(x1, x2) =5 + x1 - 2x2 and player 2’s payoff is V2(x1, x2) = 5 + x2 - 2x1.a. Assume that X is the interval of real numbers from 1 to 4 (including 1and 4). (Note that this is much more than integers and includes such numbers as 2.648 and 1.00037). Derive all Nash equilibria.b. Now assume that the game is played infinitely often and a player’s payoff is the present value of his stream of single-period payoffs, where dis the discount factor.(i) Assume that X is composed of only two values: 2 and 3; thus, aplayer can choose 2 or 3, but no other value. Consider the followingsymmetric strategy profile: In period 1, a player chooses the value 2. In period t(≥2), a player chooses the value 2. In period a player chooses the value 2 if both players chose 2 in all previous periods; otherwise, she chooses the value 3. Derive conditions which ensure…1. Write down the behavioral trap that is more likely to occur in each of the following case and Justify your answer a) While investing her money on share market, Mila filters out the information that contradicts her original idea about some particular share. b) Lee attributes successful outcomes to her own actions and bad outcomes to external factors. c) Paul continues to invest in Aqua Company’s share despite its persistent negative return. d) Sifa buys only those shares that has a consistent upward trend of returns. e) Fariha suggests her friend Samia to invest on ABC Company’s share as she foresees higher return from it. f) Sunny sells a profitable Beximco share today that earned him positive return.