Westphal's critique of ISIS's ideological reasoning uncovers the three rhetorical elements that are used to justify political violence. Which of Westphal's major claims illustrates how language creates or invents hierarchy? 1) "The concept of takfir allows ISIS to divide the world into camps of believers and disbelievers, portraying the disbelievers as inferior." 2) "In a first step towards solidarity, ISIS victimizes their potential followers by appealing to shared grievances." "ISIS's rhetoric produces a foundation and guideline for the application of 3) violent jihad."

Westphal's critique of ISIS's ideological reasoning uncovers the three rhetorical elements that are used to justify political violence. Which of Westphal's major claims illustrates how language creates or invents hierarchy? 1) "The concept of takfir allows ISIS to divide the world into camps of believers and disbelievers, portraying the disbelievers as inferior." 2) "In a first step towards solidarity, ISIS victimizes their potential followers by appealing to shared grievances." "ISIS's rhetoric produces a foundation and guideline for the application of 3) violent jihad."

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter19: Externalities And Public Goods

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 19.10P

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

In what way do both the provision of public goods and prisoners' dilemma demonstrate "collective action problems"?
Define horizontal communication with example ?
Andy, Brad, and Carly are playing a new online video game: Zombie Civil War. Each has an army of 100 zombies and must decide how to allocate them to battle each of the other two players’ armies. Three simultaneous battles are occurring: one between Andy and Brad, one between Andy and Carly, and one between Brad and Carly. Let Ab denote how many zombie soldiers Andy allocates to his battle with Brad, with the remaining 100 - Ab soldiers in Andy’s zombie army assigned to the battle with Carly. Bc denotes the number of zombie soldiers that Brad allocates to his battle with Carly, and 100 - Bc zombies go to his battle with Andy. Ca is the the number of zombie soldiers that Carly allocates to the battle with Andy, and 100 - Ca in her battle with Brad. To see how payoffs are determined, consider Andy. If Ab > 100 - Bc, so that Andy has more zombies than Brad in the Andy-Brad battle, then Andy wins the battle and receives w points where w > 2. If Ab = 100 - Bc, so that Andy and Brad…
Discuss how conflict can Manifest itself.
In 1938, major powers met in Munich to discuss Germany’s demands to annex part of Czechoslovakia. Let us think of the issue as the proportion of Czechoslovak territory given to Germany. Possible outcomes can be plotted on a single dimension, where 0 implies that Germany obtains no territory and 1 implies that Germany obtains all of Czechoslovakia: Most countries at Munich (“Allies” for short) wish to give nothing to Germany: their ideal point is 0, which gives them utility of 1. Their worst possible outcome is for Germany to take all of Czechoslovakia; hence an outcome of 1 gives them utility of 0. In between these extremes, the Allies could propose a compromise, X, which gives them utility of 1 – X. The question for the Allies is whether to propose a compromise or fight a war with Germany, which they are sure will ensue if they offer nothing. If they propose a compromise and Germany accepts, they get a payoff of 1 – X. If they fight, they win with probability p and lose with…
In 1938, major powers met in Munich to discuss Germany’s demands to annex part of Czechoslovakia. Let us think of the issue as the proportion of Czechoslovak territory given to Germany. Possible outcomes can be plotted on a single dimension, where 0 implies that Germany obtains no territory and 1 implies that Germany obtains all of Czechoslovakia: Most countries at Munich (“Allies” for short) wish to give nothing to Germany: their ideal point is 0, which gives them utility of 1. Their worst possible outcome is for Germany to take all of Czechoslovakia; hence an outcome of 1 gives them utility of 0. In between these extremes, the Allies could propose a compromise, X, which gives them utility of 1 – X. The question for the Allies is whether to propose a compromise or fight a war with Germany, which they are sure will ensue if they offer nothing. If they propose a compromise and Germany accepts, they get a payoff of 1 – X. If they fight, they win with probability p and lose with…
In 1938, major powers met in Munich to discuss Germany’s demands to annex part of Czechoslovakia. Let us think of the issue as the proportion of Czechoslovak territory given to Germany. Possible outcomes can be plotted on a single dimension, where 0 implies that Germany obtains no territory and 1 implies that Germany obtains all of Czechoslovakia Most countries at Munich (“Allies” for short) wish to give nothing to Germany: their ideal point is 0, which gives them utility of 1. Their worst possible outcome is for Germany to take all of Czechoslovakia; hence an outcome of 1 gives them utility of 0. In between these extremes, the Allies could propose a compromise, X, which gives them utility of 1 – X. The question for the Allies is whether to propose a compromise or fight a war with Germany, which they are sure will ensue if they offer nothing. If they propose a compromise and Germany accepts, they get a payoff of 1 – X. If they fight, they win with probability p and lose with…
In 1938, major powers met in Munich to discuss Germany’s demands to annex part of Czechoslovakia. Let us think of the issue as the proportion of Czechoslovak territory given to Germany. Possible outcomes can be plotted on a single dimension, where 0 implies that Germany obtains no territory and 1 implies that Germany obtains all of Czechoslovakia: Most countries at Munich (“Allies” for short) wish to give nothing to Germany: their ideal point is 0, which gives them utility of 1. Their worst possible outcome is for Germany to take all of Czechoslovakia; hence an outcome of 1 gives them utility of 0. In between these extremes, the Allies could propose a compromise, X, which gives them utility of 1 – X. The question for the Allies is whether to propose a compromise or fight a war with Germany, which they are sure will ensue if they offer nothing. If they propose a compromise and Germany accepts, they get a payoff of 1 – X. If they fight, they win with probability p and lose with…
Why might the multiple-play ultimatum game have a different result than the single-play ultimatum game? In the multiple-play ultimatum game, the first player generally offers less money to the second player than in the single-play ultimatum game. The multiple-play ultimatum game leads to a simpler equilibrium: the first player offers exactly half of the total sum to the second player. The multiple-play ultimatum game allows for players to send signals. Therefore, the receiver can punish a player who doesn’t share enough. The multiple-play ultimatum game generally results in less cooperation because both players fall into a back-and-forth pattern of trying to punish the other player.
What are examples of distributive and integrative negotiation?
Is communicative action a necessary part of strategic planning? Argue in a four-point.
Outlining examples, provide a short (economic) definition of each of these terms, which have been suggested as having a role to play in resolving social dilemmas.a) Altruismb) Reciprocityc) Punishmentsd) Social norms Answer all, please.