Please help with #1 Q1. A and B are the only two sandwich shops serving in a small town. Each shop can choose to set a highprice or a low price for sandwiches. The payoff matrix below shows the daily profit for each combinationof prices that the two shops could choose. The first entry shows A's profits, and the second entry showsB's profits. Assuming that both shops know the information shown in the matrix.AHigh PriceLow PriceAnnaa. Does each shop have a dominant strategy to set a high price, a dominant strategy to set a low price, ordoes it have no dominant strategy?b. If the two shops do not cooperate on setting prices, what will be the profit for each shop?Q2. Anna and Ben are deciding what do at weekend. The matrix below shows the payoff in units of utilityfrom each possible outcome. The first entry is Anna's utility, and the second entry is Ben's utility.SportsMovieBHigh Price($105, $110)($120, $80)HeadTailFind the Nash equilibrium (Show Calculation).BenSports(10, 20)(3,7)Low Price($40, $130)($75, $75)a. How many pure Nash equilibria are there in this game? List all of them.b. How many pure Nash equilibria are there in this game? List all of them (show your calculation steps).Q3. Suppose two players (A and B) are playing the "matching penny" game. The payoff matrix isdepicted below. Player A's payoff is the first entry and Player B's payoff is the second entry.BHead(1,-1)(-1, 1)Movie(3, 10)(4,9)Tail(-1, 1)(1,-1)

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Q1. A and B are the only two sandwich shops serving in a small town. Each shop can choose to set a high price or a low price for sandwiches. The payoff matrix below shows the daily profit for each combination of prices that the two shops could choose. The first entry shows A's profits, and the second entry shows B's profits. Assuming that both shops know the information shown in the matrix. A High Price Low Price B High Price ($105, $110) ($120, $80) Low Price ($40, $130) ($75, $75) a. Does each shop have a dominant strategy to set a high price, a dominant strategy to set a low price, or does it have no dominant strategy? b. If the two shops do not cooperate on setting prices, what will be the profit for each shop?

Q1. A and B are the only two sandwich shops serving in a small town. Each shop can choose to set a high price or a low price for sandwiches. The payoff matrix below shows the daily profit for each combination of prices that the two shops could choose. The first entry shows A's profits, and the second entry shows B's profits. Assuming that both shops know the information shown in the matrix. A High Price Low Price B High Price ($105, $110) ($120, $80) Low Price ($40, $130) ($75, $75) a. Does each shop have a dominant strategy to set a high price, a dominant strategy to set a low price, or does it have no dominant strategy? b. If the two shops do not cooperate on setting prices, what will be the profit for each shop?

Principles of Microeconomics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781305971493

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter17: Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 9PA

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